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The rule against collusion is the least controversial prohibition in competition law and is regarded 
with approval even by those generally sceptical of government interventions in markets. 
Nonetheless, some significant and challenging questions remain unanswered. For example, there 
is far less consensus than is apparent on the empirical evidence concerning (1) a cartel’s actual 
effects; (2) the detection of cartels; and (3) the effect of cartel remedies. This least controversial 
area of competition policy may very well be one for which there is in fact limited consensus.  
This dissertation explores these issues in the context of the South African grain industry. It is a 
collection of related essays on collusion following various competition policy interventions in the 
recent past. Essay one analyses the South African flour cartel, active from 1999 to 2007 and 
provides an overcharge estimation by applying comparator based methods. In Essay two, I 
examine the extent of market power in the flour industry. I ask whether observed prices and 
quantities in the flour industry reflect switching from collusive to non-collusive behaviour and 
test for this empirically.  
Essay three explores the strategic behaviour adopted by the cartel and in particular attempts by 
Pioneer Foods to create artificial barriers to entry. This essay focuses on the following questions. 
How did Pioneer Foods and the bread cartel respond to entry? How effective was Pioneer Foods’ 
conduct in maintaining collusion under the threat of entry? Essay four critically discusses the use 
of remedies in pursuing distributive justice through the restoration of competition, through 
deterrence, and through disgorgement of profits. More specifically, the design and objectives of 
the Pioneer Foods settlement agreement are examined. For some, the competition law remedies 
and in particular the discount remedy that was adopted, following confirmation by the 
Competition Tribunal, constitute a key measure of ‘success’ for the case. Essay five evaluates this 
claim by examining the design and effectiveness of the discount remedy from a comparative 
perspective. 
In each essay (albeit to varying degrees), the study will evaluate both the theoretical and 
empirical issues involved. To improve our understanding of competition policy and its 
administration, economic understanding will be joined with appreciation for case specific issues 
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Competition policy plays a prominent role in ensuring that competition in the marketplace is not 
restricted in a way that is detrimental to society. The focus of competition policy is on 
maintaining rules of competition that enable rivalry among firms to produce certain market 
outcomes. One such rule prohibits firms from entering into agreements not to compete with one 
another.  
The rule against collusion is the least controversial prohibition in competition law and is regarded 
with approval even by those generally sceptical of government interventions in markets. 
Nonetheless, some significant and challenging questions remain unanswered. For example, there 
is far less consensus than is apparent on the empirical evidence concerning a cartel’s actual 
effects. This apparently least controversial area of competition policy may very well be one for 
which there is in fact limited consensus.  
What follows below is an introductory overview of the main issues and not a comprehensive 
review of a vast literature on collusion generally. In the remainder of this overview chapter, I first 
set out the legal framework in regard to collusion before turning to a review of the economics of 
collusion. That review is intended to introduce the key issues and does not examine all facets of 
what is a vast economic literature on oligopoly and collusion. There then follows an introduction 
to the South African grain industry and a brief overview of the essays that comprise the core of 
this thesis. 
1. The law on collusion in South Africa 
 
The prohibition on restrictive horizontal practices is found in section 4 of the Competition Act, 89 
of 1998 as amended (henceforth “Competition Act”). Section 4 reads as follows: 
“4 (1) An agreement between, or a concerted practice by, firms, or a decision by an 
association of firms, is prohibited if it is between parties in a horizontal relationship1 and 
if– 
(a) it has the effect of substantially preventing, or lessening, competition in a market, 
unless a party to the agreement, concerted practice, or decision can prove that any 
                                                          




technological, efficiency or other pro-competitive gain resulting from it outweighs that 
effect; or 
(b) it involves any of the following restrictive horizontal practices:  
(i) directly or indirectly fixing a purchase or selling price or any other trading 
condition; 
(ii) dividing markets by allocating customers, suppliers, territories, or specific 
types of goods or services; or 
(iii) collusive tendering.” 
The legal prohibitions on collusion are triggered by certain types of conduct rather than by 
outcomes themselves. For example, the legal question is whether the conduct of firms in relation 
to price and other trading conditions is a result of an agreement. If not, there is no violation. If so, 
there is a violation. What then is an agreement or concerted practice? The Competition Act 
defines an agreement “in relation to a prohibited practice, to include a contract, arrangement or 
understanding, whether or not it is legally enforceable”. 2  A concerted practice arises from 
“cooperative or coordinated conduct between firms, achieved through direct or indirect contact 
that replaces their independent action but which does not amount to an agreement”.3 Therefore, a 
concerted practice may inter alia arise out of coordination which becomes evident from the 
conduct of firms in the market. The idea that a concerted practice may be inferred from behaviour 
might seem to suggest, at first glance, that interdependent oligopoly behaviour is prohibited. 
However, oligopoly behaviour does not establish a concerted practice unless, given the nature of 
the market, the behaviour of the firms concerned cannot be explained other than by concerted 
behaviour. 
Like elsewhere around the world, a short summary of South African competition law on collusion 
always reads “collusion is per se illegal”. In other words, the mere occurrence of the conduct will 
attract liability. Although the conduct cannot be justified, it does have to be established that the 
conduct has occurred. The per se rule contrasts with the effects based approach adopted in other 
areas of competition law, in which the benefits and costs of a particular course of conduct are 
weighed explicitly. Put differently, the seemingly straightforward prohibition of cartel behaviour 
hides a complex reality. This complexity is both legal and economic in nature. For instance, on 
the economic side lies the fact that nearly every cartel member will be ready to offer a reason why 
their particular cartel arrangement is good for society. For instance, one such argument is that in 
                                                          
2 See Section 1 (ii) of the Competition Act. 
3 See Section 1 (vi) of the Competition Act. 
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the absence of an agreement, firms would engage in ruinous competition which would ultimately 
lead to higher prices and a monopoly outcome. 
Firms found guilty of collusion are subject to an administrative penalty of up to 10 per cent of the 
firm’s annual turnover in South Africa in the preceding financial year.4 Administrative penalties 
are fines. Their purpose is not to punish firms found in violation of the Competition Act but to 
deter them from engaging in certain conduct. If a firm has contravened the Competition Act, then 
the following factors must be considered when determining the level of the fine: (1) the nature, 
duration, gravity and extent of the contravention; (2) any loss or damage suffered as a result of 
the contravention; (3) the behaviour of the cartelist; (4) the market circumstances in which the 
contravention took place; (5) the level of profit derived from the contravention; (6) the degree to 
which the cartelist has co-operated with the Competition Commission (“Commission”) and the 
Tribunal; and (7) whether the cartel member has previously been found in contravention of this 
Act. Therefore there is a link between the damage caused by the cartel and profits which accrue 
from the cartel activity.  
The Competition Amendment Act which was adopted and assented to, in 2009, introduces 
criminal sanctions for individuals involved in cartel conduct. 5 The Competition Amendment Act 
provides for directors or persons in a position of management authority who cause their firms to 
participate in cartel conduct to be liable to a fine of up to R500 000 or imprisonment not 
exceeding 10 years, or both.6 The Competition Amendment Act provides that it will come into 
operation on a date to be fixed by the President of South Africa by proclamation in the 




                                                          
4 The US Sentencing Guidelines recommend a base fine of 10% of the affected volume of commerce to a firm found 
guilty of collusion. To this base fine, another 10 per cent is added for the harm inflicted upon consumers who are 
unable or for other reasons do not buy the product at the elevated price. This results in a fine of 20 per cent that may 
also undergo some adjustments for aggravating and mitigating factors. In the EU, the total fine does not exceed the 10 
per cent of the overall turnover or global sales of the firm. 
5 Competition Amendment Act (No. 1 of 2009), Government Gazette No. 32533, Notice 875, of 28 August 2009. 
6 Competition Amendment Act (2009), Government Gazette No. 32533, Notice 875, of 28 August 2009, section 13. 
7 South Africa will be joining the growing number of countries that have opted to criminalise cartel conduct, including 
the US, Canada, Japan, Ireland and the UK. There is an increasing consensus among competition authorities that the 
threat of imprisonment for individuals is the best deterrent for cartel conduct, over and above administrative penalties. 
4 
 
2. The economics of collusion 
 
A. OLIGOPOLY THEORY8 
The basic theoretical framework used to study collusion is that of dynamic or repeated oligopoly.9 
This framework focuses on whether firms have incentives to cheat by undercutting oligopoly 
prices. This is because individual firm profits may be maximised by cheating. The framework 
also shows how price wars may occur even when no firm has cheated as a result of uncertainty. 
The seminal article on oligopoly theory is by Friedman (1971). For a survey on modern game 
theory in general see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991). Tirole (1988) and Vives (1999) offer valuable 
insights on the application of game theory to oligopoly, while Whinston (2006) and Kaplow and 
Shapiro (2007) provide an extensive discussion on the connection between oligopoly theory and 
competition policy.  
It is important to note from the outset that oligopoly theory does not directly distinguish between 
successful oligopolistic behaviour which results in supra-competitive pricing because of 
recognized interdependence10 and cartel behaviour wherein firms meet secretly to fix prices and 
allocate markets or various cases in between. Unlike competition law, oligopoly theory does not 
require an agreement but has a concept (whether the strategies of firms constitute an equilibrium) 
which is closely related to the idea of an agreement.11 In game theory the equilibrium concept 
refers to a situation in which, taking as given the other firms’ strategies, no firm can gain by 
deviating from its own strategy. While the concept of equilibrium is not equivalent to the 
agreement requirement, it is the only concept in oligopoly theory that relates to the notion of an 
agreement.12  
This observation is important because competition law in South Africa strongly embraces 
economics or compatibility with economic learning, both for understanding firm behaviour in 
particular cases and for administering legal rules. Oligopoly theory not only offers a sound 
analytical foundation but also a framework for explaining and predicting oligopoly behaviour in 
                                                          
8 The following discussion is limited to price fixing. However, the analytical framework is generally applicable to 
allocating markets. 
9 This corresponds to situations in which oligopolistic firms in a particular product market interact together over time. 
10 Firms do not undercut each other’s prices because of an expectation of retaliation. This retaliation is derived from a 
common appreciation of each firm’s circumstances. 
11 Kaplow (2011) explores the relationship between the concept of equilibrium with the requirement of an agreement in 
greater detail. 
12 Equating equilibrium with agreement comes with its own problems. For instance, in any equilibrium of a non-
cooperative game, including one relating to a cartel, each firm behaves in its own interest, taking as given its 
expectation of reactions of other firms. Furthermore, one equilibrium in a repeated game involves firms charging at 
marginal cost indefinitely. Although this equilibrium could be viewed as a nonbinding agreement, we would not want 
to suggest that this is illegal under competition law. Put differently, a firm can decide that it will price at marginal cost 
no matter what other firms do. The outcome will involve an equilibrium in which each firm behaves independently and 
therefore does not require a meeting of minds. 
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real markets. Repeated games capture the strategic interactions that make successful coordinated 
oligopoly pricing possible. For example, in a one-period pricing game between two symmetric 
firms that sell homogenous products and each produce at the same constant marginal cost, the 
competitive price would accordingly be equal to marginal cost. Suppose further that the firms 
jointly profit-maximize when price is equal to the monopoly price. Assume that if one firm 
charges the lowest price that firm will capture all the sales, whereas if the two firms charge the 
same price, they will divide the sales equally between them. If each firm prices at the competitive 
price, this would result in the only equilibrium of this one-shot game. Be that as it may, evidence 
from some markets shows that sometimes firms are able to charge supra-competitive prices. In 
fact, successful collusion has been observed in a variety of other settings in which the one-period 
pricing game logic discussed above would suggest that it is impossible. 
Suppose now the game is repeated infinity. At the industry-profit-maximizing price, assumed to 
be the monopoly price, no firm will wish to cut its price to gain market share if it expects this act 
to induce its rivals to cut price as well, perhaps matching the first firm’s lower price (following a 
tit-for-tat strategy) and perhaps undercutting it. The price cutting firm will be worse off whether 
the price is slightly lower than the monopoly price or all near the competitive price. Therefore, as 
long as the price cutting firm does not expect to profit sufficiently in the short run to make up for 
the loss in the long run, it will adhere to the monopoly price. It is important to note that this logic 
is equally applicable regardless of whether each firm’s expectation about the responses from other 
firms arises from their mutual appreciation of their common situation or as a consequence of 
direct agreement of the matter. 
Similarly, a firm may be willing to increase its price, say from a competitive price or from some 
intermediate level, to the monopoly price if it anticipates (again, whether by conjecture or as a 
result of explicit dialogue) that its rivals will do the same. In other words, it expects its rivals to 
reciprocate. If its rivals respond by matching the price increase, the firms will all be better off 
thereafter and the price increase can be sustained. This outcome will hold as long as the first firm 
does not lose much profit as a first mover while others delay their reactions (see Kaplow (2011)). 
The firm that increases its price first will expect its rivals to follow quickly because the other 
firms understand (again, either because of mutual awareness of the common situation or through 
prior dialogue) that delaying will be taken as cheating, leading the firm that increased its prices to 
revert back to the pre-existing price level. 
The modern game theory literature makes the above intuition more rigorous and extends it along 
a number of dimensions (see Kaplow (2011)). For example, consider the problem that cartel 
members face in detecting cheating by other cartel members in markets where each firm’s prices 
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are not readily observed. This challenge was first explored by Stigler (1964). In this setting, 
should firms observe a fall in sales, this would be taken to infer that cheating occurred. Green and 
Porter (1984) build on Stigler’s approach. In the Green and Porter (1984) model, firms cannot 
distinguish whether a low realised price is due to exogenous demand fluctuations or due to rivals’ 
cheating by other cartel members. Because of this uncertainty, firms need to choose a strategy 
that allows rapid, harsh punishment for cartel members engaging in actual cheating, in order to 
deter it effectively but avoids price wars when no cartel member cheated (in the case of a period 
of unusually low demand). This extension and many others illustrate how repeated games can be 
used to accurately show oligopolistic markets actually work. 
When I discuss the outcomes above, I also stress that monopolistic outcomes can arise through 
mutual awareness of the common situation, and do not conceptually rely on dialogue. But the 
outcome itself (that is, mutually high prices) is not of itself illegal. It is the dialogue, meaning any 
action or communication the only purpose of which is to reinforce the mutual awareness, which 
conveys illegality. The problem is that mutual awareness can be enough to give high prices, at 
least in some cases, and preventing the dialogue may not be sufficient to do so, although it may 
be all that can be achieved. 
 
B. WELFARE EFFECTS  
 
The main objection to collusion is that it leads to a transfer of wealth and to inefficiencies. To 
illustrate the welfare effects, consider a cartel selling goods directly to final consumers.13 If firms 
successfully maximize joint profits, assume the cartel price is approximated by the monopoly 
price. Prices under the cartel are higher and firms are able to appropriate some of the consumer 
surplus that would go to consumers in competitive markets. Therefore, there is a decrease in the 
aggregate quantity produced which causes total welfare to decrease and generates a deadweight 
loss.  
The consequences of a cartel on what would otherwise be a competitive market are illustrated in 
Figure I-1.14  Consumers pay 𝑃𝑚  instead of 𝑃𝑐  and they purchase only 𝑄𝑚  compared with the 
higher 𝑄𝑐 under competition. The area indicated by A represents the rent transfer from consumers 
to producers. The rent transfer A, however, does not represent a welfare or efficiency loss as it is 
a pure redistribution of wealth and has no impact on efficiency. Area B represents the net welfare 
                                                          
13 For simplicity, it is assumed that all inputs of the cartel are produced in perfectly competitive markets and that there 
are no effects outside the value chain, for example for producers of complements or buyers of substitutes. 
14 See Davis and Garcés (2009). 
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loss, known as deadweight loss. This is consumer welfare that is eliminated due to the restriction 
in output and not captured by the cartel. The total welfare loss generated by the cartel is 
represented by area B. The total harm to the consumer is represented by areas A + B.  
 
Figure I-1: Welfare effect of a cartel 
 
South African competition law has a number of objectives including goals based on both 
economic welfare (promoting economic efficiency and consumer welfare) and non-economic 
welfare (fairness and the protection of a group of market participants, for example, small and 
medium-sized enterprises). 15  Supra-competitive pricing associated with cartels is generally 
regarded as undesirable in itself, which makes sense when one objective of competition law is the 
maximization of consumers’ welfare. The other objective of competition law in South Africa is 
overall economic efficiency or social welfare. Supra-competitive pricing associated with cartels is 
still objectionable because, despite firms’ gain in profits, the excess of price over marginal cost 
results in deadweight loss. This loss is associated with sales that would have occurred at the 
lower, competitive price. 
Welfare effects of collusion are not necessarily limited to allocative inefficiency and transfers 
from consumers to producers. When a cartel raises price and accordingly reduces output, it is not 
                                                          
15 Section 2 of the Competition Act states that, “the purpose of the Competition Act is to promote and maintain 
competition in the Republic in order – a) to promote the efficiency, adaptability and development of the economy; b) to 
provide consumers with competitive prices and product choices; c) to promote employment and advance the social and 
economic welfare of South Africans; d) to expand opportunities for South African participation in world markets and 
recognise the role of foreign competition in the Republic; e) to ensure that small and medium-sized enterprises have an 
equitable opportunity to participate in the economy; and f) to promote a greater spread of ownership, in particular to 
increase the  ownership stakes of historically disadvantage persons”. 
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always the case that production is allocated efficiently among the firms and this is a further 
source of reduced welfare. For instance, well-organized cartels have the advantage over less well 
organised arrangements in that some of this loss in production efficiency can be avoided. Firms 
might agree to let their more efficient members produce more than they otherwise would permit, 
in exchange for transfer payments (see Schmalensee (1987)). 
Collusion may also cause production inefficiency on account of excessive entry.16 This is the case 
in homogenous industries where pricing remains at the monopoly price regardless of how many 
firms enter; that is, cartel pricing is perfectly effective. In this case, the higher price induces more 
firms to enter and more will enter until the additional entrant cannot cover its costs (because its 
share of the monopoly output is too small, even when price exceeds marginal cost). All of the 
supplemental entry is a social waste. There is no consumer benefit while further production costs 
are incurred. 
3. Detecting collusion  
 
The main challenge in addressing collusion is detection (see Posner (2001)). Because firms have 
incentives to hide their behaviour particularly so if it may be illegal, it is difficult to identify 
instances of collusion. One approach is to infer successful collusion from the evolution of pricing, 
such as the observing significant price increases which are not followed by corresponding 
changes in cost or observing sharp price decreases which are associated with price wars. 17 
However, some firms may be aware of the inferences which may be drawn from their conduct in 
relation to increasing prices. This awareness may instead lead these firms to adjust prices 
strategically in order to avoid detection and hide their collusive behaviour.  
Facilitating practices make it easier to engage in collusion. Facilitating practices address the 
challenges of reaching an agreement and enforcing the agreement (in particular, deterring 
cheating through the prospect that defection will be detected and punished quickly). Because 
successful collusion is difficult to reach, facilitating practices are important and have long been a 
                                                          
16 Generally, the literature on the effects of new entry identifies two competing effects (see Mankiw and Whinston 
(1986)). On one hand, there is a business-stealing effect which leads to excessive entry because prices are higher than 
marginal cost. In this situation, those firms who enter are able to do so by obtaining profits through diverting customers 
from incumbents. For incumbents the lost surplus is not taken into account by entrants. The resources which are wasted 
on excessive entry are an additional cost of supra-competitive pricing. On the other hand, to the extent that products are 
differentiated, there will be too little entry because firms offering new products do not capture all of the surplus 
generated by their contribution to product variety. Firms consider only the revenue they obtain, ignoring infra-marginal 
consumers’ surplus. If this effect is sufficiently large, the additional entry induced by price elevation is socially 
beneficial (see Kaplow (2011)). 
17 See Harrington (2005). Alternatively, margins might be determined from measures of price and marginal cost or 
inferred from the elasticity of firms’ demand curves. 
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focus of competition policy analysis of the oligopoly problem.18 The use of facilitating practices 
provides a basis for inferring the existence of collusion. This inference makes sense when there is 
no other explanation for the practice or when other explanations can be shown to be implausible 
in a particular case.19 
For example, information exchange could facilitate collusion by improving accuracy in observing 
rival behaviour, improving information about future intentions as well as diminishing time lags 
within which cheating can be more accurately detected and punished. Information exchange on 
price information may be assumed to be determinative of what constitutes an indirect price-fixing 
agreement, but it can also be viewed as facilitating practice. In addition, through the use of 
announcements of future prices, firms hoping to increase the industry price may want to convey 
their beliefs without taking the risk of raising prices unilaterally first and losing interim sales 
without being confident whether and how quickly rivals will follow. Firms might also share 
information about prices and other trading conditions through trade associations. Evidence from 
many prosecuted price-fixing cartels suggests that secret discussions were held in conjunction 
with trade association meetings. Trade association meetings provide a cover for the relevant 
firms. 
However, information-sharing activities may also yield procompetitive benefits.20 These benefits 
might provide an explanation, thereby negating the inference of collusion, and also indicate that it 
may be socially costly to prohibit the activities. There are several other facilitating practices such 
as: (1) meeting competition clauses; (2) standardization agreements; and (3) resale price 
maintenance.21 Some facilitating practices are more problematic than are others, while for other 
facilitating practices the conclusion will depend very much on the circumstances of the particular 
case. 
There are also several factors relating to market structure that affect the incentive and ability of 
collusive firms to sustain a collusive outcome in repeated game.22 An assessment of the degree to 
which these structural factors are conducive to successful collusion can sharpen the accuracy of 
inferences on the ultimate question of whether firms are engaging in collusive conduct. First, 
collusion cannot be sustained in the absence of entry barriers and it is more difficult to sustain 
                                                          
18 See Posner (2001), Harrington (2008) and Motta (2004). 
19 The issue with facilitating practices is to distinguish these from agreements in themselves: thus they are practices that 
firms may choose unilaterally and that could facilitate collusion. 
20 For a survey see Raith (1996) and Kuhn and Vives (1995). Raith (1996) proposes a general model for information 
sharing in an oligopoly which encompasses many of the known results. 
21 See Motta (2004) and Tirole (1988). 
22 Earlier surveys can be found in e.g., Tirole (1988), Shapiro (1989), and Motta (2004). 
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collusion the lower are entry barriers.23 Without entry barriers positive profits would invite entry, 
which would erode the profitability of collusion (hit and run strategies are possible). Future entry 
reduces the scope for retaliation in response to a deviation, and increases the returns associated 
with a deviation (price undercutting) in the short run. The number of firms and market 
concentration are two related factors. With a large number of firms the relative benefits from a 
short term deviation are more significant when compared with the stream of long term benefits 
associated with collusion. When there are many firms, reaching an agreement on the terms of 
collusion and punishment strategy tends to be more difficult and cheating may be harder to detect. 
There may also be more asymmetry when there are many firms, which also inhibits collusion. 
Transparency is another important factor especially when it relates to prices and sales. The lack of 
transparency on prices and sales makes it much more difficult to sustain collusion. In 
environment with limited transparency collusion is generally more limited in scope. For example, 
when firms do not observe individual prices (and therefore cannot infer from readily available 
market data) cheating on cartel agreement cannot be easily identified and punished. Product 
heterogeneity also makes collusion more difficult because reaching an agreement on prices and/or 
other trading conditions is more complex. In addition, when there is significant differentiation, 
identifying instances of firms cheating is difficult to detect, which makes it difficult to punish 
deviators.24  
Greater similarity on any dimension also supports collusion (see Kaplow (2011)). For example, 
firms with symmetric production costs will more readily be able to reach an agreement on 
collusion and none will gain disproportionately from cheating. Furthermore, extensive social 
contacts and more similar backgrounds of key decision-makers or managers may make reaching 
an agreement easier. 25 
                                                          
23 In standard oligopoly models with symmetric firms, collusion becomes more difficult to sustain if the number of 
firms increases (Shapiro, 1989). Friedman and Thisse (1994) analyse a market where firms cannot prevent entry and 
show that it is possible that an entrant will be integrated gradually into the collusive scheme. 
24 Deneckere (1983) derives some basic results on the ability to jointly maximize profits in repeated Cournot and 
Bertrand duopolies with product differentiation. Increasing the degree of product differentiation has two opposing 
effects on the ability to collude. In the short run, deviation becomes less profitable, as it is more difficult to attract 
customers of the rival firm by decreasing the price. But the punishment will also be less severe. Deneckere shows that 
for quantity setting super-games, the first effect dominates and sustaining collusion becomes more difficult with an 
increasing degree of substitutability. For price setting super-games this is true as long as the goods are sufficiently 
differentiated to guarantee that the deviating firm does not capture the whole market. But if the goods are very good 
substitutes, collusion becomes easier to sustain with a rising degree of substitutability. 
25 Such might include educational and social backgrounds, longevity in the industry, and participation in joint ventures 
and trade association activities. 
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Multi-market contact may also enhance the strategic space in which punishment may occur.26 
When firms co-exist in several markets, it is more costly for them to deviate from a collusive 
outcome, since they would be punished in all the markets at the same time. However, this 
explanation is misleading. The deviant firm can also deviate in all the markets at the same time, 
increasing the short-run benefit of a deviation. Indeed, multi-market contacts help collusion if, by 
pooling incentive compatibility constraints, they soften asymmetries that arise in individual 
markets and they allow collusion in markets where it would not be sustainable, by exploiting 
more favourable conditions on other markets. 
In general, the existence of capacity constraints has an ambiguous effect on collusion. A cheating 
firm may be able to gain more market share if its capacity is larger than the others. But other 
firms have a greater ability to punish, this is follows from the fact that the industry price can only 
be driven down if firms as a whole can supply a sufficient quantity.27 When there are many firms, 
it would seem that greater capacity would tend to help cheating firms more since there are more 
firms that can contribute to the quantity increase required for punishment. This implies that each 
firm does not need substantial additional capacity. However, the impact of asymmetry in capacity 
is less ambiguous: collusion is more difficult with an asymmetric distribution of capacities. 
Imagine that one firm has large capacity and the other small. The large-capacity firm gains more 
from deviation. The cost of deviation is lower for the large-capacity firm (the small firm is not a 
tough punisher). To induce the large-capacity firm not to cheat, may require giving the large 
capacity firm a higher market share. 
The fact that collusion is more likely (or conditions are conducive) in a given industry structure 
gives no evidence that collusion is taking place. Moreover, there are serious concerns about what 
is referred to as the structure-conduct-performance paradigm. The structure-conduct-performance 
paradigm in its simplest form holds that market structure determines conduct which in turn 
determines performance. In the present setting, the proposition would be that market structure 
factors determine whether firms collude which in turn determines whether firms realize supra-
competitive profits.  
Concerns about the relationship between structure, conduct and performance arise from empirical 
evidence or cross-sectional studies of different industries which show that structural factors, such 
as industry concentration, do not explain any of the variation in profitability. There are also 
competing explanations to explain the relationship, such as, that concentration can also be a result 
of one or a few firms being highly efficient than others, which therefore explains their 
                                                          
26 See Bernheim and Whinston (1990). 
27 See Brock and Scheinkman (1985). 
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profitability, rather than being caused by industry-wide supra-competitive pricing. But there is 
still some justification for paying attention to the micro structural factors which increase the 
incentive and ability of firms to collude when examining particular cases even when the empirical 
evidence gives us reason not to place excessive weight on their relevance.28 From a competition 
policy perspective, the issue is to be aware of those industries in which collusion is likely to be 
effective and damaging. 
4. Corporate leniency policies  
 
Leniency programmes grant complete or partial exemption from prosecution for firms that 
collaborate with the competition authorities. A leniency policy was first introduced in the US in 
1978 and reformed in 1993. In the European Union, the leniency programme was introduced in 
1996 and modified in 2002.29 In South Africa, the corporate leniency policy (“CLP”) came into 
force on 6 February 2004 and was modified in 2008. Before the adoption of the CLP in February 
2004, few cartels were investigated and prosecuted under the Competition Act. Perhaps this was 
because of the intrinsically secret nature of cartels which renders both their detection and 
investigation difficult. The CLP is meant to destabilize cartels by encouraging firms to defect and 
report. The CLP is meant to assist the Commission in prosecuting cartels under section 4(1)(b) of 
the Act.  
The CLP provides for a cartel member to receive immunity from prosecution before the Tribunal 
and from administrative fines in return for disclosing all relevant information and documents 
relating to the cartel activity. Only one member of a cartel may be granted immunity. As a result, 
the CLP creates a race to the door by rewarding the first member of the cartel to provide evidence 
on the cartel. The CLP does not make provision for granting partial immunity to second or third 
applicants, or for determining an applicable reduction in the fine.  
The CLP explicitly requires that applicants confess their participation in a cartel in return for 
immunity. The CLP is applicable to any cartel conduct falling within the ambit of the Act. The 
CLP provides that CLP applications may be made in relation to cartel activity that the 
Commission is not aware of. The Commission will also accept applications with respect to cartel 
conduct that the Commission is aware of, provided the Commission does not have sufficient 
information or no investigation has yet been initiated the CLP provides for immunity to be 
granted on a conditional basis.30  Granting of immunity is a continuous process that is only 
                                                          
28 See Bresnahan, (1989). 
29 See Motta and Polo (2003) and Aubert et al. (2005) for further details on leniency programs in the US and the EU. 
30 Motta and Polo (2003) point out that antitrust authorities may not always be able to provide enough evidence to 
prove that there was an illegal agreement among firms although it has started an investigation. Prosecuting a cartel is 
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concluded upon a final determination being made by the Tribunal or if the decision is appealed, 
the Competition Appeal Court. 
5. Industry background  
 
As a prelude to the essays, it is useful to begin with a brief overview of the grain industry. Under 
the apartheid regime, markets for most agricultural products were regulated. The first democratic 
government’s trade liberalisation programme converted to tariffs (and reduced the tariffs 
themselves), the quantitative trade restrictions on agricultural products. The reforms represented a 
wide-ranging move away from statutory intervention and were geared towards promoting market 
efficiency and competitiveness in the sector. It was expected that under de-regulated conditions of 
free competition prices would, on average, be lower and that firms would be more efficient as 
competitive rivalry spurred them to cut costs. 
With the liberalisation of agriculture in 1996, agricultural commodity prices much more closely 
linked to the global agricultural economy and global price movements. For example, local prices 
for maize and wheat tend to track international price movements after taking into account 
transport costs. In effect, farmers, who benefited from protection as well as other support 
measures in the past, are more exposed to volatility from international prices as well as exchange 
rate movements which may have been exacerbated by speculation. Traders tend to follow 
import/export parity calculations to determine prices. South Africa is a net importer of wheat, the 
price of wheat tends to be set at import parity. Pricing of maize gravitates between export and 
import parity depending on whether there is a surplus or a shortage.  
The grain industry is one of the largest industries in South African agriculture producing between 
25 per cent and 33 per cent of the total gross value of agricultural production. Grains grown in 
South Africa include maize, wheat, barley, soybeans, sunflower, groundnuts, oats, canola and 
sorghum; and end-products include maize meal, bread, starch products, glucose, flour, animal 
feed, sunflower oil, margarine, peanut butter, etc. The grain value chain under regulation was 
relatively uncomplicated, in that the industry operated through a fixed channel system and the 
Control Boards were the main intermediaries between the farm gate and the processing levels. 
Various inputs and services were provided by agricultural farmer co-operatives, with high levels 
of support from the government. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
costly and leads to conviction only with a certain probability. Therefore, leniency programs that apply to firms who 
cooperate after an investigation has started might have an important role in the prosecution of cartels. 
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While liberalisation removed direct controls, the subsequent unveiling of cartels suggests that 
extensive anti-competitive arrangements replaced direct regulated control. Firms involved with 
the baking of bread and the milling of wheat and maize engaged in cartel conduct with the goal of 
limiting competition. Contributing factors to these market outcomes include high entry barriers, 
the high level of industry concentration, vertical integration, multimarket contact, market 
transparency and symmetry in costs and market shares. Given the market structure, the history of 
the industry and the extensive social networks, overcoming the coordination problems necessary 
to establishing a cartel was relatively easy. Upon the creation of the cartel, incentives for each 
firm to cheat were immediately created. Each firm in the cartels had an incentive to cut its price, 
increase its output and gain market share, and thereby increase its profits. But if each firm did so, 
collusion would immediately dissolve into competition. With repeated interaction, the ability to 
enforce collusive agreements became an important part of the cartel arrangements. 
The cartels were uncovered in 2007 following an application for corporate leniency by one of the 
cartel firms (see Figure I-2). The successful prosecution of the bread and the milled wheat and 
white maize cartels demonstrates that cartels have pernicious effects on poor consumers despite 
the obstacles created by legal prohibitions on collusion (Section 4 of the Competition Act) and 
individual firm’s incentives to compete rather than to collude.  




6. Introduction to the essays 
Collusion covers what is undoubtedly the most settled area of competition law and policy in most 
countries around the world. In this study, I unsettle the discourse somewhat by suggesting that 
very little is known about collusion in South Africa. The essays below will look at three central 
topics of this study: cartel overcharges, cartel stability and remedies. In each essay (albeit to 
varying degrees), the study will evaluate both the theoretical and empirical issues involved. To 
improve our understanding of competition policy and its administration, the economic 
understanding will be joined with appreciation for case specific issues and the law.  
Essay One analyses the South African flour cartel which was active from 1999 to 2007 and 
provides an overcharge estimation by using comparator based methods. The empirical analysis is 
complemented by a descriptive overview of the history and structure of the South African flour 
industry. The flour cartel fixed the price of flour and allocated customers from 1999 to 2007. I 
find that the overcharges to independent bakeries range from 7 per cent to 42 per cent. I also show 
that the cartel profits were approximately two times higher during the cartel than the price war 
year 2002 or the post collusion year 2008.  
In Essay two, I examine the extent of market power in the flour industry. I ask whether observed 
prices and quantities in the flour industry reflect switching from collusive to non-collusive 
behaviour and test for this empirically. Within the framework of a structural model of equilibrium 
pricing, I specify a simultaneous equation switching regression model in which the parameters of 
the demand and cost functions are estimated. My estimated conduct parameters suggest that the 
level of market power exercised by the flour millers is quite low in both periods. The perfect 
collusion hypothesis is rejected by the data. In addition, the estimated level of the conduct 
parameter diverges from those implied by the models of competition and therefore I cannot define 
precisely the firm behaviour.  
Essay three explores the strategic behaviour adopted by the cartel and in particular Pioneer 
Foods to create artificial barriers to entry. This essay focuses on the following questions. First, 
how did Pioneer Foods and the bread cartel respond to entry? Second, how effective was Pioneer 
Foods’ conduct in maintaining collusion under the threat of entry? I provide direct evidence of 
cartel predation through below-cost pricing in the bread industry by comparing prices to average 
variable costs. I find evidence of episodes of predatory pricing. Essay four critically discusses the 
use of remedies in pursuing distributive justice through the restoration of competition, deterrence, 
and disgorgement of profits, More specifically, the design and objectives of the Pioneer Foods 
settlement agreement is examined. The remedies that were concluded with Pioneer Foods 
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constitute a major measure of “success” in the enforcement of competition law in developing 
countries. They included, among others, an administrative fine, part of which by agreement was 
set aside for the creation of an Agro-processing Competitiveness Fund aimed at lowering the 
barriers to entry, as well as a commitment to reduce prices on the sale of flour and bread over an 
agreed period designed to stimulate rivalry while at the same time enabling smaller non-vertically 
integrated participants to compete in bread. I also demonstrate the impact of the discount remedy, 
using a comparative approach.  
With Pioneer Foods admitting to its involvement in milled wheat and milled white maize cartels 
as well as engaging in general exclusionary conduct, there was little suspense over the existence 
of most egregious offenses in competition law and the subsequent harm to consumers and 
competition. For some, the competition law remedies and in particular the discount remedy that 
was adopted, following confirmation by the Tribunal, constitute a key measure of ‘success’ for 
the cases. Essay five evaluates this claim by examining the design and effectiveness of the 
discount remedy from a comparative perspective. I find that the period before, during and after 
the Pioneer Foods discount remedy was characterised by increasing wheat prices. However, the 
increasing wheat prices did not translate into increased bread prices during this period. Further, 
the discount remedy also induced responses from Pioneer Foods’ main competitors resulting in 
even wider gains for consumers than Pioneer Foods’ own price reduction commitment. South 
Africa was shielded from higher bread prices, in part because of the Pioneer Foods discount 
remedy, albeit temporarily during the discount remedy period. After the discount remedy period, 







II. ESSAY ONE 





One important presumption of competition law, and the least controversial, is that cartels are bad 
for consumers because they increase prices and reduce supply. The South African competition 
regime, like those elsewhere around the world, prohibits cartels.31 Yet firms continue to find 
collusion to be very profitable.32 The per se illegality of cartel conduct has not been an efficient 
deterrent. For this reason, competition authorities around the world, including in South Africa, 
have recently increased their effort to detect and deter cartels.  
Complementing the work of competition authorities, academics such as Harrington (2004a), 
Harrington (2004b), Levenstein and Suslow (2004), Connor (2004) and Connor (2001) have 
improved our understanding of the pricing dynamics of cartels. On the empirical side, there exist 
a number of case studies focusing on the workings of specific cartels. These case studies 
investigate how the cartel operated, how effective it was in sustaining collusion and how large the 
generated welfare losses actually were. Examples of such studies include Porter (1983), Ellison 
(1994), Porter and Zona (1999), Genesove and Mullin (2001), Röller and Steen (2006), Asker 
(2010) and de Vanssay and Erutku (2011).33 
The legacy of apartheid in South Africa, largely due to extensive regulation and state support, 
resulted in an economy that was highly concentrated. Protectionist policies were aimed primarily 
at encouraging import substitution industrialization. Post-apartheid, the South African 
government took significant steps to liberalize many of the formerly price regulated markets. 
Industry restructuring led to the break-up of regulated cartels, but what lagged behind was the 
strict enforcement of competition policy to ensure that competition was being preserved. It turns 
out that liberalization inadvertently, by increasing competition in formally price regulated 
markets, increased the incentives for firms to participate in cartels. Hence, many formerly price 
regulated industries turned to collusion after liberalisation. 
                                                          
31 Section 4(1) (b) of the Competition Act 1998, as amended, prohibits price fixing, market allocation and bid rigging.  
32 Perhaps one reason for the persistence of cartels is a desire to have a ‘quiet life’ on the part of managers. Managerial 
slack may provide a motive of managers forming a cartel that may not show up in the form of profitability but x-
inefficiencies. 
33 Connor and Lande (2006) and Levenstein and Suslow (2006) offer surveys of contributions to the empirical research 
on inter-industry studies of samples of cartels. 
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The wheat value chain was extensively regulated by the state from 1937 to 1996. The Wheat 
Board was the main intermediary between the farm gate and the processing level of wheat 
products. Marketing of wheat was regulated through a single channel marketing system 
administered by the Wheat Board. The Wheat Board was sole buyer and seller of wheat at 
predetermined prices. The Wheat Board also controlled imports and exports of wheat and flour. 
With liberalisation, the expectation was that millers would compete. Competition it was hoped 
would result in low prices of flour and bread. But instead of competing, the millers simply 
replaced state regulation with private regulation.34 The flour cartel was uncovered in 2007. The 
cartel was uncovered when Premier Foods, one of firms involved in the cartel, applied for and 
was granted corporate leniency in terms of the CLP. The cartel fixed the price of flour, bread and 
maize meal and allocated customers in flour and bread from 1999 to 2007.  
Before analysing the effect of the wheat flour cartel on prices, an understanding of both the wheat 
flour market and the cartel arrangement is an essential precondition. In section 2 I outline the 
policy background and market dynamics of the flour industry. Section 3 describes the flour cartel. 
After the liability of the cartel is established, the task is to determine overcharge estimates due to 
price-fixing using a reduced-form price equation. In Section 4, I present the estimated results of 
the overcharge. I use both private and publicly available price data to estimate the cartel price 
overcharge. In particular, I find that the overcharges to independent bakeries in flour range from 7 
per cent to about 42 per cent. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The industry 
 
A. POLICY AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Wheat cultivation is one of the oldest agricultural activities in South Africa.35 Wheat milling is 
one of the oldest industries. It all began with first European settlement in the Western Cape 
                                                          
34 Government regulation of the milk sector began as early as the 1930s through minimum price regulation for certain 
products. This was achieved through various milk and dairy control boards. The system of control boards was abolished 
in 1997 when the Marketing Act of 1968 was abolished. In March 2006, the Commission initiated a complaint against 
milk processors. The Commission alleged that during the period January 2002 to March 2006, milk processors had 
directly and indirectly fixed procurement prices for raw milk. See Tribunal Consent Order in the matter between the 
Commission and Lancewood Cheese. Tribunal Case No 103/CR/Dec06. 
35 See Section 7 Committee Evaluating the Deregulation Process: the wheat to bread value chain report, 1999. National 
Agricultural Marketing Council. 
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province. The wheat industry grew rapidly in the 19th century, in line with the increased 
demand.36 This growth was supported by the introduction of improved farming equipment.  
Import duties on wheat and flour were first imposed in 1826.37 The import duty on wheat was 
suspended because of a local crop failure between February 1920 and June 1921. At the same 
time, world wheat prices declined after 1920. This period also witnessed a reduction in local 
freight charges. When selling their produce, local farmers were exposed to competition from 
imported wheat, which could be landed and transported inland at lower cost. So they began 
lobbying for higher protective duties. Due to their lobbying efforts, between 1921 and 1926, a 
dumping duty was imposed on Australian wheat. The dumping duty was superseded in 1926 by a 
tariff increase.  
To support local farmers, prices of wheat were artificially maintained at a level which made 
wheat production in South Africa profitable. Due to a further reduction in world prices in 1930 
and 1931, the import duty on wheat was increased while imports of flour and maize meal were 
placed under permit. Special customs duties on a sliding scale were also imposed to raise the 
minimum import price of wheat, flour and maize meal.  
The control of imports and the high protective tariffs were instrumental in maintaining the local 
price level, but prices were constantly under pressure to fall because of over-supply in the market. 
In light of this, co-operative groups attempted to regulate supply and carry over surpluses for use 
in years of shortages.38 Importantly the powerful lobbying efforts of co-operative groups led to 
the creation of the Wheat Board in 1935.39 The Wheat Board was essentially empowered, to 
regulate the flow of wheat to the market by paying storage compensation in respect of wheat 
stored by co-operative groups and farmers.40 The Marketing Act of 1937 introduced the Wheat 
Control Scheme giving the Wheat Board the sole right to sell wheat. In addition, the Marketing 
                                                          
36 See Vink (2012). 
37 The increasing population of settlers coupled with the discovery of the diamond and gold fields, led to significant 
growth in wheat production in South Africa. In addition, the development of railways, in conjunction with reduced 
freight charges, resulted in wheat cultivation being restricted to areas where natural conditions were most suitable, 
while shortages were imported from overseas. 
38 The costs and risks attached to these efforts were borne by the co-operative producers. 
39 Under Section 19 of Act No 58 of 1935. 
40 During the first two years of its existence the Wheat Board had a difficult task as a bumper crop was reaped in 
1935/36 and there was a surplus on hand in 1936/37. By utilising its levy revenue on wheat milled in the country and 
with the aid of Government, the Wheat Board succeeded in preventing a price collapse, although a decline in prices did 
take place. Wheat growing was the most profitable branch of farming during the depression years. 
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Act empowered the Wheat Board to fix prices from producer to consumer and to rationalise the 
milling and baking industries, subject to ministerial approval.41  
With the outbreak of World War II, the Wheat Board introduced subsidies on grade A wheat to 
increase production. Subsidies to producers continued up until 1957. After 1957 the subsidy was 
paid only on bread flour. After 1977 the subsidy was paid only on flour intended for the baking of 
standard bread. The subsidy was paid to the baker with the objective of keeping the price of bread 
to the consumer as low as possible. The Wheat Board ceased regulating the prices and marketing 
of products derived from the processing of winter cereals in 1991, although it continued 
regulating the production price of wheat. The bread subsidy was also abolished in 1991, while 
value added tax on white bread was introduced.  
In summary, up until the 1990s the marketing of agricultural products in South Africa, including 
grain products, was extensively regulated by the state through the Marketing Act of 1937 
(consolidated in the Marketing Act of 1968).42 Institutions mandated to implement the legislation 
included the Land and Agricultural Bank as well as Control Boards. Specific to wheat, the Wheat 
Board was the main intermediary between the farm gate and the processing level of wheat 
products. Marketing of wheat was regulated through a single channel marketing system 
administered by the Wheat Board.  
The Wheat Board was sole buyer and seller of wheat at predetermined prices. The Wheat Board 
also controlled imports and exports of wheat and wheat flour. Millers were obliged to take up all 
locally produced wheat for milling. Fixed price schemes and the agricultural co-operatives were 
generally appointed as agents of the relevant boards. The co-operatives functioned as regional 
monopolies. Under these schemes, farmers were paid a fixed price on delivery to the co-
operative. This resulted in substantial cross-subsidisation from farmers proximate to the market to 
farmers situated further away from the market. The system was meant to reduce regional 
differences and ensure the stability of agricultural prices. 
The first democratic government initiated a complete transformation of the industry with the 
introduction of the Marketing of Agricultural Products Act, No. 47 of 1996. The new Act 
dramatically changed agricultural marketing. Changes included the closure of the Wheat Board, a 
conversion from quantitative trade restrictions to tariffs and gradual reductions in the tariffs 
                                                          
41 Co-operatives and other agents were engaged at a commission, to receive, grade and finance the wheat, and store and 
deliver it to millers on the instruction of the Wheat Board. The apartheid Government used to protectionist policies to 
support favoured firms. See also Groenewald (1964). In September 1949, the Wheat Control Scheme became the 
Winter Cereal Scheme with control extended to include barley, oats and rye. 
42 See Vink and Kirsten (2000).  
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themselves. The South African Futures Exchange (“SAFEX”) for agricultural products was 
established in the free market environment as a hedging instrument.43 
B. MARKET DYNAMICS 
 
Wheat represents one of the most important field crops in South Africa.44 The wheat industry is 
important because it contributes significantly towards the total gross value of agricultural 
production. In addition, milled wheat in the form of flour is a key input into bread, one of the 
main staple foods for South Africans. The purpose of milling is to break up the grains of wheat 
into flour (which comes from the centre of the grain or endosperm), bran (the skin of the wheat) 
and pollard (the dusty material created during the grinding process). The aim of the miller is to 
extract the maximum proportion of flour from the grain with the least possible contamination by 
bran and/or pollard because they discolour the flour and reduce quality.  
The wheat milling process consists of three stages, each with its specific type of machinery. In the 
break process, roller mills are used to gently crack the wheat kernel open to prepare the wheat for 
further processing, with the aim of removing as much as possible of the bran from the endosperm. 
In the scraping process, the endosperm is scraped from the bran and is refined by means of roller 
mills, sifting machines and purifying methods. In the reduction process, the endosperm is finally 
refined by means of smooth roller mills and graded by sifting machines. The flour made from the 
endosperm is mainly used for human consumption and comprises a mixture of fine granules of 
starch and protein.  
Wheat is generally classified as hard or soft. Hard wheat has higher protein content than softer 
wheat and is mainly used for bread. Soft wheat is more suitable for confectionary and biscuits. 
The main products produced from the wheat milling process in South Africa include brown and 
white bread flour (used for baking bread, white bread flour accounts for about 40 per cent of 
sales, while brown bread flour accounts for about 26 per cent of sales), industrial flour (sold to 
only industrial users and is not available to end-customers, it accounts for about 1 per cent of 
flour sales), wheat offal (used for cereals and/or sold to the animal feed manufacturing industry) 
and cake flour (used to bake cakes and accounts for about 30 per cent of sales).  
Figure 1-1 provides an overview of the wheat to flour value chain. South Africa has 4 major firms 
in the milling industry namely Pioneer Foods, Tiger Brands, Premier Foods and Foodcorp. These 
firms are all involved through their various divisions in wheat milling and baking industries. In 
                                                          
43 Post liberalisation the grain value chains generally consist of six key levels; (1) the input (e.g. fertiliser) for 
agricultural production; (2) agricultural producers (farmers); (3) storage and trading of grain; (4) the milling, processing 
of grain for supply on a wholesale basis; (5) retail of wheat products; and (6) end-consumption. 
44 See Meyer and Kirsten (2005). 
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addition, these firms were all involved in the flour and bread cartels. The flour cartel also 
included a smaller firm, Godrich Flour Mills. The firms in the flour cartel accounted for more 
than 98 per cent of all flour sales. 













The flour industry is highly concentrated and is characterised by multi-market contact, 
homogenous products and a history of collusion, both at the level of milled wheat and in the main 
end consumer product, bread. The firms interact in more than one than one market at the same 
time. In particular, the firms have extensive presence in a number of geographic markets. They 
bake bread, mill white maize and produce other foodstuffs such as pasta. Furthermore, the flour 
and bread industries were extensively regulated prior to 1996.45 
Flour is essentially an intermediate product either used internally by vertically integrated 
companies for their own bakery operations or it is sold to other firms to bake bread or 
manufacture other products such as cakes and biscuits. Although bread and maize meal are staple 
foods and the main sources of energy for the majority of South Africans, it does not imply that 
flour and maize meal are substitutes. Various other factors such as consumer income, demand and 
supply, differences in nutritional value, seasonal output of raw product, regional consumption 
patterns, etc., also affect consumer decisions.  
Flour and maize meal are not competing products and are in separate product markets. There is no 
supply side substitution between wheat milling and maize milling. The size differences between 
                                                          
45 Cartels in flour have also been discovered elsewhere around the world. In Europe, the Dutch, Belgian and German 
competition authorities have all recently prosecuted flour cartels. For example, on 22 December 2010, the Netherlands 
Competition Authority concluded that 15 flour milling firms agreed to share the market in order to limit competition 
and even went as far as to buy out and shut down rivals that would not join the cartel.  













the wheat and the maize kernels mean that the settings and design of the milling equipment is 
different. Converting a maize milling plant into a wheat milling plant requires replacing all the 
milling equipment which requires significant capital outlays. It is for this reason that the milling 
companies tend to design and configure their milling facilities in terms of the type of product. 
Competition takes place at both national and regional levels. The competitive dynamics are 
associated with sourcing of wheat, the supply and demand balances across regions and the 
significant transport costs. Flour producers are able to compete with each other on a national level 
through a network of storage depots and regional scattered mills across the country (see Figure 1-
2). 
Figure 1-2: Location of wheat mills by the major milling companies 
 
Notes: 1 = Pioneer Foods; 2 = Tiger Brands; 3 = Premier Foods; 4 = Foodcorp; 5= Godrich;  WC =Western Cape; EC = 
Eastern Cape; KZN = KwaZulu-Natal; GA = Gauteng; FS = Free State; L = Limpopo 
 
Raw wheat is sourced through the SAFEX from traders and farmers, and can also be purchased 
directly from farmers in what is referred to as the ‘physical market’. If wheat is delivered through 
SAFEX, the seller of the wheat must ensure that the wheat is delivered according to the SAFEX 
rules of delivery and the location difference to factor in the transport costs will be reflected in the 
final price.46 More than 80 per cent of wheat in South Africa is produced in the Free State, 
                                                          
46 The price of wheat on different markets is adjusted to take account of the differences in transport costs, exchange 
rates, etc., in order to make comparisons possible. Such an adjusted price is called a reference price; it is calculated 
with respect to a reference point. In the case of grains in South Africa the commonly used reference point is 









Western Cape and Northern Cape provinces. South Africa is not a major producer of wheat in the 
world and wheat is imported to supplement domestic production: South Africa is a net importer of 
wheat. Wheat prices are generally lowest in the Western Cape, where there is generally a local 
surplus and prices are set against the inland (Randfontein) price, determined by import parity 
through Durban, less transport from the Western Cape.47 
 
3. The flour cartel 
 
There are two main elements to successful collusion. The first element is reaching an agreement. 
There must be some understanding among the firms regarding what conduct is permitted under 
the terms of the collusive agreement, for example, the prices that the firms will charge. The 
second element is enforcing the agreement. Timely detection of deviations from a collusive 
agreement and a credible mechanism for the punishment of deviations are key conditions to 
enforcing the agreement. Specifically, detection and punishment must be sufficient to deter 
individual firms’ incentive to cheat on the agreement, typically by cutting prices in the short-term, 
in order to achieve greater profits through a higher market share, at the expense of the other firms, 
before the latter can respond.48 
 
A. ORIGIN AND GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE CARTEL 
 
Private meetings and telephone contacts between the wheat milling firms began in 1999 and 
carried on until March 2007.49 It appears that the cartel started subsequent to the de-regulation of 
the industry. Instead of competing, the flour producers replaced the regulated cartel with private 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Randfontein. In order to adjust prices to this reference price, the international commodity price (‘free on board’ or FOB 
Gulf price) has to be adjusted to take account of all the costs incurred in bringing the wheat to Durban. This price, 
called the CIF price, is adjusted to local currency using the current exchange rate. Once this is done, all local Rand 
based costs (off-loading, losses, interest, local transport costs) can be added resulting in a final landed (local) price per 
tonne at the point of consumption, or the reference point. 
47 The Competition Tribunal (“The Tribunal”) highlighted the above dynamics in the matter between CTH and Senwes, 
noting that “while trading (derivative) market may be national, in the sense that traders are located nationally and 
compete for supplying processors nationally, geography cannot thereafter be dispensed with.” It further also recognised 
that in the market for the physical supply of grain there is a competitive advantage to having the best location for 
storage. Simply put, while millers can procure nationally through SAFEX trading, the regional dynamics will 
ultimately be reflected in the transactions. See the Competition Tribunal’s decision in Case Number 110/CR/Dec06. 
48 For recent extensive surveys of the evidence of collusive activity, see Levenstein and Suslow (2006). 





agreements. Cheating on cartel agreement was part of the collusive equilibrium. Flour producers 
have similar overhead costs and hence, it was very easy for the firms to lose market share and 
customers when they increased their prices especially following an increase in the price of raw 
material. Some firms would delay on the increase in price and therefore attract customers of those 
firms that had already increased their prices. These cheating episodes led to discussions between 
firms and co-ordination of price increases in an effort to “stabilise” the market. The firms 
understood that co-ordination was necessary for them to avoid losing customers and market share.  
The cartel’s internal enforcement mechanism was such that when deviations became visible, the 
cartelists first communicated before reverting to a price war. The cartelists only met when there 
was some instability in the market. When the market was running smoothly with firms increasing 
their prices after the increase in raw material costs, there was no need to have any discussions. 
However, when some firms decided to cheat, by for example holding over on the increase, the 
discussions would then become necessary. 
The cartel meetings were held at regional and national levels. Cartel meetings took place at 
different locations in the different provinces. For example, in some provinces, the meetings were 
better known as “church meetings”. Indeed, the price fixing meetings were held in church halls 
and were, quite astonishingly, often preceded by a prayer. In other provinces, the firms organised 
themselves into regional forums and the meetings were not only structured in the sense that the 
meeting dates were agreed upon in advance, the meetings were chaired by different people. The 
illicit agreements were not based upon any precise formula, although a pattern can be discerned:50  
i. A core group of firms, namely Tiger Brands, Pioneer Foods, Premier, Foodcorp and 
Godrich Flour Mills were involved in the cartel. 
ii. Up to and including 2003, the firms had multilateral and bilateral meetings every 4 to 6 
weeks in which they discussed price increases, implementation dates and customer 
allocation by region. The cartelists were usually present at all meetings and those that 
were not present, were brought or kept up to speed on developments and discussions by 
those present. During various periods when there were no meetings between the 
representatives of the milling firms, ad hoc contact was maintained by way of telephone 
calls.  
iii. The firms had an agreement not to target one another’s customers (bakeries and other 
big wholesalers and retailers). This so-called “gentlemen’s agreement” in the industry 
amounts to customer allocation and was also used as a method of monitoring behaviour, 
pricing and market shares over time. If a customer of a competitor approached a milling 
                                                          




company for a price, it was understood that they should be offered a high 
(uncompetitive) price. In certain cases where a competitor did indeed target and poach a 
customer by low pricing there would be telephone calls and sometimes meetings to 
discuss the situation and to ensure that all members adhered to this understanding at all 
times. 
iv. After 2004 there were regular telephone contacts and infrequent multilateral and 
bilateral meetings. It is not clear what changed after 2004, perhaps the cartelists were 
trying to elude detection by customers and the authorities. 
v. Price lists were determined nationally, together with minimum prices to which regional 
marketing and sales managers could discount. These price lists were then sent to the 
regional managers. The regional managers had some discretion in deviating from these 
lists, although they had no mandate to adjust prices below the minimum national prices. 
vi. In 2006, the core group of the cartelists met and discussed national prices and these 
were filtered down to the regions. 
vii. The meetings initially occurred frequently but fizzled out later and occurred mostly 
when there was non-compliance with the “gentlemen’s agreements” or when firms 
failed to raise their prices after an increase in the price of raw material or as agreed. 
 
B. COMPETITION TRIBUNAL DECISIONS AND TIMELINES 
 
Section 4 (1) (b) of the Competition Act provides that an agreement between, or concerted 
practice by, firms or a decision by an association of firms, is prohibited if it involves directly or 
indirectly fixing a purchase or selling price or any other trading condition or dividing markets by 
allocating customers, suppliers, territories, or specific types of goods or services. The firms must 
be in a horizontal relationship.51 Section 4 (1) (b) of the Competition Act is a per se provision. 
The mere occurrence of the specified conduct will attract liability. It is not open for justification 
but it must nevertheless be established that the prohibited conduct has taken place.52  
Premier Foods, Tiger Brands, Pioneer Foods and Foodcorp have all admitted that their conduct 
contravened section 4 (1) (b) of the Competition Act. They have admitted that during the period 
between 1999 and 2007, they were all part of a cartel that fixed selling prices as well as the 
implementation dates of such prices and allocated markets for flour. 
                                                          
51 Section 1(1) (xiii) of the Competition Act defines a horizontal relationship as one that exists between competitors. 
52 American Natural Soda Ash Corporation v Competition Commission 2005 6 SA 158 (SCA). 
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When Premier Foods applied for corporate leniency in terms of Commission’s corporate leniency 
policy in the bread cartel case, it also indicated that the cartel extended to the milling industry as 
well.53  Because of Premier Foods’ co-operation with the Commission’s investigation and its 
confession to its role in both the bread cartel and the milling cartel, Premier Foods was granted 
conditional immunity from prosecution on 16 March 2007.  
Tiger Brands corroborated Premier Foods’ allegations and entered into a consent agreement with 
the Commission on 9 November 2007. In terms of the consent agreement, the Tribunal imposed a 
fine on Tiger Brands for its role in the bread cartel. Tiger Brands confessed its role in the bread 
cartel and provided further evidence on the milling cartel. Tiger Brands co-operated with the 
Commission in its investigation and was granted conditional immunity from prosecution in terms 
of the corporate leniency policy.54  
On 6 January 2009, the Tribunal confirmed a consent agreement between the Commission and 
Foodcorp regarding Foodcorp’s involvement in the bread cartel and imposed a fine. 55  On 3 
February 2010, after contested proceedings, the Tribunal found that Pioneer Foods had been 
involved in a conspiracy to fix the prices of bread as well as market allocation in the Western 
Cape province and nationally.56  
The flour cartel complaint was referred to the Tribunal for determination on 15 March 2010. On 
30 November 2010, the Tribunal confirmed a consent agreement between the Commission and 
Pioneer Foods regarding Pioneer Foods’ involvement in the milling cartels.57 On 12 December 
2012, the Tribunal confirmed a consent agreement between the Commission and Foodcorp 
                                                          
53 On 14 March 2007, the Commission initiated a complaint against Tiger Brands, Pioneer Foods, Foodcorp  and 
Godrich Milling in respect of alleged collusive activities in the wheat milling industry. 
54 The Tribunal imposed a fine of R98 million on Tiger Brands for its role in the bread cartel. This represented about 
5.7 percent of its turnover from baking for the financial year 2006. See Commission press statement, 12 November 
2007, Tiger Brands admits to participation in bread and milling cartels and settles with Competition Commission. 
Available at: http://www.compcom.co.za/2007-media-releases/ 
55 The Tribunal imposed a fine of R45 million on Foodcorp. This represents 6.7 percent of its turnover for baking 
operations for the financial year 2006. See Commission press release, 5 January 2009, Competition Commission settles 
with Foodcorp. Available at: http://www.compcom.co.za/assets/Uploads/AttachedFiles/MyDocuments/5-Jan-09-CC-
Settles-with-Foodcorp.pdf 
56 The Tribunal ruled that Pioneer Foods had engaged in fixing the price of bread products in the Western Cape 
province and nationally and imposed a fine of R196 million. See Competition Commission v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd 
(15/CR/Feb07, 50/CR/May08), Available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACT/2010/9.html 
57 See also Bonakele and Mncube (2012) for details on the design and objectives of the Pioneer Foods settlement 
agreement. The remedies that were concluded with Pioneer Foods constitute a major measure of “success” in the 
enforcement of competition law in developing countries. They included, among others, an administrative fine, part of 
which by agreement was set aside for the creation of an Agro-processing Competitiveness Fund aimed at lowering the 
barriers to entry, as well as a commitment to reduce prices on the sale of flour and bread over an agreed period 




regarding Foodcorp’s involvement in the milling cartels and imposed a fine.58 Godrich Flour 
Mills is contesting the Commission’s findings and the Tribunal is still to adjudicate at the time of 
writing. 
C. THE CARTEL AND HARM TO INDEPENDENT BAKERIES 
 
Suppose there is a vertically integrated cartel producing flour and bread. The vertically integrated 
cartel sells flour to independent bakeries, who use the flour to bake bread and compete with the 
vertically integrated cartel in the bread market. Competition in the bread market can be 
characterised as involving a cartel (given that the cartel controls in excess of 98 per cent of the 
market, this is akin to a monopoly baker) with a competitive fringe. Figure 1-3 below shows the 
demand for bread and the demand for flour (the intermediate product), which is used in the 
production of bread.59  
Let 𝑤0 denote the flour price in the absence of a cartel and 𝑝0 be the corresponding price for 
bread. Suppose a cartel operating in the flour market succeeds in raising flour prices to 𝑤1. The 
cartel has an indirect effect on the price of bread, which increases up to 𝑝1. 











                                                          
58 The Tribunal imposed a fine of about R89 million which amounted to 10 per cent of the affected turnover of its 2010 
milling division. See Commission press release, 13December 2012 Competition Commission settles milling case with 
Foodcorp. Available at http://www.compcom.co.za/assets/Uploads/AttachedFiles/MyDocuments/Commission-settles-
milling-case-with-Foodcorp-.pdf 
59
 Note that this figure assumes that there is an input cost taking monopoly baker with no marginal cost beyond the 
linear wholesale price of flour. The derived demand for flour is then the marginal revenue curve in relation to the 


















The cartel in the market for flour harms the independent bakeries (who demand flour in order to 
produce bread), industrial flour purchasers (industrial flour is sold to industrial users in bulk and 
is not available to end-customers) as well as the indirect purchasers of flour (consumers who 
purchase bread for their consumption). 
Assume, there is Bertrand competition in the bakery market and bakeries belonging to the flour 
cartelists are not affected by the flour cartel while independent bakeries are affected. Therefore, 
there is no pass on effect. Direct customers such as independent bakeries and industrial users are 
harmed because they are forced to pay (𝑤1 − 𝑤0) more for the 𝑞1 units purchased from the cartel 
and because the volume they sell in the end product market falls from 𝑞0 𝑡𝑜 𝑞1 , which implies a 
loss of profits equal to (𝑝0 − 𝑤0 )(𝑞0 − 𝑞1). In the absence of the pass on effect, the harm caused 
by a cartel for direct customers is the sum of areas a, b, and c. 
The harm caused by the cartel on direct customers is reduced if they can pass-on part of the flour 
price increase to their own customers by increasing the price charged for bread from 𝑝0 to 𝑝1. As 
shown in Figure 1-3 the harm caused by the flour cartel on the direct customers of flour is given 
by the sum of areas a, b and c minus area d. Area a measures the flour cartel overcharge. The 
combined area b and c measures the loss of profits associated with the reduction in volume 
caused by the cartel. Area d measures the pass-on effect. 
Consumers of bread pay a price 𝑝1 when they would have paid 𝑝0 in the absence of the cartel. 
Consumer welfare in market for bread also falls as a result of the reduction in volume from 
𝑞0 𝑡𝑜 𝑞1. Observe that area a, now accrues to the cartel. Area a, is not therefore a loss for society. 
It used to belong to the direct customers, it now belongs to the cartel. Similarly, area d, is not a 
loss for society. It used to belong to the consumers (bread buyers), it now belongs to the “direct 
customers”. So areas a and d are not part of the social loss created by the cartel. These two areas 
have simply changed hands. This is not the case, however, with areas b, c and e which represent 
the true harm created by this cartel on the South African economy. 
When the flour and bread cartels were in operation, there is an open question as to how much of 
the collusive mark-up was realised in the flour mark-up and how much in the bread mark-up. In 
principle, collusion could have taken place exclusively in the flour market, that is, maximal 
surplus from bread consumers could have been extracted by flour millers raising the price of flour 
and then competing (with this artificially high cost of flour) in the bread market. Given the lack of 
substitute for flour in the baking of bread, such a collusive scheme could be effective. However, it 
is probably not difficult to find reasons for why the cartel may not want to raise the price of flour 
too much and to instead collude both in the milling and baking market.  
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A firm found guilty in a cartel case and sued for damages may invoke the passing-on defence, 
that is, its (direct) buyer passed on to its own customers the higher price. The degree of pass-on 
depends on the structure of the market. If the buyer faces Bertrand competition downstream and 
its rivals were not affected by the cartel, the pass-on will be 0. If there is Bertrand competition 
downstream and all buyers were affected by the cartel, the pass-on will be 100 per cent. If the 
buyer is a monopolist downstream, then the pass-on will be partial (under linear demand 
assumptions, it turns out to be 50 per cent).60 This also opens the issue of possible claim by 
indirect customers, who would have been harmed by the pass-on 
The analysis below assumes that there is no pass on effect in the independent bakery market. This 
assumption is reasonable because the independent bakeries were excluded from the bread cartel 
and the vertically integrated cartel is known to have engaged on predatory pricing strategy to 
drive out independent bakeries of the bread market.61 In addition, Pioneer Foods admitted in 
November 2010 that this conduct impeded small independent bakeries from expanding within the 
market as part of the Pioneer Foods consent order concluded by the Tribunal. 
 
4. Estimating wheat flour price overcharges to independent bakeries 
 
A. METHODS OF CALCULATING OVERCHARGES 
 
There are different methods that have been proposed to estimate overcharges in the context of 
cartel cases.62 First, comparator-based methods take the data on economic variables, such as 
prices, sales volumes, or profit margins, observed when there is no cartel or in markets where 
there is no cartel as an indication of the hypothetical world without the cartel.63 An alternatively 
method combines the comparisons over time and across markets and is sometimes called the 
‘difference in differences’ method because it looks at the development of the relevant economic 
variable (e.g. the price) in the alleged cartelised market during a certain period (difference over 
time on the cartelised market) and compares it to the development of the same variable during the 
                                                          
60 See Verboven and van Dijk (2009). There is also a huge empirical literature on the pass-on (also called pass-
through), especially in macro and international trade. 
61 Essay 3 provides direct evidence of predation through below-cost pricing in the cartelised South African bread 
industry by comparing prices to average variable costs.  
62 See also European Commission (2009) and (2011). 
63 Various techniques are used to implement these methods. Simple techniques include individual data observations, 
averages and interpolation. The implementation of these methods is sometimes refined by the use of econometric 
techniques, in particular, regression analysis. 
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same time period on an unaffected comparator market (difference over time in the market without 
a cartel). The comparison shows the difference between these two differences over time. 64 
Second, cost-based methods are based on the observation that changes in price should reflect 
changes in costs. These methods use some measure of production costs per unit, and adding a 
mark-up for a profit that would have been ‘reasonable’ in the but-for scenario. These methods can 
only be used in the estimation of overcharges if detailed production cost data are available for 
analysis. Third, a variation of comparator-based and cost-based methods is the constant margin 
approach. Instead of analysing prices, variable costs become the focus of the analysis. The 
constant margin approach assumes that cartel members earned profit margins from non-
cooperative conduct before and after the period of the cartel. The but-for benchmark is an implicit 
gross margin that remains constant for the affected period. Costs of production are collected for 
the pre-cartel, cartel and post-cartel periods.  
Finally, simulation methods draw on economic models of market behaviour. These methods uses 
direct information on the cartelised market is to specify an economic equilibrium model that 
explicitly specifies the demand and cost conditions, and the nature of oligopolistic behaviour in 
the market under consideration.65 When the model is completely specified, it is possible to carry 
out counterfactual simulations (see Verboven and van Dijk (2009)).66 The simulation approach 
makes it possible to compute both the cartel margins and the competitive (or non-cooperative) 
margins without relying on any cost data. In practice, the approach can be used in combination 
with the cost based approach. This would amount to computing the competitive but-for price 
using accounting cost data, plus an allowance for the competitive margin based on a simulation 
model. 
B. THE REDUCED FORM MODEL 
 
The price overcharge by a cartel is calculated as the difference between the cartel’s price and the 
price that would have existed in a counterfactual or but for world without the cartel. The method 
for assessing the overcharges adopted consists of comparing the actual situation during the period 
when the flour cartel produced anticompetitive effects with the situation on the same market after 
                                                          
64 One advantage of the difference in differences method is that it can subtract out changes unrelated to the cartel that 
occurred during the same time period as the cartel. 
65  The simulation model should be constructed in such a way that it replicates (a) the most significant factors 
influencing supply and (b) demand conditions These factors would be expressed as a set of equations in which a 
number of parameter values need to be included. 
66 For example as cited in Connor (2007), Raper et al. (2000) use simulation to determine the degree of monopsony 
power exercised by cigarette manufacturers in the U.S. market for leaf tobacco; they also determine the absence of 
countervailing monopoly power by sellers in that market. de Roos (2006) provides an example of how well dynamic 
simulation can fit the facts of a cartel, in this case the global vitamin C conspiracy. 
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the cartel ceased. 67 One advantage comparing, over time, data from the same geographic and 
product market is that market characteristics such as the degree of competition, market structure, 
costs and demand characteristics may be more comparable than in a comparison with different 
product or geographic markets. 
The reduced form model uses data on prices and the explanatory variables from both the cartel 
and non-cartel periods (see for example, Nieberding (2006), Rubinfeld (2008), Van Dijk and 
Verboven (2009), and McCarry and Rubinfeld (2011)).68 The model describes the equilibrium 
price that results from the interaction of demand and supply (or cost) forces in the flour industry, 
with the output variable having been removed by substitution and is given by:69 
 
𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡                        (1) 
 
𝑝𝑖𝑡 represents the price of flour at time 𝑡 in region, 𝑖 , and C is a set of variables that affect per-
unit costs (wheat prices). S is a group of variables affecting demand (the prices of substitute 
products). The cost and demand-shift variables included are assumed to be exogenous, since they 
are presumed to be determined independently of price and therefore unaffected by it (see 
Rubinfeld (2008)).70  
Included within the explanatory variables is a dummy variable, 𝐷. The dummy variable assumes 
the value of one for observations during the cartel period and zero for observations outside the 
cartel period. The estimated coefficient of the dummy variable if found to be significant provides 
an estimate of the average overcharge due to the cartel. Put differently, the dummy variable 
represents a “shift” in the price line under study rather than causing a change in its shape (or 
slope).  
                                                          
67 In principle, three different points of reference that can be used for the comparison over time; (1) An unaffected pre-
cartel period (comparison ‘before and during’ the cartel. A comparison of the prices in the same market, before and 
during the cartel. A complication to this assessment in the flour industry in South Africa is that the industry has always 
been cartelised, establishing the before period is difficult. Recall that the industry was regulated from 1937 to 1996); 
(2) An unaffected post-cartel period (comparison ‘during and after’ the cartel. A comparison of the prices in the same 
market during and after the cartel; and (3) Both an unaffected pre- and post-cartel periods (comparison ‘before, during 
and after’ the cartel).  
68 Some of the advantages of using a reduced form model for estimating damages include, (1) the fact that data 
requirements are limited to time series of the respected cartelized product; (2) the economic concept behind the 
approach is simple and straightforward; (3) the estimation of the over-charge itself is relatively easy to implement; and 
(4) it is not necessary to make any assumptions on industry conduct absent the cartel. 
69 See Appendix AI. 




However, as discussed by Finkelstein and Levenbach (1983), if prices are affected in more 
varying and complex ways, the use of one scale dummy variable for the entire cartel period 
(which assumes that the cartel added a fixed Rand or percentage amount to price during the 
conspiracy) may be too simple an approach (see also Nieberding (2006)).71 When the duration of 
the cartel is long and the necessary data is available, the more appropriate way to evaluate the 
overcharges is to use a forecasting approach. In this approach, one estimates a regression model 
that explains prices using only data for the control period in which competition was not restricted. 
Thereafter, the regression model is used to predict but-for prices in the cartel period.  
The error term reflects random shifts in demand, marginal cost, or conduct by the market 
participants. The error term is assumed to be independent of, and therefore uncorrelated with, all 
of the right-hand side variables. Further, we note that there are demand and cost shifters which 
are only observable to the firms. These unobservable characteristics will be captured by the error 
term in the empirical model.  
For a number of reasons, the dummy variable approach adopted to estimate overcharges is likely 
to underestimate the true harm caused by price fixing.72 First, the dummy variable approach 
requires that the cartel period is precisely defined. Because of data availability problems, I have 
used data from September 2003, while I know the cartel began as early as 1999. This suggests 
that the cartel period was longer than the period identified. Therefore, the estimated cartel 
overcharge may under-estimate the true cartel overcharge. Furthermore, the effects of the cartel 
may last longer than the cartel itself. This is because the members of the cartel may able to 
collude tacitly after the cartel ceases to exist. A long cartel generates focal points for prices that 
can facilitate tacit coordination among the members of a tight oligopoly. 
Second, as shown by Basso and Ross (2010), the overcharge measure is likely to underestimate 
the harm caused by a cartel on direct and indirect purchasers as it omits potentially significant 
volume effects. Third, the dummy variable approach measures the price overcharge as the 
difference between the average price observed in the cartel period and the average price observed 
after the cartel period, provided that such a difference is statistically significant. However, the use 
of standard statistical significance criteria may lead to the conclusion that the cartel may not have 
had a material effect on prices, when in fact the opposite is true. 
 
                                                          
71 Another shortcoming of the reduced form model, is the fact that the omission of relevant variables can bias the 
results. Omitted variables that are correlated with the independent variables would create a bias in the regression 
coefficients. Furthermore, the results might not be robust to the choice of functional form. 
72 See Andreu, Padilla and Watson (2011). 
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C. DATA AND RESULTS 
 
The dataset contains information on monthly wheat prices, flour prices to the independent bakery 
channel and other variables from September 2003 to December 2008 for Gauteng and Western 
Cape provinces. Table 1-1 presents some of the descriptive statistics and variable description.  
The dataset is constructed using a combination of both public and private data. The private data is 
from the National Chamber of Milling (“NCM”) and the firms involved in the cartel. The private 
dataset includes prices and costs. We include in the dataset monthly consumer price index data 
from Statistics South Africa (“Stats SA”). This data captures monthly food prices and is provided 
by the South African Grain Information Service (“SAGIS”) and is public. It contains nominal 
prices of substitutes such as oats. Wheat flour can be substituted with oat flour in baking bread 
and other products. 
Table 1-1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Description 
GA_WF_P 63 3553.5 1213.1 Represents the average monthly real price per tonne of white bread flour in Gauteng (in Rands) 
GA_WF_WC 63 2519.1 1028.1 Represents the real wheat cost per tonne of white bread flour in Gauteng (in Rands) 
GA_BF_P 63 3516.5 1129.9 Represents the average monthly real price per tonne of brown bread flour in Gauteng (in Rands) 
GA_BF_WC 63 2325.9 944.8 Represents the real wheat  cost per tonne of brown bread flour in Gauteng (in Rands) 
GA_CF_P 63 3685.2 1166.3 Represents the average monthly real price per tonne of cake flour in Gauteng (in Rands) 
GA_CF_WC 63 2661.4 1089.7 Represents the real wheat  cost per tonne of cake flour in Gauteng (in Rands) 
WC_WF_P 63 3298.6 1202.0 Represents the average monthly real price per tonne of white bread flour in Western Cape (in Rands) 
WC_WF_WC 63 2113.2 1014.2 Represents the real wheat cost per tonne of white bread flour in Western Cape (in Rands) 
WC_BF_P 63 3195.4 1106.1 Represents the average monthly price per tonne of brown bread flour in Western Cape (in Rands) 
WC_BF_WC 63 2115.8 1015.4 Represents the real wheat  cost per tonne of brown bread flour in Western Cape (in Rands) 
WC_CF_P 63 3823.2 1149.3 Represents the average monthly real  price per tonne of cake flour in Western Cape (in Rands) 
WC_CF_WC 63 2988.7 1143.3 Represents the real wheat  cost per tonne of cake flour in Western Cape (in Rands) 
Safexp 63 2081.7 850.5 Represents the average monthly real SAFEX Randfontein wheat price per tonne (in Rands) 
Oats 63 9.9 1.1 Represents the real price of oats per 500g (in Rands) 




The wheat cost is calculated using the average monthly SAFEX Randfontein wheat price per 
tonne (i.e. monthly average using daily SAFEX prices, lagged by 3 months to take into account of 
mills buying wheat on forward contracts) plus the SAFEX transport differential which is adjusted 
annually, less the average monthly chop (offal) price adjusted for the extraction rate (for example, 
for cake flour the extraction rate 70 per cent per tonne of milled wheat).73 The extraction rate is 
obtained from the NCM. Other costs are obtained from the firms’ annual submission to the 
NCM’s costing survey data. These costs are averaged across the regions for all of the firms and 
include packaging, distribution, production and marketing costs per tonne of milled wheat.  
The flour prices are obtained using the average monthly transaction price for a 12.5kg bag of 
flour sold to the independent customer channel, multiplied by 80 to convert them to a price per 
tonne, adjusted for an extraction rate of approximately 70 per cent per tonne of flour as obtained 
from the NCM. The price and cost data is deflated using the South African consumer price index 
which is provided by Stats SA. The base year for the deflator of real prices is 2005. The proved 
existence of the cartel suggests that independent bakeries paid a high price for flour and were 
therefore harmed by the cartel. Figures 1-4 to 1-7 show the development of flour prices and wheat 
costs per tonne of flour from September 2003 to December 2008 in Gauteng and Western Cape 
provinces.  
  
                                                          
73 All SAFEX prices are Randfontein-based, this means that if a producer can deliver or a miller can accept delivery at 
Randfontein, they will receive or pay the SAFEX price for the delivery month contract (the spot price). The delivery 
usually takes place at points across the various producing regions, all spot prices are SAFEX adjusted prices. For 
example if the transport costs between Randfontein and the silo where a producer chooses to deliver is R100/tonne, the 
delivery price for the producer will be equal to the Randfontein price (the delivery month contract price) minus the 
R100/ton transport cost. The buyer will now collect the maize from the relevant silo at the SAFEX price minus the 
R80/ton. These transport cost differentials are calculated every year and are available from SAFEX. 
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Figure 1-4: Real Gauteng white bread flour price, September 2003 to December 2008  
 
Source: own calculations 
Figure 1-5: Real Western Cape white bread flour price, September 2003 to December 2008 
 
Source: own calculations 
 
































































































log Gauteng white bread flour price log Gauteng white bread flour wheat cost

































































































log Western Cape white bread flour price log Western Cape white bread flour wheat cost
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Figure 1-6: Real Gauteng cake flour price, September 2003 to December 2008 
 
Source: own calculations 
Figure 1-7: Real Western Cape cake flour price, September 2003 to December 2008 
 
Source: own calculations 
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log Western Cape Cake cake flour price log Western Cape cake flour wheat cost
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Figures 1-4 to 1-7 provide a simple comparison of prices during the period of the alleged cartel 
with the prices in the period after the cartel, on the assumption that the latter provide a reasonable 
approximation of price levels in the absence of the cartel. While this approach is appealing 
because of its simplicity and visual transparency, it is subject to a number of potentially 
significant pitfalls. Observations of the likely impact of the cartel are difficult to make from the 
figures. Post cartel, flour prices increased substantially up to May 2008 following the increase in 
wheat prices, after which wheat prices began to fall while the flour price remained stable and 
sticky downwards. Note as well that although prices increased after the cartel, the gap between 
price and cost fell. 
There are several explanations for this observation. First, it could be a result of asymmetric price 
transmission of cost changes whereby price responds quicker to cost increases than to cost 
decreases. The literature reveals that “rockets and feathers” phenomenon has been observed for 
many agricultural markets. 74  Second, tacit collusion is more likely after explicit collusion, 
because firms may have learned ways to organise themselves in manner in which tacit collusion is 
the outcome during the explicit cartel (see Connor (2004)). Connor’s argument suggests that 
prices decline after the explicit cartel but just not to competitive levels, other things equal. If the 
cartel is not perfectly colluding and is not motivated by the desire to maximise joint profits but 
rather socialisation, it is possible that the tacit collusion outcome results in higher prices. 
Alternatively, Harrington (2004) shows that the likelihood of damage assessment based on post-
cartel prices may in fact create an incentive for firms to price above the non-collusive price in the 
post-cartel period in order to complicate calculations of damages. This strategic behaviour may 
lead to an underestimation of cartel damages if the assessment is based on post-cartel prices.75 
The arguments above support the use of pre-cartel price information as the more appropriate 
benchmark. However, it is impossible to get pre-cartel price data for flour given the history of 
regulation in the flour industry in South Africa. Ideally the benchmark period selected for 
identifying but for prices should capture long-run equilibrium prices. In addition, it is important 
                                                          
74 See for example, Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel (2004), Frey and Manera (2007) and Cutts and Kirsten (2006).  
75 While private antitrust class actions have historically been weak in South Africa, the South African Constitutional 
Court recently ruled in favour of the companies looking to initiate a class action against various bread producers. Note 
that the firms involved in the bread cartel are the same firms involved in the flour cartel. The Constitutional Court 
judgment overturned two previous rulings by the Western Cape High Court as well as the Supreme Court of Appeal 
that denied the distributors the ability to bring a class suit against Pioneer Foods, Tiger Brands and Premier Foods who 
were found guilty by the Competition Tribunal for price-fixing. This gives the bread distributors another chance to sue 
the cartelists. The Constitutional Court referred the case to the Western Cape High Court to hear the argument again. 
See Children’s Resource Centre Trust v Pioneer Food (50/2012) [2012] ZASCA 182 (29 November 2012) and 





that the conditions under which prices were set before, during and after the cartel be clearly 
understood. If prices are un-representative during the selected benchmark period then the 
counterfactual prices generated by this approach may be misleading.76 
I estimate a log-linear model. As discussed above, only the relevant cost and demand variables 
are included in the empirical analysis. Notice that I do not include the quantity variable itself as 
an independent variable but instrument quantity by using the price of substitutes. This is done to 
avoid the inter-dependence of price and demand. From an econometric perspective, ignoring the 
interdependence can cause serious consequences in the form of biased coefficients. The model is 
expressed in its implicit form as:  
ln(𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒) =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ln(𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡) + 𝛽2 ln(𝑂𝑎𝑡𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒) + 𝛽3(𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦) +   
The explanatory variables included in the model aforementioned and their definitions are 
presented in Table 1-1. 
Table 1-2 shows the results of the log-linear regression specification using OLS. The R-squared 
value of 0.909 (Column 1) indicates that 90.9 per cent of the total variation in the price of brown 
bread flour explained by the explanatory variables in the model. The wheat price (cost shifter) is 
significant and positively related to the price of flour. This is accordance with priori expectations. 
The regression results show that a 1 per cent increase in the price of wheat leads to a 0.479 per 
cent increase in the price of brown bread flour in Western Cape. The results show that the price 
difference between the cartel period and the non-cartel period (that is, the price overcharge) is 
given by the exp (0.217) - 1 and is equal to 24.2 per cent for brown bread flour (column 1).77 The 
Western Cape estimated results also reveal an overcharge of the value of exp (0.275) -1= 31.2 per 
cent for white bread flour (column 2).  
Table 1-3 shows the estimated results of brown, white and cake flour in Gauteng, respectively. In 
line with priori expectations, all the cost shifters are positive and significant in Table 1-3. For 
example, a 1 per cent increase in the price of wheat leads to a 0.513 per cent increase in the price 
of Gauteng brown bread flour. The overcharge is of the value of exp (0.0973)-1= 10.2 per cent for 
                                                          
76 This approach assumes that the selected benchmark prices would have been constant during the period of the cartel 
which implicitly assumes that the key determinants of pricing conduct would have remained entirely unchanged during 
the period of the cartel as compared to the selected benchmark period. This is a strong assumption and may be difficult 
to justify where the cartel spans a significant time period during which demand and supply conditions are likely to have 
changed. 
77 In the logarithmic specification, the approximated price overcharge follows from: log 𝑃𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙
𝑃𝑛𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙




exp (𝛽3) and therefore  
𝑃𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙− 𝑃𝑛𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙
𝑃𝑛𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙




white bread flour and the overcharge is of the value of exp (0.128)-1 = 13.7 per cent for cake 
flour. 
Table 1-2: Western Cape flour markets regression analysis (log –linear model) 
  (1) (2) (3) 














   
(0.0709) 
Dcartel 0.217*** 0.275*** 0.0538* 
 
(0.0593) (0.0650) (0.0316) 
lnOats 1.580*** 1.982*** 0.895*** 
 
(0.286) (0.322) (0.273) 
Constant 0.652 -0.154 1.780*** 
 
(0.642) (0.666) (0.402) 
Observations 63 63 63 
R-squared 0.909 0.899 0.938 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 1-3: Gauteng flour markets regression analysis (log –linear model) 
  (1) (2) (3) 












   
(0.0687) 
Dcartel 0.0401 0.0973* 0.128*** 
 
(0.0527) (0.0558) (0.0435) 
lnOats 0.968** 1.139*** 1.121*** 
 
(0.423) (0.321) (0.262) 
Constant 1.942*** 0.954 1.117** 
 
(0.594) (0.576) (0.469) 
Observations 63 63 63 
R-squared 0.846 0.945 0.950 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In equation (1) above I have assumed that the explanatory variables have the same impact on the 
price of flour during and after the cartel regime. However, this assumption may be unrealistic, 
because the demand and cost shifters will have different impacts on price in different competitive 
regimes, which, if not properly taken into account, results in biased parameter estimates, and thus 
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in the estimated impact of the cartel. For example, during non-collusive regimes other than 
perfect competition, firms are wary of increasing their prices as a result of higher costs. This is 
because, if their rivals do not follow suit, increasing price as a result of higher costs will result in 
a loss of market share. Conversely, during the cartel period, firms may find it easier to pass-on 
cost increases relative to non-collusive regimes.78  
Put differently, with collusion, a firm faces less uncertainty regarding the reactions of its rivals 
and this may make it easier to pass-on a cost increase. Should this be the case, one method of 
capturing these dynamics is to estimate a version of equation (1) where the parameters capturing 
the sensitivity of prices to costs are allowed to vary across competitive regimes. Accordingly, the 
cost shifter is interacted with the cartel dummy and the model can be written as follows: 
𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑖𝑡𝐷𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡                        (2) 
It is interesting to note that all the interaction terms are negatively signed and significant. The 
coefficient of the multiplicative term, 𝐶𝑖𝑡𝐷𝑖 actually measures the difference in the effect of wheat 
costs on the flour price between the cartel period and the non-cartel period; it is not a measure of 
the effect for the cartel period only. To illustrate using the results for Western Cape province 
brown bread flour prices (Column 1 in Table 1-4), the effect of wheat costs on the flour price 
during the cartel period is equal to 0.148 per cent (i.e. -0.614 + 0.762).79  If we value the 
interaction at the (average) value taken by each variable over the cartel period, the cartel 
overcharge is positive and is estimated at about 35 per cent of the observed price. For white bread 
flour and cake flour in Western Cape province, the cartel overcharge is estimated at about 42 per 





                                                          
78 This is especially true if the firms have asymmetric cost structures. 
79 Suppose we want to compare the effect of wheat costs on the flour price between the cartel period (𝐷𝑖) and the non-
cartel period (𝐹𝑖). Equation 2 can be specified as follows: 𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃2𝐶𝑖𝑡𝐹𝑖 + 𝜃3𝐶𝑖𝑡𝐷𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡, where 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a 
vector of other explanatory variables and 𝜃1 is the corresponding vector of coefficients. 𝐷𝑖 + 𝐹𝑖 = 1. Eliminating 𝐹𝑖 
through substituting, gives the base specification of the model: 𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃2𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑀𝑖 + (𝜃3− 𝜃2)𝐶𝑖𝑡𝐷𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡. The 
two models are mathematically equivalent but there are differences in interpreting the results. By dropping out 𝐹𝑖 which 
now serves as the base, the coefficient of 𝐶𝑖𝑡𝐷𝑖 it represents the differential effect of the wheat costs during the cartel 
period over the non collusion period. Thus, the interpretation of results is less straightforward for the base approach. 
80 While for Gauteng province, the estimated overcharge for white bread flour and cake flour is at about 24 per cent and 
33 per cent respectively. 
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Table 1-4: Western Cape flour markets regression analysis (log –linear model 
  (1) (2) (3) 





























   
(0.107) 
Dcartel 4.752*** 5.694*** 4.034*** 
 
(0.851) (0.907) (0.826) 
lnOats 0.739** 0.904** 0.367 
 
(0.338) (0.347) (0.289) 
Constant 0.403 -0.584 1.282*** 
 
(0.725) (0.747) (0.420) 
Observations 63 63 63 
R-squared 0.937 0.937 0.951 
Robust standard errors in parentheses,  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 1-5: Gauteng flour markets regression analysis (log –linear model) 
  (1) (2) (3) 





























   
(0.101) 
Dcartel 2.670 3.163*** 4.238*** 
 
(1.932) (0.973) (0.779) 
lnOats 0.613 0.709* 0.589* 
 
(0.582) (0.382) (0.296) 
Constant 1.685*** 0.717 0.782 
 
(0.603) (0.615) (0.518) 
Observations 63 63 63 
R-squared 0.850 0.951 0.963 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




In equations 1 and 2, I assumed that the flour price does not depend on past prices. If I relax this 
assumption and assume that the flour price does not adjust instantaneously to changes in market 
conditions. This is because even after controlling for contemporaneous and exogenous market 
factors, current price (𝑝𝑖𝑡) may still depend on past prices (e.g., 𝑝𝑖𝑡−1, etc.). To control for this, I 
allow for a presence of a lagged dependent variable. For example, incorporating 𝑃𝑖𝑡−1  into 
equation 1 yields, 
𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑝𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑖𝑡                        (3) 
 
Table 1-6 and Table 1-7 show that 𝑝𝑖𝑡−1 is significantly correlated to current price, 𝑃𝑖𝑡 , while its 
inclusion does not significantly perturb the sign and significance of the other included 
independent variables. The long run equilibrium price 𝑝𝑒 is estimated by setting 𝑝𝑒 = 𝑝𝑡 = 𝑝𝑡−1 





. To illustrate using the results for Western Cape province brown bread flour (Column 1 in 
Table 1-6), the long run effect of the cartel on the equilibrium price is approximately 27.6 per 
cent. If I consider white bread flour, the long run effect of the cartel on the equilibrium price is 
approximately 36 per cent. While for Gauteng province cake flour, the long run effect of the 
cartel on the equilibrium price is approximately 13 per cent. 
A common problem in most empirical studies using time series data is due to the time-series 
properties of the data. 81  For example, all variables may be similarly trending so that any 
relationship between them may simply be because each is growing over time.82 The concern in 
using non stationary data is that a spurious regression may be performed which generally 
overstates how good is a model’s “fit”, as well as makes independent variables appear to be more 
significant than they actually are in explaining variation in the dependent variable.  
One method to account for the presence of non stationarity in the data is the error correction 
model (see Nieberding (2006)). The error correction model uses data that are expressed as first 
differences, but also to allow for short-run dynamics (by incorporating lags of the variables), as 
                                                          
81 Nieberding (2006) explains that a stochastic process which generates a time series is said to be stationary if its mean 
is constant over time, and exhibits a constant and finite variance so that “shocks” only have transitory effects. Time 
series data that violate these stationarity conditions are termed “non stationary” and often exhibit an upward or 
downward trend without reversion to a constant mean, and any “shock” will have a lasting impact on future values of 
this series. Two or more nonstationary series are cointegrated if they have a linear combination that is stationary. If the 
nonstationary time series to be used in a regression are cointegrated, then regression results containing these series may 
be meaningful (and not spurious). 
82
 While a complete discussion of stationarity, the related concept of cointegration and the formal statistical tests used 
to diagnose such phenomena is not necessary for the aims of this essay, suffice it to say that regressions containing 




well as the long-term relationship between the equilibrium price being modelled and its actual 
value (by including an error correction term). 
Table 1-6: Western Cape flour markets regression analysis (log –linear model 
  (1) (2) (3) 





























   
(0.171) 
Dcartel 0.111*** 0.158*** 0.0250 
 
(0.0398) (0.0497) (0.0291) 
lnOats 0.926*** 1.258*** 0.603** 
 
(0.259) (0.320) (0.257) 
Constant -0.240 -0.776 0.780 
 
(0.599) (0.562) (0.498) 
Observations 62 62 62 
R-squared 0.931 0.925 0.949 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 





Table 1-7: Gauteng flour markets regression analysis (log –linear model) 
  (1) (2) (3) 





























   
(0.126) 
Dcartel 0.00211 0.0348 0.0574* 
 
(0.0487) (0.0451) (0.0326) 
lnOats 0.502 0.611** 0.638*** 
 
(0.386) (0.299) (0.238) 
Constant -0.0214 0.222 0.289 
 
(0.858) (0.448) (0.404) 
Observations 62 62 62 
R-squared 0.885 0.957 0.962 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Connor (2007) suggests a margin approach as a variation on the before-and-after and cost-based 
methods. Figure 1-8 below shows the average percentage industry profits before, during and after 
the cartel. The average percentage profits on turnover are before tax and interest. 83 Notice that 
there is a drop in profits by more than half following deregulation in 1996. This may have been 
one motivation why the industry fearing liberalisation decided to continue with regulation, albeit 
private regulation, in order to restore industry profits. 
A price war in 2002 could explain the drastic drop in average industry profits. As an alternative to 
the before and after regression results, the cartel profits in Figure 1-8 are approximately two times 
                                                          
83 Figure 1-8 uses average EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization) margins, more 
precisely accounting profits. Accounting profits, however, do not correspond to economic profit and consequently may 
be misleading in the evaluation of the firms’ ability to raise price above marginal cost. An accounting profit is defined 
as the difference between a firm’s revenues and its operating expenses (or explicit costs). In contrast, an economic 
profit is defined as the difference between a firm’s revenues, operating expenses, and the opportunity cost of the inputs 
used to make the firm’s sales. Economic profits account for real costs, not historical or bookkeeping costs, and the cost 
of using a unit of a resource is the maximum amount that a unit could earn elsewhere. Only economic profits are 
possibly relevant and reliable for evaluating market power. Notwithstanding the above, even economic profits are 
generally not a reliable proxy for market power. For example, factors unrelated to market power can influence a firm’s 
profit margins, such as a firm’s management, cost structure, and exogenous factors beyond the firm’s control. See Bork 
and Sidak (2013). 
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higher during the cartel than the price war year 2002 or the post collusion year 2008. Figure 1-8 
also suggests that the cartel may have experienced two episodes and that the first episode (1996-
2001) was somewhat more effective in generating cartel profits than the second episode.84 
Figure 1-8: Percentage industry profits on turnover before tax and interest 
 
Source: own calculations 
 
How do my estimates compare with findings elsewhere? Most of the empirical studies indicate 
that the majority of cartels that have been studied have a positive overcharge. For example, 
several studies derive overcharge estimates for various past cartels in various industries and 
countries. Posner (2001) considers 12 cartel cases, the median amount by which the price 
increased is estimated at 28%. A 2002 OECD study based on a survey of cartel cases conducted 
by its members between 1996 and 2000, finds that the median overcharge was between 13 per 
cent and 16 per cent of the cartel price (with a variation from 3 per cent to 40 per cent). Werden 
(2003) reviews 13 other studies, and finds 21 per cent mean overcharge. 85 
Connor and Lande (2006) provide a survey of cartel overcharge estimates by examining more 
than 500 referred journal articles, working papers, monographs and books. They find an average 
in the range of 31 per cent to 49 per cent and a median overcharge in the range of 22 per cent and 
                                                          
84 While in the first episode the cartel held regular meetings, in the second episode the cartel held regular telephone 
contacts perhaps because of probability of detection concerns. 
85 See also Appendix A II. 
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25 per cent of affected commerce. Connor and Lande then conclude that the presumption that 
cartels overcharge by 10 per cent is much too lenient and the current levels of cartel penalties 
should be increased significantly. Combe et al (2008) analysed 64 cartels prosecuted by the 
European Commission and argue that fines imposed against cartels by the European Commission 
are overall suboptimal. Levenstein and Suslow (2006), based on their review of 16 cartel case 
studies, calculate an average mean overcharge of 43 per cent. They find that in all cartel cases 
surveyed, the cartel was able to raise prices immediately following cartel formation. Oxera 
Consulting (2009) further examined the dataset underlying the Connor and Lande (2006) study, 
as well as an additional observations provided by Connor and Lande.86 Figure 1-9 illustrates the 
distribution of cartel overcharges across this new dataset of 114 observations. 87  The sample 
includes international and national cartels that affected a wide range of different industries. The 
geographic spread of the sample extends to the US and Canada as well as cartels from Europe and 
other regions. In 93 per cent of all cartel cases considered, cartels do lead to an overcharge. Seven 
cartels have an overcharge of more than 50 per cent. About 70 per cent of all cartels have an 
overcharge of between 10 per cent and 40 per cent. According to Oxera Consulting, the median 
overcharge is 18 per cent of the cartel price. The mean average overcharge is around 20 per cent.  
One important key limitation of all these studies is publication bias. Publication bias stems from a 
sample selection problem. A sample selection problems arises if observations that ought to be 
included in the data set are absent from the sample. Many cartels are unsuccessful in raising 
prices but because of publication bias are not reported upon because editors and reviewers have a 
strong preference for studies with statistically significant results (see Ehmer and Rosati (2009)). 
  
                                                          
86 Oxera Consulting (2009)  refined the sample of cartels examined in Connor and Lande (2006) by considering only 
cartels (a) that started after 1960 (thus taking into account only more recent cartels), (b) for which an estimate of the 
average overcharge was available (rather than only an estimate of the highest or lowest overcharge), (c) for which the 
relevant background study explicitly explained the method for calculating the average overcharge estimate, and (d) 
which were discussed in peer-reviewed academic articles or chapters in books.  
87 The 114 cartels are based on different types of collusion, including bid-rigging. 
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Figure 1-9: Distribution of cartel overcharges in empirical studies of past cartels 
 




The quantification of the overcharge suffered by independent bakeries in South Africa as a result 
of collusive behaviour requires a comparison with the position in which this group of customers 
would have been but for the cartel. Put differently, in calculating overcharges, I ask the question, 
what would have happened without the collusive behaviour? To answer the hypothetical question 
I need to estimate the but-for world with which then to compare with actual world. To be specific, 
because the flour cartel raised prices to independent bakeries, the but-for price is estimated as a 
reference point for comparing with the price actually paid by these customers. 
It is impossible to know with certainty how the flour market would have exactly evolved in the 
absence of the collusive behaviour. Prices, sales volumes and profit margins, all depend on a 
range of factors and complex interactions between market participants that are not easily 
estimated. For this reason, the estimation of the hypothetical but for world relies on a number of 
assumptions. Hence, the calculation of overcharges is subject to considerable limits as to the 
degree of certainty and precision. There is no a single ‘true’ value of the overcharge suffered that 
can be determined, but only best estimates relying on assumptions and approximations.  
However, that it is difficult to measure the overcharge should not lead to the adoption of arbitrary 
rules of thumb. The dummy variable approach is only one method of estimation. There are others, 
but the choice of the method to estimate overcharges depends on (1) specific set of facts about the 
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industry, (2) the availability and quality of data and (3) the nature of the hypotheses being 
tested. 88  While admittedly, estimations of overcharges are subject to assumptions. That the 
estimation methods are imperfect is however not a reason to discard them. Best practice suggests 
that whenever used, one should assess the results of each approach in light of its limitations, 
perform a sensitivity analysis to assess the robustness of the results and reconcile with more direct 




                                                          
88 The reliability and precision of the analysis depends on whether the analysis has been tackled rigorously. 
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A. Appendix  
 
I. DERIVING THE REDUCED FORM PRICE AND QUANTITY EQUATION  
In this appendix, I compute the derivation of the reduced form equation which shows that 
equilibrium prices and quantities are linear functions of both demand and supply shifters.89 To 
isolate the cartel and non-cartel influences on price, one may quantify the interaction of buyers 
and sellers through the explicit construction of behavioural supply and demand relations in the 
context of a structural model. The demand curve gives the quantity that consumers would like to 
purchase at a given price, conditional on other variables that affect demand. The supply curve 
gives how much sellers are willing to sell at a given price, conditional on other supply shifters. 
The economic theory pertinent to the industry under study guides the specifications.  
Suppose that the demand and supply model can be represented by the two estimating equations: 
𝑞𝑡
𝑠 = 𝜇0 + 𝜇1𝑝𝑡 + 𝜇2𝑆𝑡                
𝑞𝑡
𝑑 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑝𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐷𝑡              (a1) 
where 𝑞𝑡𝑠  and 𝑞𝑡𝑑  represent the quantity demanded and supplied, respectively, at time 𝑡 ;  𝑝𝑡 is 
market price, and 𝐷𝑡 and 𝑆𝑡 represent exogenous demand and supply shifters.
90  Using the 
equilibrium condition that supply equals demand (𝑞𝑡𝑑 = 𝑞𝑡𝑠), I can solve for the equilibrium price 
𝑝𝑡. This yields a reduced-form equation that relates equilibrium price to exogenous supply and 
demand factors.91 
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𝛾1−𝜇1
) 𝐷𝑡       (a3) 
 
                                                          
89 See also Nieberding (2006). 
90 The expected signs of the parameters attached to 𝐷𝑡and 𝑆𝑡  will depend on the economic theory reason for their 
inclusion in the structural model. 
91 When interpreting reduced-form regression coefficients estimated from a model, one needs to remember that these 
parameters are a function of those from the underlying structural model. 
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Similarly, the reduced–form quantity equation, 𝑞𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑆𝑡, 𝐷𝑡), can be derived from equation (a1) 







) 𝑆𝑡 − (
𝜇1𝛾2
𝛾1−𝜇1
) 𝐷𝑡            (a4) 
This is the same as the reduced form quantity equation: 





) = 𝛽3        (
𝜇2𝛾1
𝛾1−𝜇1
)  = 𝛽1         (
−𝜇1𝛾2
𝛾1−𝜇1
) = 𝛽2         (𝜇1 − 𝛾1) ≠ 0    (a6) 
 
The two reduced-form equations given by (a3) and (a4) show explicitly how the two endogenous 
variables price and quantity are jointly determined and how changes in the exogenous variables 






II. MARKET SHARE VOLATILITY  
In the example of the flour cartel above, the application of the estimation methods focuses 
primarily on price. It is, however, likewise possible to use these methods to estimate other 
economic variables such as market shares, profit margins, rate of return on capital or the value of  
assets. Figure A-1 provides the monthly national market shares over time of total milled wheat 
flour for all wheat milling members of the NCM for the period 2003-2009. These individual 
shares have remained relatively stable over time. I would have expected more volatility in share 
once the cartel was uncovered. Perhaps firms continued with tacit coordination given the market 
structural characteristics of the flour market.  
In fact concerned about this possibility, in 2010, the Commission initiated a complaint against all 
the flour millers who were also members of the National Chamber of Milling (the industry 
association) for anticompetitive information exchange. In particular the Commission was 
concerned that the firms were exchanging disaggregated sales volumes data on a monthly basis, 
disaggregated per province, per product type, per pack size and per customer channel. 
Information exchange could facilitate tacit collusion and would increase market transparency by 
reducing strategic uncertainty about competitors’ actions.  
Figure A-1: Monthly National Market Shares for All Flour Products (2003-2009 
 





2. ON MARKET POWER AND CARTEL DETECTION: THE FLOUR CARTEL 
CASE 
1. Introduction  
 
The work of competition authorities centres around the assessment of the degree of competition 
in an industry. This assessment is usually based on qualitative evidence. In some cases, however, 
the qualitative evidence is often conflicting and difficult to obtain. But in other cases, notably 
hard-core cartels, such evidence once obtained often leads to a straightforward prosecution of the 
cartel. Empirical methods such as those based on conjectural variation models have been 
suggested as capable of providing possible supportive evidence to the qualitative evidence. It is 
suggested that these empirical techniques could help to gauge the degree of market power, and to 
identify the existence of collusive behaviour. For homogenous product industries, these empirical 
methods consists of estimating a parameter (a conduct or a conjectural variation parameter), 
whose value indicates the degree of market power that is exercised in the market. A value close to 
1 suggests that firms have a greater degree of market power and value close to 0 suggests that 
firms have a lesser degree of market power. 
In the enforcement of competition law, market power is assessed in relation to existing 
competition, potential competition and the strength of buyers. For several different reasons, 
competition authorities are expected to identify the source of this market power, which may not 
be the result of anti-competitive conduct. For example, in abuse of a dominant position cases, the 
concept dominance depends on market shares and/or market power. According to Section 7 of the 
South African Competition Act, a firm is dominant in a market if; “(a) it has at least 45 per cent 
of that market; (b) it has at least 35 per cent, but less than 45 per cent, of that market, unless it can 
show it does not have market power, or (c) it has less than 35 per cent of the market, but has 
market power”. The tests applied under the Competition Act, relating to abuse of dominant 
position cases have two common elements: whether a firm is dominant in a relevant market and, 
if so, whether it is abusing that dominant position. 
In other cases, competition authorities may be expected to determine whether market power in a 
given industry arises from collusive behaviour. This helps not only in identifying the harmful 
effects of the collusive behaviour and but could also be useful in detecting the existence of a 
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cartel. In all cases undertaken by competition authorities, linking market power to firm conduct is 
at the core of the investigation and the work of competition authorities. 
The traditional definition of market power in economics textbooks points out that market power 
exits whenever firms have the ability to set price above marginal cost. But this definition in which 
price equals marginal cost only applies to a theoretical setting, where there are no barriers to entry 
and economic profits are competed away. In reality, market power stems from a number of 
sources such as fixed costs, product differentiation, cost efficiency, or superior products. To 
operationalize this definition, the Competition Act defines market power “as the power of a firm 
or business to control prices, to exclude competition or to behave, to a large extent, independently 
of its competitors, customers or suppliers”. 
In the enforcement of competition law, a conclusion that firms in a particular relevant market 
have market power or price above marginal cost is not sufficient to determine the existence of 
anticompetitive behaviour. In many industries market power is widespread and the sources of the 
market power are multiple. Therefore, it is important to identify market power that results from 
collusion or anticompetitive behaviour from market power which results from other factors. 
Interestingly during litigation, in many competition law cases, the debate centres around the 
existence and source of market power.  
I assess whether the flour industry outcomes are consistent with the exercise of market power and 
whether the firms engaged in coordinated behaviour or competition during some well-defined 
periods. To this end, section 2 provides a brief description of the flour industry in South Africa. 
Section 3 introduces the empirical estimation of market power and firm conduct literature. In 
section 4, I ask the question, do observed prices and quantities in the flour industry reflect 
switching from collusive to non-collusive behavior and test for this empirically using the monthly 
time series data from September 2003 to December 2008.92 My estimated conduct parameters 
suggest that the level of market power exercised by the flour millers is quite low in both periods. 
The perfect collusion hypothesis is rejected by the data. Perfect collusion is coordination on 
distinct output or price levels equal to the joint profit maximization outcome while partial 
collusion is often referred to as coordination on distinct output or price levels less than the joint 
profit maximization outcome.93 Section discusses whether the model can be used to detect cartels. 
Section 6 concludes. 
                                                          
92 Within the framework of a structural model of equilibrium pricing, for a homogenous good market, we specify a 
simultaneous equation switching regression model in which the parameters of the demand and cost functions are 
estimated. 




2. Industry background and the flour cartel 
 
There are four major firms that operate in the wheat milling industry in South Africa, namely 
Premier Foods, Tiger Brands, Pioneer Foods and Foodcorp. These four companies control in 
excess of 90 per cent of the wheat flour market. All four of these firms are vertically integrated in 
the sense that they mill wheat into flour which is then used to supply both their own bakeries and 
independent third parties such as the chain stores and smaller bakeries. Although these firms 
operate across the country, not all of them have mills throughout the country. For example, only 
Premier Foods, Tiger Brands and Pioneer Foods have mills throughout the country, while 
Foodcorp has a mill in Gauteng.  
Up until the 1990s, the marketing of agricultural products in South Africa, including grain 
products, was extensively regulated by the state. In this regulated environment, the agricultural 
co-operatives functioned as regional monopolies and regular meetings were held between wheat 
millers. These meetings occurred both within the Chamber of Milling and the Wheat Board and 
as well as outside of these structures. At these meetings, the wheat producers discussed various 
issues of common interest such as rail deliveries of wheat, wheat quality standards and joint 
shipment of imported wheat. Thus, a culture of co-operation and discussion was entrenched in the 
industry over many years. 
In 1996, the wheat industry was deregulated. However, despite deregulation, the wheat millers 
continued to liaise with one another regarding issues of common interest. The National Chamber 
of Milling also continued as a legitimate forum for sharing information on the industry where 
issues of common interest were discussed freely and legitimately. In 2007, the Commission 
uncovered that the wheat millers had also continued, sometimes through the auspices of the 
Chamber of Milling, as well as through other less formal forums, to engage in collusive behaviour 
in contravention of section 4 of the Competition Act. 
Fighting cartels is one of the most important areas of activity for competition authorities globally. 
The ability of competition authorities to effectively do so is often hampered by the difficulties 
pertaining to the gathering of direct evidence. This is not surprising given the nature of cartel 
activity. Firms engaging in collusive activity rather than competition tend to conduct themselves 
in secretive and stealthy ways. Firms meet behind closed doors, ensuring that there is no paper 
trail and at times cloaking their activities in the guise of normal commercial practices thereby 
seeking to mislead and divert competition agencies. 
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The cartel members were usually all present at all meetings and those that were not, were brought 
or kept up to speed on developments and discussions by those present. During various periods 
when there were no meetings between the representatives of the milling firms, ad hoc contact was 
maintained by way of telephone calls. The extent of the co-operation between the firms also 
allowed them to raise complaints amongst themselves in the case of cheating by a firm on the 
collusive price. 
While the cartel meetings took place in various regions, the purpose was the same across all the 
regions. The firms were concerned with fixing the price of flour and allocating customers. For 
example, in some provinces, the meetings were better known as “church meetings”. Indeed, the 
price fixing meetings were held in church halls and were, quite astonishingly, often preceded by a 
prayer. In other provinces, the firms organised themselves into regional forums and the meetings 
were not only structured in the sense that the meeting dates were agreed upon in advance, the 
meetings were chaired by different people.  
Regional representatives of the different firms would then report the outcome of the meetings to 
their national principals. At other times, the national principals themselves attended these 
meetings. Given that the firms were also involved in maize milling, some of the price fixing 
meetings would fix both flour and maize meal products. The regional agreements were not 
discrete agreements with different adherents but were part and parcel of the execution of a 
national cartel. The firms maintained their conspiracy to fix prices and allocate customers in 
meetings and at times through telephone contacts between 1999 and 2007. 
 
3. The literature 
 
The New Empirical Industrial Organisation (“NEIO”) literature provides several empirical 
models to determine the source of market power. Note however, that NEIO models are not so 
new anymore. In the 1950s and 1960s, the structure-conduct-performance paradigm was the main 
methodology applied to infer firm conduct. The NEIO literature emerged in the late 1970 relies in 
part on conjectural variation models and stems from the criticism lodged against the structure-
conduct-performance paradigm (see Church and Ware (2000) Chapter 12 for a comprehensive 
summary of the shortcomings).94 The NEIO literature was pioneered by Iwata (1974), Gollop and 
                                                          
94 More generally, oligopoly models trace their roots to the seminal works of Cournot (1838) and Bertrand (1883). For 
a summary see Office of Fair Trading (2011). In Cournot's model, firms simultaneously choose quantities assuming 
their rivals' quantities are fixed. In Bertrand's model, firms simultaneously choose prices assuming their rivals' prices 
are fixed. In both cases, whether firms have 'Cournot conjectures' or 'Bertrand conjectures,' firms act as if their rivals' 
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Roberts (1979), Bresnahan (1981, 1982), and Lau (1982), among others. For a survey see 
Bresnahan (1989). 
The NEIO approach addresses concerns with the structure-conduct-performance paradigm which 
treats market structure as exogenous. The base hypothesis of structure-conduct-performance 
paradigm is that more concentrated industries imply less competitive conduct, and hence higher 
prices . Although the structure-conduct-performance paradigm does not estimate directly firm 
conduct, it assumes that higher market concentration is associated with more coordination.  
The NEIO approach stresses that: (1) one should be careful with the use of accounting cost data; 
(2) focus on industry-level analysis, and account for institutional idiosyncrasies of the industry; 
and (3) identify causal relationships rather than correlations. For example, profits and 
concentration are jointly determined. A correlation between profits and concentration does not 
necessarily reflect collusive conduct, but rather significant differences in efficiencies among 
firms. Econometrically, there is an endogeneity problem. 
To estimate firm conduct directly, there are two main steps. First, a model of consumer demand is 
estimated to determine the extent to which consumers are sensitive to price changes (the price-
elasticity of demand).95 Second, a firm (or industry) supply relation is also estimated in order to 
recover a value for the conduct parameter. To recover the conduct parameter, the estimate of the 
price elasticity of aggregate demand is used. The value taken by the estimated conduct parameter 
tells us about firm behaviour, for example, (1) when the conduct parameter takes the value of 0, 
the firms are perfectly competing and price equals marginal cost; (2) when the conduct parameter 
takes the value of 1, the firm is a monopolist or firms are perfectly colluding; and (3) when the 




                                                                                                                                                                             
choices are fixed when they make their own choices. Bowley (1924) was the first to introduce the notion of a 'reaction 
function' and the idea that firms might anticipate their rivals' reactions when making their choices (Office of Fair 
Trading (2011)). His model and those that trace their roots from it have become known as conjectural-variations 
models, where the term 'conjectural variations' was coined by Frisch (1933) to describe the slopes of the conjectured 
reaction functions. 
95 The intuition is simply that consumer behaviour governs the ability of firms to raise price above marginal cost. If 
consumers are very price sensitive, (for example a large number of consumers stop purchasing the product in response 




4. Estimating market power and firm conduct in the wheat flour industry 
 
My goal is to estimate market power and show how market power changed after the uncovering 
of the cartel. I do this by isolating the cartel and non-cartel influences on price and quantity. This 
allows us to understand the interaction of buyers and sellers in the wheat flour industry through 
explicitly constructing behavioural supply and demand relations in the context of a structural 
model.96 I use a switching model to identify collusive conduct whenever observed data contains a 
collusive and non-collusive of conduct across time periods, as in the Porter (1983) model. In this 
tradition, the model below allows the firms’ conduct to vary between periods of collusion and of 
competition (after the cartel). In other applications, firms supply the same product, but they 
behave differently depending on the geographic market, one such example is Salvo (2010) who 
set to test whether coastal cement markets in Brazil are constrained by the threat of imports, 




Following Porter (1983), assume a static, homogeneous product oligopoly model where the 
number of firms 𝑁 is exogenous. All firms know the functional form of market demand and each 
other’s costs. The major cost component of milling flour is wheat which is sourced from SAFEX. 
Wheat flour is a homogenous product. Assume there is a constant elasticity industry demand 
curve. A constant elasticity demand function considerably simplifies subsequent calculations and 
estimation. Now suppose market price in period 𝑡  is denoted by 𝑝𝑡  and the total quantity 
demanded, 𝑄𝑡 is assumed to assumed to be a log-linear function of price, 
 
𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑡 + 𝜇1𝑡,            (1) 
 
The price elasticity of demand is given by  𝛼1 , is presumed to be negative. Similarly 𝛼2  is 
presumed to be positive. This is because  𝐺𝑡  is a vector of exogenous demand shifters. The 
demand shifters include prices of substitutes, for example, breakfast oats. Prices of substitutes 
                                                          
96 The main attraction this model is that it results in a two-equation linear system that explain equilibrium industry price 
and quantity data. The two reduced-form equations show explicitly how the two endogenous variables (𝑝𝑡 and 𝑄𝑡) are 
jointly determined, and how changes in the exogenous variables affect the endogenous ones. Fortunately, we have 
industry data on prices and quantities. In competition law practice and some academic writings, however, it is easier to 
obtain pricing data than quantity data, and therefore common to see only the reduced-form price equation. That is, data 
on prices and the independent variables are used to estimate values for the reduced-form regression parameters. Then, 
by using the actual values of the independent variables and the reduced-form regression coefficients, predicted values 




have a positive effect on demand. μ1t  is the error term (μ1t ~ N(0, σ2)). The demand error term, 
accounts for demand factors observable to firms but not included in the model.  
 
B. SUPPLY  
 
Assume that each firm has fixed costs of 𝐹𝑖 and a constant elasticity variable cost function. The 
cost of producing output 𝑞𝑖𝑡 for firm 𝑖 in period 𝑡 is given by, 
 
𝐶𝑖(𝑞𝑖𝑡) = 𝑎𝑖𝑞𝑖𝑡
𝛿 ,               for 𝑖 = 1 … . 𝑁,       (2) 
where 𝛿 is the constant elasticity of variable costs with respect to output and is equal to one if 
there is an equilibrium. The firm specific shift parameter is 𝑎𝑖. The fixed costs are assumed to be 
small enough that firms have positive discounted expected profits in equilibrium. The firm-level 
cost function allows for an industry supply or output curve for a range of models of competition. 
Now for optimisation assume that each period (for example, one month), firms maximize their 
per-month profits. Additionally, assume each firm forms a conjecture about how other firms will 
respond during that month, 𝜃𝑖𝑡. The wheat flour of the firms is of approximately the same quality, 
all firms charge equal prices in the equilibrium. From these behavioural assumptions, the actions 




) = 𝑀𝐶𝑖(𝑞𝑖𝑡)            for 𝑖 = 1 … . 𝑁,           (3) 
Marginal revenue equals marginal cost, first-order conditions for profit maximization by each 
firm. Here 𝑀𝐶𝑖  is the marginal cost function of firm 𝑖 . In the Bertrand equilibrium, if firms 
choose price non cooperatively in each period, they price at marginal cost. This means that 
𝜃𝑖𝑡 = 0 for all 𝑖 and 𝑡. If instead they maximise joint profits, that 𝜃𝑖𝑡 = 1 for all 𝑖 and 𝑡. If instead 
firms produce at Cournot output levels, 𝜃𝑖𝑡 = 𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝑞𝑖𝑡 𝑄𝑡⁄ , the market share of firm 𝑖 in period 𝑡. 
While, the economic model applies to individual firm decisions and noting that the wheat flour 
cartel was not characterised by new entry during the cartel period, I do not estimate firm-level 
models. For estimation purposes, aggregate data is used. As is common when only industry-level 
price and quantity data are available, the individual supply equations are weighted by market 
shares in time 𝑡, 𝑠𝑖𝑡 and added up.
 97 Then I get an industry supply relationship, 
                                                          
97 This approach, while reducing the number of estimating equations, is not without limitations. In aggregating the first-
order conditions, one cannot estimate separate conjectural and cost parameters for each firm and time period. To reduce 
the dimensionality of the parameters in the industry supply function, Porter (1983) assumes that the firm-level values of 






) = ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖 𝑀𝐶𝑖(𝑞𝑖𝑡)          where 𝜃𝑡 = ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖 𝜃𝑖𝑡.      (4) 
Given these functional forms for the market demand and cost function, the market share of firm 𝑖 







≡ 𝑠𝑖 in each of the above cases above.  
The market share of each firm will be constant over time and invariant across changes in industry 
conduct. The higher the value of the firm specific variable cost shift parameter, 𝑎𝑖, the lower is 
the market share of firm 𝑖. 









       (5) 
𝐷 depends on only on the parameters of the cost functions of the firms. Taking the natural log of 
the supply relationship yields the aggregate supply function, apart from the addition of an error 
term, 
𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑡 = (𝛿 − 1)𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑡 + 𝑙𝑛𝐷 − 𝑙𝑛(1 +
𝜃𝑡
𝛼1
)       (6) 
For Bertrand, Cournot or perfectly collusive firms 𝜃 = 0 𝑜𝑟 𝐻 𝑜𝑟 1 , respectively. H is the 
Herfindal index and is invariant across time, as long as the number of firms remains unchanged. 
Suppose 𝐼𝑡 is a dummy variable which equals to 1 when the industry is in a collusive state (in 
relation to the wheat flour cartel, this is the period up until March 2007 when Premier was 
granted conditional immunity from prosecution) and equals 0 when the industry is in a non-
cooperative state. Because I observe alternative periods of perfect competition and collusion, 
based on the dummy variable, 𝐼𝑡, I can specify the time varying conduct parameter, 𝜃𝑡 =  𝜃0 +
𝜃1𝐼𝑡. The parameter 𝜃0 is still not identified.
 Porter (1983) essentially assumes it is zero. It is also 
reasonable to assume that in the flour industry after the uncovering of the cartel, firms compete 
perfectly. The parameter 𝜃1 is identified. Then the supply relationship is given by, 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑝𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑄𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑡 + 𝜇2𝑡           (7) 
                                                                                                                                                                             
advantage of reducing the number of conjectural and cost parameters to two. It makes it easy to calculate equilibrium 
prices and quantities in perfectly competitive and monopoly (collusive) markets. However, this simplifying assumption 




If during the collusive period firms maximise joint profits then 𝛽3 =  log (1 +
1
𝛼1
). Assuming that 
at the period when the cartel breaks up, conduct is Bertrand, that is, firms compete perfectly. 
Then 𝛽0 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐷 and β1 = δ − 1. Since δ is assumed to be greater than 1, β1 should be positive.  
 
C. IV ESTIMATION 
 
To estimate the demand and supply functions, I do not use ordinary least squares (OLS) or the 
basic econometric approach because both functions are likely to contain an endogenous regressor. 
OLS estimations could introduce two econometric problems. First, OLS estimators of the 
coefficients on price are inconsistent since price is endogenously determined in the supply-and-
demand system (Goldberger, 1991). Second, if the error terms in the supply-and-demand 
equations are correlated, then the OLS estimates lack efficiency (Lin, 2005). 
Put differently, using OLS ignores the interdependence of flour price and flour demand. An 
increase in the demand leads to an increase in the willingness to pay and Millers are able to 
charge a higher price per unit. On the other hand, a decrease in price, for example, due to an 
improved milling technology, leads to an increase in demand. From an econometric perspective, 
applying OLS lacks both identification and efficiency. This can therefore lead possibly to 
erroneous estimates. To address the identification problem, I use the instrumental variable (IV) 
estimator and implement two stage least squares (2SLS) using the -ivreg2- routine in Stata v12.98  
IV estimation basically involves replacing the endogenous variable in the equation of interest 
with its predicted value from an OLS regression which regresses the endogenous variable on a set 
of instrumental variables. These instruments should be good predictors of the endogenous 
variable (i.e., they should be relevant and strong predictors) but should be appropriately excluded 
from the equation of interest (i.e., they should be valid instruments). 99 
Note that the relevance of an instrumental variable refers to its ability to predict the endogenous 
variable of concern, whereas validity refers to the requirement that instruments should be 
uncorrelated with the error term in the equation of interest. If the instrumental variable is relevant 
                                                          
98 See Baum, C.F., M.E. Schaffer, and S. Stillman, ivreg2: Stata module for extended instrumental variables/2SLS, 
GMM and AC/HAC, LIML and k-class regression. See http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s425401.html. 
99 A valid instrument should meet three requirements; (1) the instrument must be correlated with the endogenous 
variable, conditional to the other covariates; (2) the instrument cannot be correlated with the error terms in the 
explanatory equation and (3) exclusion should also be applied when instrumental variables are selected to differentiate 
the supply and the demand equation. An exogenous supply shifter does not affect demand except through its effect on 
price and can be used as a valid instrument for price in the demand equation. Similarly, an exogenous demand shifter 




and valid, 2SLS will produce consistent estimates of the parameters of the reduced form models. I 
subject the instrumental variables to tests for validity using the Sargan-Hansen test of 
overidentifying restrictions. The joint null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid instruments 
(i.e., they are uncorrelated with the error term) and that the excluded instruments are correctly 
excluded from the estimated equation. A rejection of the null hypothesis casts doubt on the 
validity of the instruments.  
To ensure the robustness of my estimates to arbitrary heteroskedasticity, I estimate my models 
with Stata’s -robust- option. The Cragg-Donald statistics are not valid in the presence of 
heteroskedascity. I therefore report the Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic (testing instrument 
relevance) and the Kleibergen-Paap F statistic (testing for weak instruments) which are valid in 
the presence of heteroskedascity. In both cases, a significant result suggests that the 2SLS model 
is identified (i.e. the relationship between the instrumental variable and the instruments is 
sufficiently strong to justify inference from the results). An insignificant test statistic indicates 
that the model is underidentified or too weakly identified (due to the weak relationship between 
the instrumental variable and the instruments) to justify inference from the model. 
I use the Ramsey reset test, adapted for instrumental variable estimation, to provide test of model 
specification. The test is more properly thought of as test of a linearity assumption in the mean 
function or a test of functional form restrictions and omitted variables and can be useful as a 
general check of model specification. In addition, I check that the presumed endogenous variable 






Before discussing results, note that the dataset contains information on monthly sales volumes, 
flour prices, and prices of demand and cost variables from September 2003 to December 2008. 
Table 2-1 presents some of the descriptive statistics and variable description.  
Table 2-1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Description 
Total quantity 64 165844.0 12791.2 Total quantity of cake flour (tonnes) 
SAFEX 64 2098.6 856.4 Average monthly SAFEX Randfontein wheat price per 
tonne (Rand) 
Price flour 64 6898.7 1260.6 Average monthly price of bread flour per tonne (Rand) 
Rice 64 8.2 2.5 Price of rice per kg (CPI, Rand) 
Other costs 64 494.4 53.3 Other costs per tonne of flour (Rand) 
Breakfast oats 64 9.9 1.2 Price of breakfast oats per 500g (CPI, Rand) 
Maize meal price 64 4.2 0.8 Price of maize meal per kg (CPI, Rand) 
DUMMY 64 0.7 0.5 1 if in cartel period and 0 otherwise 
 
The dataset is constructed using a combination of both public and private data. The private data is 
from the National Chamber of Milling (“NCM”) and the firms involved in the cartel themselves. 
The private dataset includes sales volumes. I include in the dataset monthly consumer price index 
data gathered from Statistics South Africa (“Stats SA”). This data captures monthly food prices 
and is provided by the South African Grain Information Service (“SAGIS”). This data is in the 
public domain. It contains nominal prices of flour and its substitutes such as maize meal, cereal, 
oats and rice. Figure 2-1 shows evolution of bread flour prices during and after the cartel. 
The wheat cost for is calculated using the average monthly SAFEX Randfontein wheat price per 
tonne (i.e. monthly average using daily SAFEX prices, lagged by 3 months to take into account of 
mills buying wheat on forward contracts) plus the SAFEX transport differential which is adjusted 
annually. Other costs are obtained from the firms’ annual submission to the NCM’s costing 
survey data. These costs are averaged across the regions for all of the firms and include 
packaging, distribution, production and marketing costs per tonne of milled wheat. The quantity 
data is obtained from the monthly destination of flour sales in tonnes per region. The cereals price 
index is compiled using the grains and rice price indices weighted by their average trade share for 
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2002-2004. The cereals price index is provided by the United Nations Food and Agriculture 
Organization (“FOA”).100  
Figure 2-1: Bread flour prices (1kg) Nominal CPI, Rands 
 





The estimated results are shown in Table 2 2. Columns 1 and 2 show the estimated results for the 
log-linear specification (where logarithms are taken of both dependent and independent 
variables). In the demand equation, the price elasticity is negative and significant but less than 1 
in absolute value. The demand curve is inelastic. This is consistent with the fact that wheat flour 
is used in a wide range of products for which substitutes cannot be readily found. As expected, 
increases in the price of oats and the cereal price index lead to greater flour demand. A 1 per cent 
rise in the price of oats makes for a 0.352 per cent increment in flour demand. This does not seem 
out of line with expectations. The coefficients for price and prices of oats are significant and 
positive. The supply equation shows that price was significantly higher during the cartel. Price is 
                                                          
100  Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) (2013). FAOSTAT-Agriculture database. Food and Agriculture 
Organization. [online] Available at: <http://www.fao.org> 
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an increasing function of quantity demand as expected. However, the coefficient for quantity is 
not significant.  
Table 2-2: Regression analysis (IV estimation) 
  log-linear model linear model 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 

































 Constant 13.75*** 30.54* 145,616*** 24,523* 
 





































Observations 64 64 64 64 
R-squared 0.561 0.636 0.502 0.463 
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic):  17.369 9.178 18.906 8.483 
Chi-sq(3) P-val =  0.001 0.083 0.000 0.101 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):  12.069 7.297 16.506 6.514 
(Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic): 13.479 8.465 17.36 7.33 
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all 
instruments):  0.0018 0.0319 0.518 1.971 
Chi-sq(2) P-val = 0.9044 0.0863 0.444 0.1785 
-endog- option: 
    Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors: 15.463 12.795 25.648 12.897 
Chi-sq(1) P-val =  0.0004 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 
Ramsey/Pesaran-Taylor RESET test 
    Test statistic:  0.002 0.063 0.097 3.075 
 P-value 0.962 0.797 0.881 0.781 
Notes: (i) Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; (ii) for the endogeneity test the null is 
that the specified endogenous regressors can actually be treated as exogenous; (iii) the instrument validity test is based 
on the Hansen-Sargan test. The joint null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid instruments, i.e., uncorrelated with 
the error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation. (iv) A statistical 
test of instrument relevance is provided by the Kleibergen-Paap LM test. The null hypothesis is that the instruments are 
not relevant. (v) Weak identification arises when the excluded instruments are correlated with the endogenous 
regressor, but only weakly. The Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic provides a formal test of weak identification. The null 




Columns 3 and 4 show the estimated results corresponding to the linear specification (where the 
data observations for both dependent and independent variables are left as levels). 101  The 
diagnostic statistics reveal that, for  both IV models, the endogenous variable is endogenous and 
the instruments are valid. They also suggest that the instruments are relevant and there is no 
evidence that the instruments are weak. The Pesaran-Taylor test suggests that there is no evidence 
of model misspecification. 
If I assume 𝛽3 =  log (1 +
𝜃
𝛼1
) for some constant 𝜃, then the value of 𝜃 implied by the estimates of 
𝛽3 and 𝛼1 is 0.031. What is important to note is that during the cartel prices were above those 
implied by the perfectly competitive price setting and were less than those implied by static joint 
profit maximizing. Note as well, that there is a slight drop in market power after the end of the 
cartel and 𝜃 is 0.028. My estimated conduct parameters suggest that the level of market power 
exercised by the wheat flour millers is quite low in both periods. In fact, it is closer to perfect 
competition 𝜃 = 0  than the monopoly outcome  𝜃 = 1 . The perfect collusion hypothesis is 
rejected by the data. But this highlights one important shortcoming of this approach. To be clear, 
when the estimated conduct parameter diverges from those implied the models of competition 
then I cannot define precisely the firm behaviour.  
There are two conditions to measure market power accurately. First, the functional form 
assumptions on demand and marginal cost must be correct, and second, the observed market 
outcomes must be generated by a conjectural variation model. If these conditions are not met, the 
risks of misspecification are high and the estimated market power (or conduct) parameter will 
become biased. 
I report estimates of the conduct parameter under two different functional form assumptions so as 
to assess the sensitivity of the conduct parameter estimate. A standard problem in most empirical 
studies is the selection of a functional form for the demand and marginal cost that is a poor 
                                                          
101 Assume a linear inverse demand function as below, where 𝑄𝑡 is demand in period t, 𝑃𝑡 is price in period t and 𝑋𝑡 is 
an exogenous demand shifter. 
𝑄𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑃𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑋𝑡 + 𝜖 
The supply function can be written as: 
𝑃𝑡 = 𝛽0 + (𝛽1 −
𝜃
𝛼1
)𝑄𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑊𝑡 + 𝜇 
where Wt is the exogenous cost shifter and 𝑄𝑡  is the quantity in period t. We solve the identification problem by 
assuming 𝜃𝑡 = {𝜃𝑐 , 𝜃𝑛} takes two values, 𝜃𝑐  indicates the value under a collusion regime and 𝜃𝑛 indicates the value 
under a non cooperative regime. 
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approximation of the data. The problem is that these assumptions cannot be directly tested. This 
leads to misspecification issues.102  
Another source of misspecification arises when the underlying economic model that generates the 
price and quantity data observed is poorly approximated by a conjectural variation model, then 
the empirical conjectural variation models may fail to estimate accurately market power. For 
example, the equilibrium outcome of some repeated oligopoly games cannot be reproduced by a 
conjectural variation model. In these cases, Corts (1999) critique applies. 
Corts (1999) finds that empirical conjectural variation models can yield inconsistent estimates of 
the conduct parameter if firms are engaged in efficient collusion (that is, above Cournot, below 
monopoly). For example, suppose that firms are colluding on a price higher than the Cournot 
price but lower than the joint monopoly price. Corts shows that the traditionally estimated 
conduct parameter typically will underestimate market power. This is because the traditional 
empirical industrial organisation approach does not consider the potentially binding incentive 
compatibility constraint (ICC) associated with the sustainability of collusion.  
Puller (2009) offers a solution to the Corts (1999)’s critique. I do not use, however, Puller 
(2009)’s correction for two reasons: (1) it requires firm-level quantity data, which I do not have; 
and (2) Puller (2009)’s correction is robust to efficient tacit collusion, but may not be robust to 
other forms of dynamic pricing. The degree of market power in wheat flour market is quite low 
implying that collusion may have been quite inefficient. So the Cort’s critique may not even 
apply to my situation. 
To estimate market power, some studies compare the estimate of the conduct parameter with 
direct estimate of the elasticity-adjusted Lerner index. However, the difficulties of getting access 
to data that accurately describes marginal cost mean that a very few studies can actually 
implement this comparative assessment. There is a growing literature examining the accuracy of 
empirical conjectural variation models.  
Starting with Genesove and Mullin (1998) who tested static oligopoly models using detailed 
historical data on the US sugar industry in the late 19th and early 20th century. During this time, 
the American Sugar Refining Company (also known as the Sugar Trust) attempted to dominate 
the industry, whilst fighting several entry attempts. Genesove and Mullin estimate the industry 
level conduct parameter during this period. 
                                                          
102 To illustrate arbitrarily, suppose the industry level conduct parameter estimate is 0.5 whereas the Cournot is 0.25 (in 
a four-firm market), the difference may simply be due to misspecification. 
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Their work was motivated by questions about the empirical conjectural variation model’s 
approach to estimation. The empirical conjectural variation model’s estimation relies on the first 
order condition for a firm relating price, conduct, output, inverse demand. The first order 
condition is used to estimate the conduct parameter directly or to estimate cost for a given value 
of the conduct parameter. Questions about the approach have centred on the robustness of 
estimates across functional forms and, more importantly, on the Corts (1999) critique. Genesove 
and Mullin (1998) illustrate that empirical conjectural variation models of estimating maker 
power understate market power. 
Wolfram (1999) uses detailed marginal cost data from the UK electricity industry to compare the 
industry level elasticity-adjusted mark-ups and finds that market power is very low (that is, the 
calibrated conduct parameter is 0.05 , equivalent to a symmetric 20 firm Nash-Cournot model). 
Then and in line with the approach taken by Genesove and Mullin (1998), Wolfram uses rotations 
of demand to estimate the industry conduct parameter. The results reveal an industry conduct 
parameter very close to 0. 
Clay and Troesken (2003) follow a similar approach as that used by Genesove and Mullin, in 
particular they adopt similar demand and cost function, to the US Whiskey Trust in the late 
nineteenth century. Notwithstanding the fact that the Trust was a hard-core cartel, their results 
suggest that it did not exercise much market power. They found a relatively low level of market 
power. Like Genesove and Mullin, Clay and Troesken find that the NEIO methodology appears 
to perform reasonably well for low levels of market power. They find that when conduct was 
allowed to have two regimes, normal and more collusive, which were identified based on 
historical evidence, estimates improved further. For the linear model, estimates of conduct were 
0.07-0.09 for the normal, 0.15-0.18 for the more collusive regime depending on the informational 
structure. This compares well to direct estimates of 0.08 for the normal regime and 0.18 for the 
more collusive regime 
Kim and Knittel (2006) also compare direct estimates of the adjusted-Lerner index that they 
construct using actual data on marginal cost with the estimated conduct parameter. To recover the 
elasticity of demand, they estimate a demand model for strategic firms, that is, firms that possess 
market power. They leave aside non-strategic firms that are price-takers and only bid their 
marginal cost curves. To test the robustness of the results, they assume that the demand curve 
takes different functional forms. Their analysis shows that the estimated conduct parameter tends 
to overstate market power. For example, in the linear demand case, the direct estimate of market 
power is 0.070 whilst the conduct parameter estimate from the estimated model is 0.123. The 
comparison becomes even less favourable for the linear-log and log-log models. For these models 
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the conduct parameter estimates are 0.188 and 0.229 respectively. Salvo's (2010) study finds that 
the empirical conjectural variation model of estimating market power understates market in the 
Brazilian Cement industry. 
The available evidence is mixed. It does not appear that the reliability of the empirical conjectural 
variation model approach is a function of the issues that are being investigated. For example, 
Genesove and Mullin (1998) and Clay and Troesken (2003) both examine the CPM's ability to 
recover estimates of market power in hard-core cartels, yet they find bias in opposing directions. 
Similarly, Kim and Knittel (2006) and Salvo (2010) estimate the degree of market power exerted 
in two homogenous product industries and also they find different directions for the bias. 
 
5. Detecting cartels 
 
In many competition investigations, the set of evidence gathered by competition authorities is not 
always clear-cut. Discriminating between collusive and non-collusive conduct is a challenge.103 
The empirical conjectural variation model approach may be helpful when such situation arises.  
But can it also be used to detect cartels? The presence of high price-cost margins may be an 
obvious first indication of a cartel. Harrington (2008) cautions on the pitfall of this measure as a 
screen for collusion because price-cost margins may be high for two reasons, that is, a high 
conduct parameter or a low price elasticity of demand. Hence, from observing high price-cost 
margins one may falsely conclude there is a cartel, whereas in practice the elasticity of demand in 
the industry is very low. A high price-cost margin whenever properly measured only provides 
evidence of market power and does not imply collusion.104 
So a more refined approach would be to use evidence on a high conduct parameter as an 
indication of cartel behaviour. Essentially this method compares the collusive and competitive 
models in order to determine which better fits the data. There is evidence of collusion if a 
collusive model better fits the data and the conduct parameter is high.105 While appealing at first, 
there are major problems to this approach which explain why it is not commonly as a tool for 
detecting cartels. First, there are empirical problems with estimating conduct associated with the 
robustness to functional form and specification errors. Second, and more importantly, there is also 
                                                          
103 For competition authorities, the objective of detecting a cartel is not to identify industries with high price-cost 
margins but rather to uncover prosecutoriable cases of collusion. 
104 Other reasons for a high price-cost margin are greatly differentiated products, production technologies protected by 
patents and trade secrets, and high search costs for consumers; and one suspects these are much more ubiquitous than 
collusion. 
105 Applications include Porter (1983) and Ellison (1994). 
70 
 
the question on the appropriate benchmark. How high should the conduct parameter be to speak 
of a cartel? 
To illustrate, in the flour industry, firms admitted their guilt and the settled the case before 
adjudication motivated by the testimonies of the other conspirators. However, available evidence 
suggests that demand is inelastic, so that the cartel was clearly not perfect in implementing the 
monopoly outcome. At the same time, the conduct parameter was not estimated to be very high, 
yet it may have been sufficiently high to raise prices drastically. Put differently, perfect collusion 
is often unlikely, but partial collusion may be sufficient to raise prices drastically and make 
cartels successful. So the question then is, how severe should partial collusion be before it should 
be used as evidence of an (illegal) cartel? For these reasons, it is unlikely that an estimate of the 
conduct parameter can be very useful in competition cases as evidence of the existence of cartels. 
Perhaps a simpler approach which focuses on looking at prices and whether there have been 
structural breaks is more useful. The idea is to simply estimate a reduced form price regression as 
a function of exogenous demand and cost shifters and include a test for a structural break. This 
test essentially asks whether price has increased or decreased at a certain time period for reasons 
other than demand or cost variables. 
A related application is by Abrantes-Metz, Froeb, Geweke and Taylor (2005). They use the time 
at which companies become aware of the competition investigation as the structural break. They 
test whether the variance in prices changes, and find a significant decrease in the price variance. 
One should generally be cautious because the event (such as trade association, new entry) may 
lead to a structural break for other reasons than cartel behaviour. For this reason, it is important to 
also show that the structural break is consistent with cartel behaviour. If there is no prior 
information on breaks, one may attempt to visually identify a break from a price series graph, e.g. 
see when price starts trending upwards or down-wards. There are also statistical methods for 
identifying structural breaks without prior information. 
Alternatively, I can test for differences between competitive and cartel firms. The illustration of 
this approach is provided in Porter and Zona (1993). They look at 116 auctions for highway 
construction contracts during 1979-1985. The procurement auctions are organized as first-price 
sealed bid. They have prior information on which firms were convicted for rigging bids. Bid 
rigging may take various forms: agreeing on bids in advance, on who will submit the lowest bid, 
rotating lowest bid, agreeing not to participate, etc. 
They estimate the bid function separately for competitive firms and for cartel firms. They find 
that the coefficients are significant for competitive firms (bids are initially decreasing and then 
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increasing in capacity and utilization. For cartel firms, the coefficients are insignificant or have 
opposite signs. A Chow test rejects the hypothesis that coefficients are equal. Porter and Zona 
also look at the ranking of bids. They find that the probability of being the lowest bidder or 
highest bidder does not differ significantly for competitive firms, but they do differ significantly 
for cartel firms. This is consistent with cartel story: winning bids (the lowest bids) are driven by 
cost determinants and expected surplus. In contrast, phantom bids (non-winning) should only be 
higher than the winning bid, but should not otherwise relate to cost factors.  
Porter and Zona (1999) use a similar approach for procurement auctions for school milk. A 
market is a school district where each district awards an annual contract for the supply of school 
milk. They test whether the bids of suspected firms respond the same way as the bids of 
competitive (unsuspected) firms. They estimate a bidding function for alleged cartel members and 
compare this with bidding functions of competitive firms. In addition, they also estimate a probit 
equation for the probability to participate in an auction. In summary, in these studies there is prior 
information on who is a possible cartel firm. In the first step one then tests whether there are 
significant differences in bidding behaviour between both groups of firms, and in a second step 




I have applied a 'switching model' approach suggested by Porter (1983) to the flour industry in 
South Africa. My goal was to demonstrate how a switching model could help assess market 
power. I identified two periods in the data, (1) the collusive conduct period and (2) the non 
collusive conduct period. To implement the model, I assumed that after the cartel ended, firms 
adopt a specific conduct (for example, perfect competition), which then allows us to recover the 
level of market power under collusion. 
Note that whenever I use this approach, I are likely to obtain a non-zero value for the conduct 
parameter. This would suggest that firms exercise some market power. Market power defined to 
mean that firms set price above marginal cost. This observation is too general and does not give 
us insights into the conduct, given that, even if the conduct parameter value is above zero in a 
given market in which several firms supply a product, this does not imply that these firms do not 
compete. Market power is not always the result of collusive conduct. There exist alternative 
sources of market power. For example, firms can achieve market power by supplying 
differentiated products or by having production processes requiring large upfront fixed costs. 
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My estimated conduct parameters suggest that the level of market power exercised by the wheat 
flour millers was quite low in both periods. But it does not correspond to the values implied by 
the models of competition. At first glance, this is surprising because I have hard core evidence of 
cartel during the collusive period. But, one could suggest simpler explanations for this 
observation. For example, the desire to have a ‘quiet life’ on the part of managers leads to 
managerial slack. Managerial slack may provide a motive of managers forming a cartel that may 
not show up in the form of profitability but x-inefficiencies.  
However, several important lessons are demonstrated by the findings. First, when the estimated 
conduct parameter diverges from those implied the models of competition, I cannot define 
precisely the firm behaviour. Second, given that the identification of the conduct parameter relies 
on functional form assumptions, it is important to test the robustness of the results to different 
functional form assumptions. Third, in order to use the model, I assumed that flour is 
homogenous. In other industries, where products are differentiated, the model would not be 
applicable. Further, as suggested by the Corts critique, when firms' behaviour cannot be replicated 
by a conjectural variation model, the results are unreliable. 
In light of the above, a pessimist might very well argue that the empirical conjectural variation 
model approach does a poor job of estimating market power and detecting cartels. While 
admittedly, this may be the case, it is not unique to the empirical conjectural variation models. 
The weaknesses of the models highlights a cautionary note for policy makers. This means caution 
should be exercised when relying on empirical techniques to makes inferences about industry 
performance. Therefore, one needs to point out at the outset that the empirical conjectural 
variation models are not perfect. More precisely, there are based on static models of competition, 
while collusive conduct is best explained by taking into account repeated firm interactions. 
However, knowing that a model has shortcomings is not a reason to ignore it when insights from 
the model could support the qualitative evidence. In any case, for policy makers’ best practice 
suggests that whenever any empirical model is used in competition policy, the policy maker must 
assess the empirical results in light of the limitations and perform sensitivity analysis to assess the 





B. Appendix  
 
I. MARKET POWER 
A common measure of market power is the above Lerner index. The problem is that marginal 
costs are unobserved. Suppose however that we know how to describe competition in the market. 
Consider, the following example of a perfect cartel. Assume that demand is given by  𝑄 =  𝑄(𝑝), 
with 𝑄 ′ <  0   and cost is given by  𝐶(𝑄)  and further the equilibrium is given by profit-
maximizing price [or quantity]. 
The profits are given by 𝜋 = 𝑝(𝑄) − 𝐶(𝑄(𝑝)) and the optimal price stratifies the following first 
order conditions: 
𝑄(𝑝) + 𝑝𝑄 ′(𝑝) − 𝐶 ′(𝑄(𝑝)𝑄 ′(𝑝) = 0          a1 
𝑄(𝑝) + (𝑝 − 𝐶 ′(𝑄(𝑝)))𝑄 ′(𝑝) = 0            a2 
This describes the trade-off between increasing margin and reducing sales following a price 
increase. We can therefore measure monopoly power by the Lerner index: 
𝐿 ≡





          a3 
With homogenous products, Bertrand competition gives rise to the Bertrand paradox, that is, in a 
static model with only two price-setting firms prices equal marginal cost, so there is no market 
power.  In a Cournot industry with homogeneous products the industry-level market power is 
𝐿 ≡





               a4 
The Lerner index can take any value between 0 and 1. Under perfect competition, the Lerner 
index is 0. Firms are assumed to exercise market power when the Lerner index takes any positive 
value. However, the Lerner index does not indicate of firm conduct. For example, in some 
industries the Lerner index near 1, because marginal costs are close to 0, yet firms may be 
actively competing. A high Lerner index does not necessarily mean that there is collusive 
conduct. They can be there are multiple sources of market power. 
The price-elasticity of demand tells us by how much demand will fall when price goes up. This is 
because consumer behaviour governs the ability of firms to raise price above marginal cost. If 
consumers are very price sensitive, this limits the firms’ ability to exercise market power and 
hence, the price-cost margin is small. Alternatively, when the price-elasticity is low (inelastic 
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demand), firms have high profit margins. Consider two simple specifications to estimate the price 
elasticity of demand. First, the linear demand function, 𝑄𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑃𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑋𝑡 + 𝜖, where X are 
exogenous demand shifters (e.g. income);  𝜖 is the error term. The price-elasticity of demand is 
given by 𝜂 = −𝛼1(
𝑝
𝑄
). Whereas, with constant elasticity demand function, 𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡 +
𝛼2𝑙𝑛𝑋𝑡 + 𝜖. The price-elasticity of demand is given by 𝜂 = −𝛼1 
In the NEIO approach, the equilibrium condition is used to measure market power without 
observing costs. Three pieces of information are necessary to estimate market power without 
relying on accounting data: (1) knowledge of the conduct in this particular industry; (2) a 















II. IDENTIFYING CONDUCT 
Can conduct be identified (jointly with cost and demand parameters) from equilibrium price and 
quantity data from different time periods? Following Bresnahan (1982), assume a linear inverse 
demand function as below, where 𝑄𝑡 is demand in period t, 𝑃𝑡 is price in period t and 𝑋𝑡 is an 
exogenous demand shifter. 
 
𝑄𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑃𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑋𝑡 + 𝜖                a5 
 
The linear marginal cost function is: 
 
𝑀𝐶𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑄𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑊𝑡 + 𝜇                    a6 
 
where Wt is the exogenous cost shifter and 𝑄𝑡 is the quantity in period t. 
 
The supply equation is defined as below 
𝑃𝑡 = 𝜃 (−
𝑄𝑡
𝛼0
) + 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑄𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑊𝑡 + 𝜇                   a7 
where θ is the conduct parameter. θ is equal to one if there is a monopoly or perfect collusion and 
zero if there is marginal cost pricing (perfect competition). Rearranging the supply function, I get: 
 
𝑃𝑡 = 𝛽0 + (𝛽1 −
𝜃
𝛼1
)𝑄𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑊𝑡 + 𝜇                    a8 
Therefore, using the exogenous variables I can identify 𝛼0, 𝛼1, 𝛼2, 𝛽0, (𝛽1 −
𝜃
𝛼1
) , 𝛽2 but I cannot 
separate the conduct parameter 𝜃 in the expression (𝛽1 −
𝜃
𝛼1






See Figure 1 in Bresnahan (1982) 
 
The slope of the marginal cost curve does not allow us to identify the conduct parameter. 
However, suppose I alter the model by adding a variable that exogenously rotates demand. Then, 
I have: 
𝑄𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑃𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑋𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑃𝑡𝑍𝑡 + 𝜖                a9 
 
where 𝑍𝑡 is the exogenous variable. The supply function now becomes: 
𝑃𝑡 = 𝜃 (
−𝑄𝑡
𝛼1+𝛼3𝑍𝑡
) + 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑄𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑊𝑡 + 𝜇                 a10 
 





                      a11 
And the supply function can be written as: 
𝑃𝑡 = 𝜃𝑄𝑡
∗ + 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑄𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑊𝑡 + 𝜇                      a12 
 
Now I can identify the slope of the marginal cost from variations in output and the conduct 
parameter from separate variations in 𝑄𝑡∗ . An example of this approach is Aw (1993) who 





See Figure 2 in Bresnahan (1982) 
 
Alternatively, following Porter (1983), I can solve the identification problem by assuming 
𝜃𝑡 = {𝜃
𝑐 , 𝜃𝑛} takes two values, 𝜃𝑐 indicates the value under a collusion regime and 𝜃𝑛 indicates 
the value under a non cooperative regime. Note the different use of 𝜃 relative to Bresnahan: (1) 𝜃 
varies over time according to a theory of repeated interaction; (2) no attempt to measure which 
equilibrium is being played in each period just document that there are 2 different states (the 
assumption is that the equilibrium being played is constant within a regime). Ellison (1994) re-
examines the Porter model, generalizing it in several ways. He also looks at Rotemberg-Saloner 
















III. APPENDIX FIRST STAGE REGRESSIONS 
Demand regression 
  
                                                                               
Instruments:   lnpertonmaize lncereal lnCpriceindex lnSAFEXP lnave_OC dcartel
Instrumented:  lnPrice
                                                                               
        _cons      13.7483   .5176645    26.56   0.000     12.71246    14.78415
lnCpriceindex     .1221673   .0301006     4.06   0.000     .0619362    .1823984
     lncereal     .3467191   .1639787     2.11   0.039     .0185985    .6748398
lnpertonmaize    -.2359103    .067139    -3.51   0.001     -.370255   -.1015655
      lnPrice    -.1315293   .0694811    -1.89   0.063    -.2705607     .007502
                                                                               
   lnQuantity        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                              Robust
                                                                               
                                                       Root MSE      =  .02972
                                                       R-squared     =  0.5612
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  4,    59) =   20.88
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression               Number of obs =      64
                                                                               
        _cons     5.830016   2.008345     2.90   0.005     1.808374    9.851658
      dcartel     .1967542   .0572749     3.44   0.001     .0820633    .3114452
     lnave_OC    -.2886723   .2384351    -1.21   0.231    -.7661304    .1887858
     lnSAFEXP     .4955834   .1438332     3.45   0.001     .2075623    .7836044
lnCpriceindex    -.3143028   .1554768    -2.02   0.048    -.6256398   -.0029658
     lncereal     1.807459   .3479746     5.19   0.000     1.110652    2.504266
lnpertonmaize    -.2120463   .1970908    -1.08   0.287    -.6067138    .1826212
                                                                               
      lnPrice        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    1.61514594    63  .025637237           Root MSE      =  .08404
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.7245
    Residual    .402563704    57  .007062521           R-squared     =  0.7508
       Model    1.21258223     6  .202097039           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  6,    57) =   28.62
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      64










                                                                              
               lnCpriceindex
Instruments:   lnSAFEXP lnave_OC dcartel lnpertonmaize lncereal
Instrumented:  lnQuantity
                                                                              
       _cons      30.5082   18.59008     1.64   0.106    -6.690452    67.70686
     dcartel     .2160915    .106169     2.04   0.046     .0036478    .4285351
    lnave_OC     .9792609   .8704346     1.13   0.265    -.7624747    2.720996
    lnSAFEXP     .4895246   .0710289     6.89   0.000      .347396    .6316531
  lnQuantity    -2.632941   1.983483    -1.33   0.189    -6.601881       1.336
                                                                              
     lnPrice        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  .09982
                                                       R-squared     =  0.6360
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  4,    59) =   31.69
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression               Number of obs =      64
                                                                               
        _cons      10.5204   .7094364    14.83   0.000     9.099777    11.94102
lnCpriceindex     .1000223   .0549213     1.82   0.074    -.0099557    .2100003
     lncereal       .03555     .12292     0.29   0.773    -.2105931    .2816931
lnpertonmaize    -.0672376   .0696212    -0.97   0.338    -.2066516    .0721765
      dcartel     .0339423    .020232     1.68   0.099    -.0065716    .0744562
     lnave_OC     .2943123   .0842258     3.49   0.001     .1256529    .4629716
     lnSAFEXP    -.0464574   .0508083    -0.91   0.364    -.1481992    .0552844
                                                                               
   lnQuantity        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    .118733152    63  .001884653           Root MSE      =  .02969
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.5324
    Residual    .050232511    57  .000881272           R-squared     =  0.5769
       Model    .068500642     6  .011416774           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  6,    57) =   12.95
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      64




III. ESSAY THREE 
3. STRATEGIC ENTRY DETERRENCE: PIONEER FOODS AND THE BREAD 
CARTEL 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Predatory pricing is exclusionary conduct in which the predatory firm sacrifices short run profits 
in order to achieve long run gains, in doing so causing rivals to exit and social welfare to be 
reduced. On one hand, predatory pricing can be anti-competitive, but on the other handprice 
reductions are the essence of competition. The debate on predatory pricing has been highly 
contested and has intrigued the competition policy community for more than a century. Some still 
argue that predatory pricing is as rare as dragons.106 Modern explanations of predatory pricing are 
mostly about asymmetric information and these explanations also focus on  a monopoly 
excluding weaker rivals.107 A notable exception to this literature is Harrington (1989) who studied 
collusion and predation under free entry. 108 
In December 2007, the Commission  received a complaint from Mossel Bay Bakery. Mossel Bay 
Bakery alleged that Sasko owned by Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd engaged in predatory pricing. 
Mossel Bay Bakery alleged further that, Sasko threatened it with price wars if it did not increase 
its price of bread. Mossel Bay Bakery also alleged that Pioneer Foods baked bread in Worcestor, 
300km away and transported it to Mossel Bay but sold its bread at a lower price in Mossel Bay 
than in Worcestor, in an attempt to drive Mossel Bay Bakery out of the market. If true, the alleged 
conduct could be in contravention of section 8 (c) of the Competition Act (dealing with 
anticompetitive general exclusionary conduct) and/or section 8 (d) (iv) (dealing with 
anticompetitive below average variable cost pricing). 
In February 2010, after contested proceedings, the Tribunal found that Pioneer Foods had been 
involved in a conspiracy to fix the prices of bread as well as market allocation in the Western 
Cape province and nationally. Further, while the Commission alleged that Pioneer Foods had 
engaged in anticompetitive predatory pricing in several towns in theWestern Cape, Pioneer Foods 
admitted in November 2010 that this conduct impeded small independent bakeries from 
expanding within the market and competing effectively, in contravention of section 8 (c) of the 
                                                          
106 See Easterbrook (1981). 
107 For a survey of this literature see Kobayashi (2010) and. Ordover and Saloner (1989). 
108 See Harrington (1989). 
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Competition Act, as part of the Pioneer Foods consent and settlement order concluded by the 
Tribunal.109  
I explore the relationship between strategic entry deterrence and the ability of colluding firms to 
maintain cartel profits in the presence of entry threats. Using Pioneer Foods’ admission to having 
engaged in predatory price wars, I focus on the following questions. First, how did Pioneer Foods 
and the bread cartel respond to entry? Second, how effective was Pioneer Foods’ conduct in 
maintaining collusion under the threat of entry. Section 2 discusses the literature on predatory 
pricing while section 3 outlines the relevant legislation for dealing with predatory pricing 
complaints. Section 4 provides background information of the bread industry, in particular the 
bread cartel in the Western Cape and section 5 presents a model and discusses the results. Section 
6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature  
 
Predatory pricing has given rise to a large and often conflicting economic literature. Before the 
1980s theoretical and empirical literature on price predation resulted in widespread skepticism 
regarding the rationality and frequency of predatory pricing. Sceptics argued that price cutting is 
the essence of competition, that imposing liability on a firm for setting its prices too low should 
only been done with great caution, if ever, and that successful predation, if it happens at all, is 
extremely rare. For a detailed review of the predatory pricing literature, see Kobayashi (2010) and 
Ordover and Saloner (1989). 
McGee’s (1958) influential article on the Standard Oil case provides the most appropriate starting 
point in reviewing the predation literature. Before McGee’s review, the consensus was that the 
Standard Oil case provided the classic case study in which local price predation was achieved. 
First, McGee challenged as a factual matter, whether Standard Oil had engaged in predatory 
pricing. McGee’s review of the record found that there was little or no evidence that Standard Oil 
systematically used local predatory pricing to monopolise the oil refining industry. 
Second, McGee argued, as a theoretical matter, that predatory pricing would only be an optimal 
strategy under very strong assumptions. McGee emphasized that better monopolising strategies 
exist, why would a monopolist engage in predatory pricing when it could simply and more 
profitably acquire its rivals? McGee pointed out that threat of predatory pricing was not credible. 
A monopolist would lose more by predatory pricing when it could just co exist with a rival. 
                                                          




McGee noted that driving a rival from the market might do little to increase the predator’s market 
power, because other entrants would enter. McGee questioned why the prey could not credibly 
survive the predatory pricing by drawing on internal funds or borrowing as needed. 
McGee’s review initiated a vast literature that also questioned the theoretical and empirical 
relevance of predatory pricing. For example, while Easterbrook (1981) covered the same ground 
as McGee, he elaborated of a number of issues. Following Selten (1978), Easterbrook criticised 
the credibility of a threat to predate in multiple markets. Selten (1978) used game theory to 
demonstrate how rational players could undermine threats of predation in multiple markets. 
Selton’s argument is commonly known as the “chain store paradox”. Many others, followed 
McGee in reviewing other cases where predatory pricing was alleged. Similar to McGee, this 
literature found little or no evidence of profitable predation. For example, Koller (1971), 
reviewed 31 cases of alleged predation, and found few instances of successful predation.110  
Ordover and Saloner (1989) provide a survey of post-1980 theoretical literature which sought to 
respond to McGee, Easterbrook, Koller and other skeptics. Ordover and Saloner summarise this 
literature into three classes of models based upon asymmetric information: (1) asymmetric 
financial constraints, (2) reputation based models, and (3) signaling models.111 
The first class is the well-known “deep pocket” model.112 Under this model, the smaller firm 
would earn positive profits, but for predation. By depleting the rival’s financial resources, or 
credibly threatening to do so, the predator can induce exit or deter entry. Bolton and Scharfstein 
(1990) show how deep pocket predation can occur even if the prey and its lenders are 
sophisticated. In their model, lenders’ decisions regarding external financing are sensitive to a 
firm’s short term performance. This gives managers incentives and addresses manager 
shareholder agency costs. However, a predator knowing this relationship between a firm and its 
lender can take advantage of it by using price predation to lower current profits, which in turn 
reduces external financing and induces exit. The use of financial contracting by potential entrants 
to reduce the threat of predation, and the effect of renegotiation on its effectiveness is further 
examined by Snyder (1996). 
                                                          
110 Following McGee’s methodology, Elzinga (1970) re-examined the history of the gunpowder trust, and found that 
many of the alleged victims were not victims of predatory pricing, and that there was no conclusive evidence that any 
of the victims were subjected to predatory pricing. Adelman (1966) found little evidence of predatory pricing by A&P 
despite the government’s successful prosecution for predatory pricing. 
111 These studies, as well as much of the literature on strategic entry deterrence, concentrate solely on the monopoly 
case. Their qualitative results can be expected to hold when the incumbents act as a cartel. 
112 Telser (1966) examines asymmetries favouring the incumbent, such as capital-market imperfections and related 
features that prevent competition on equal terms and later Benoit (1984) shows that moderate asymmetries can produce 
severely asymmetric outcomes. In Fudenberg and Tirole (1985)\ predation causes the entrant to have sufficiently little 
cash after entry that it cannot stay in the market; no bank will lend to it at a profitable interest rate. 
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In the second class of asymmetric information models, are reputational models of predation 
where the predator faces multiple markets entry. Selten’s chain store paradox showed that 
predatory pricing is irrational in a finite game. In responding to the backward induction logic, 
reputational models demonstrate that predation may be rational (see the highly influential work 
by Milgrom and Roberts (1982b) and Kreps and Wilson (1982)). For example, Milgrom and 
Roberts consider a finite sequence of different entrants, all of whom know that fighting entry is 
costly for the incumbent. For the incumbent failure to fight any entry might reveal that fighting 
entry is unprofitable and induce subsequent entrants to enter. The incumbent’s readiness to fight 
deters potential entrants, even if the early entrants are well informed and therefore initial 
predation may be rational. 
The third class of asymmetric information models are signaling models of predation. In these 
models, predation occurs when the entrant is unsure about either the incumbent’s costs113 or 
market demand.114 And the incumbent wishes to credibly signal information about demand and 
costs. Signaling models include models of limit pricing where lowered prices are used to deter 
entry.115  Other theories of predation include Cabral and Riordan (1997, 1994) and Marx and 
Shaffer (1999). 116  Fumagalli and Motta (2009) show how based on scale economies and 
sequential buyers (or markets), the entrant needs to reach a critical scale to be successful but the 
incumbent is ready to make losses on earlier buyers so as to deprive the prey of the scale it needs, 
thus making monopoly profits on later buyers. The examples of the literature cited above focus on 
the monopoly case, while their results can be expected to hold for the cartel case, Harrington 
(1989) studies whether cartel members can sustain cooperation over time under the threat of free 
entry in an infinitely-repeated game and shows that firms can deter entry by credibly threatening 
to meet any entry with an episode of below cost pricing.117 
                                                          
113 See Salop and Shapiro (1980), Milgrom and Roberts (1982a), Saloner (1987) 
114  Roberts (1986) examines a similar model where information is incomplete as to demand rather than cost. In 
addition, there is earlier literature on ‘test market predation’ (Sharfstein (1984), describing an earlier model by Salop 
and Shapiro (1980)) in which there could be signaling in a local or ‘test’ market competition that occurs prior to 
competition at the national level. 
115  For example, Saloner (1987) adapted the Milgrom and Roberts (1982a) limit pricing model to consider how 
predatory pricing can be used to induce the exit of an existing competitor 
116 Cabral and Riordan (1997, 1994) have a learning curve model of equilibrium predation, in which firms’ current 
period production costs are a function of the cumulative production. In such a learning curve environment, Cabral and 
Riordan show that rational predation occurs in equilibrium, where the predator expands output and lowers price in 
order to further take advantage of the learning curve cost reductions and to induce its rival’s exit. 
117 Harrington (1984) develops a model to solve an entry game between a duopoly and a potential entrant when there is 
a certain type of informational asymmetry. The two incumbent firms know whether they are able to collude, but the 
potential entrant does not. Asymmetric information is shown to result in entry's being deterred which would have 
occurred under complete information. For the incumbent firms to deter entry, however, they must price more 
competitively to reduce current profits. A high pre-entry profit rate is endogenously derived to be a signal to the 
potential entrant that entry is profitable. 
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The empirical evidence on predation has also been hotly debated since the 1950s. Similar to the 
post-Chicago School literature, recent empirical studies have challenged the findings of the 
Chicago School. For example, Zerbe and Cooper (1982) updated and expanded Koller (1971) 
study. However, in contrast to the low rate of successful predation reported by Koller, Zerbe and 
Cooper (1982) found that the predator was successful, or would have been successful but for a 
lawsuit, in raising prices in 27 out of 40 cases. A limitation of empirical studies of litigated cases 
is that it is unclear what inferences can be made from the results. Litigated cases are a highly 
selected sample of cases, and may not be representative, in either frequency or substance, of the 
larger universe of cases, including settled or dropped cases and cases never filed, see Priest and 
Klein (1980). Bolton et al. (2000) argue that proof of predation in litigation cases is not rare, and 
may be considerably higher if settled cases were taken into account. 
Burns (1986) found evidence that predatory pricing by American Tobacco enabled it to acquire 
its rivals, those who were targets of the predation and others based on reputational effects, on 
more favourable terms using regression analysis. Burns found statistically significant coefficients 
consistent with predation reducing the cost of acquiring competitors through both reputation and 
direct effects. Burns estimates the effect of reputation was to reduce the acquisition costs by 25 
per cent, with an additional discount of 56 per cent resulting from preying on the relatively 
smaller fine cut tobacco, snuff, and smoking tobacco firms. Morton (1997) used regression 
analysis to examine pricing by ocean shipping conferences in response to entry, and found 
evidence consistent with the long purse theory. Morton found evidence of the deep pocket theory 
of predation. Morton’s main result was that new and smaller entrants were more likely to 
experience price wars. Weiman and Levin (1994) using regression analysis, found that Southern 
Bell Telephone priced below cost, especially in areas where it competed with rival networks. 
Further, telephone prices fell immediately prior to new entry and prices fell further after new 
entry.  
Genesove and Mullin (2006) provided direct evidence of predation through below-cost pricing in 
the American sugar industry before World War 1 by comparing sugar prices to a direct 
measurement of marginal cost. Genesove and Mullin found episodes of prices that were below 
marginal cost and they constructed competitive price-cost margins, and showed that actual 
margins were lower than these constructed margins. Genesove and Mullin’s work is most closely 
related to this paper, in that I also provide direct evidence of predatory pricing.  
Experimental methods have also applied to predatory pricing (see Plott (1989), Normann (2007)). 
Issac and Smith (1985) examined predation in an experimental setting designed to be conducive 
to the observation of predatory pricing and it was not observed. Harrison (1988) extended the 
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Issac and Smith experiments to a setting where the monopolist faced a single entrant in multiple 
markets. In this setting, Harrison found some evidence of predatory pricing, but the evidence is 
weak given that only one trial looked at multiple markets. Gomez et al. (2008) report that 
predation was not observed in three replications of the Harrison experiments. An interesting 
question arises from the above examples, what can I learn from the empirical evidence on 
predatory pricing? It appears the answer depends on how I define predatory pricing. 
 
3. Relevant legislation 
 
Legal rules in competition policy are aimed at minimising the sum of direct costs and error costs. 
Error costs include the costs of Type I and Type II errors. Type II errors include allowing 
anticompetitive predatory pricing while Type I errors include falsely labelling price cuts as 
anticompetitive when in fact they are welfare increasing or deterring efficient price competition 
from occurring in the first place. Areeda and Turner (1975) provide the seminal article on the cost 
based test applied to predatory pricing cases. Their work is premised on the observation that in 
perfectly competitive markets, price equals short‐run marginal cost. Areeda and Turner (1975) 
propose that prices above short run marginal cost should be lawful, while prices below short run 
marginal cost unlawful. The short run period is suggested because a firm does not change 
production assets. However, it is difficult to observe, let alone measure marginal cost. Areeda and 
Turner (1975) suggest the use of average variable cost (“AVC”) as a more easily observable 
proxy. In this case, prices below AVC would be presumptively unlawful. 
According to Areeda and Turner (1975), a price below AVC is irrational for a profit-maximising 
firm, whereas a price above AVC is, in the short-run at least, sustainable and therefore a 
reasonable benchmark for a legitimate price. The implicit assumption here is the argument that 
competition law should only protect firms which are at least as efficient as the dominant firm. The 
Areeda and Turner test has had a major influence on predatory pricing laws in many developing 
and developed countries, including South Africa. In Europe, the European Court of Justice 
(“ECJ”) framed the Areeda and Turner test in its AKZO decision in the following manner;118 (1) 
prices set by a dominant firm below its AVC are presumed abusive; (2) prices above AVC but 
below average total costs are abusive if they are intended to eliminate a competitor; and (3) prices 
above average total costs are conclusively legal.  
                                                          
118 Case C‐62/86, AKZO Chemie BV v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. I‐3359 ¶¶ 70‐73 (E.C.J. (holding that above variable 
cost but below total cost pricing is illegal if intended to eliminate a competitor). 
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Because of problems with the classification of fixed and variable costs, the allocation of common 
fixed and variable costs between two or more products, and developments in economic thinking 
have led others to propose certain modifications to the Areeda and Turner test. de la Mano and  
Durand (2005) argue for a three-step structured rule of reason to establish a presumption that the 
observed practice is predatory, that is;119 (1) the sacrifice of short-run profits (actual sacrifice); (2) 
the negative impact on rival profitability which may induce a prey to exit, reduce its scale or stay 
out of the ‘sacrifice’ market or closely related markets (likely exclusion); and (3) the ability to 
recoup the initial profit sacrifice by exercising increased market power after the predatory phase 
(likely recoupment). 
In December 2008, the European Commission issued its guidance paper on enforcement priorities 
in applying Article 82 EC to exclusionary conduct by dominant firms (“Guidance Paper”). 
According to the Guidance Paper, pricing below average avoidable cost (“AAC”) is a clear 
evidence of sacrifice. AAC involves comparing the incremental cost of remaining in the market 
with the avoidable cost of exiting it. A rational firm would not sell below its AAC. It makes more 
economic sense for firm to exit the market, if avoidable costs exceed the incremental costs.  
The AAC test has the advantage of not requiring the identification of fixed and variable costs. 
While the AAC overcomes some challenges associated with the Areeda and Turner test, it can 
raise significant practical problems. First, the AAC test does not avoid the difficulty under the 
Areeda and Turner test of defining the appropriate time period over which avoidable costs should 
be identified. Second, some assets are transferable assets between markets. Assets that can be 
transferred between markets result in much larger avoidable costs that those which cannot. Third, 
demand complementarity means that prices that are below AAC may be recovered if the loss-
leading sales generate follow-on revenues in other higher margin products. Fourth, a dominant 
firm could minimise losses by reducing sales and charging a higher price than by exiting. Finally, 
considerable accounting problems may arise in measuring avoidable costs.  
The Guidance Paper suggests that pricing above AAC but below long-run average incremental 
cost (LRAIC) may be also viewed as abusive under specific circumstances. Recoupment is not 
expressly mentioned although the Guidance Paper states that consumers are likely to be harmed 
where the dominant firm is, as a result of its conduct, “likely to be in a position to benefit from 
the sacrifice”. This appears to imply that a possibility of recoupment is required under the 
Guidance Paper’s predation test. The differences between the Guidance Paper and the U.S. test 
for predation under Brooke Group case is that the U.S. test captures only pricing below average 
                                                          
119 See De la Mano and Durand (2005), Three-Step Structured Rule of Reason to Assess Predation under Article 
82.”Discussion Paper, Office of the Chief Economist. DG Competition. European Commission. 
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variable cost, whereas the Guidance Paper focuses on sacrifice; and while probability of 
recoupment is required in the U.S., a mere possibility is sufficient under the Guidance Paper.120  
In the case of the South African competition law regime, the relevant applicable sections of the 
Competition Act under which allegations of predatory pricing by a dominant firm are assessed 
include section 8 (c). Section 8 (c) prohibits a dominant firm from engaging in exclusionary 
conduct defined in general terms, with no penalty for a first contravention and with the onus on 
the complainant to demonstrate that the anti-competitive effect outweighs its technological, 
efficiency or other pro-competitive benefits. An exclusionary act is defined as that which impedes 
or prevents a firm entering into, or expanding within, a market. Section 8 (d) identifies particular 
types of exclusionary acts that are prohibited as an abuse of dominance, and where a penalty may 
be imposed for a first contravention and the onus on the Commission to demonstrate that the anti-
competitive effect outweighs its pro-competitive benefits. The types of conduct specified under 
section 8 (d) include selling goods or services below their marginal or average variable cost in 
section 8 (d) (iv). 
In the Nationwide/SAA case, the Tribunal set out the test for predatory pricing. 121 First, the 
Tribunal argued that the complainant must establish that the respondent is pricing below cost for a 
sustained period and that this price-cost relationship need not be the one referred to in 8 (d) (iv) 
but should have some support in the literature as an appropriate measure of costs. Second, the 
Tribunal stressed the need for some additional evidence of predation. The Tribunal further stated 
that if the complainant is relying on the provisions under section 8 (c) and can show that the 
respondent costs are below some other appropriate measure of costs, it may prevail provided it 
adduces additional evidence of predation beyond mere evidence of recoupment. 
 
4. The bread industry: A historical background 
 
A. BACKGROUND  
 
The bread industry was extensively regulated up until 31 March 1991. Through legislation a 
quota system was established, product specifications (such as weight, height and width per loaf) 
were prescribed, prices at which bread was sold were set and volumes to be produced and 
distribution areas for each producer determined. Bread prices were subsidised by government and 
                                                          
120 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993). 
121
 Competition Tribunal case number 92/IR/Oct00. Available at http://www.comptrib.co.za/assets/Uploads/Case-
Documents/92IROCT00.pdf and assessed on 19/07/2012 
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there was no value added tax on bread. In this environment, there were approximately 370 
bakeries country-wide which included the four largest national bakeries and smaller independent 
brands. 
During the regulated period, regular meetings took place between bread producers largely, 
although not exclusively, under the auspices of the Chamber of Baking, to which all of the bakers 
belonged. Bread producers discussed various issues including circumstances in which producers 
were encroaching on each other’s allocated areas and where producers were exceeding their 
volumes, together with compensation that those violating the agreements were obliged to pay. A 
culture of co-operation and information sharing on prices, volumes and market allocation was 
entrenched in the industry over many decades. Market participants knew the price of bread 
(determined by government), each other’s distribution territory and volumes sold by the various 
producers.  
With deregulation, the legislative impediment to competition was removed. However, bread 
producers continued with their interaction with regard to common issues such as labour relations 
and missing bread crates. The Chamber of Baking also continued as a forum for sharing 
information on the industry where issues such as deliveries of wheat, quality of wheat, 
unscrupulous bakers and security concerns were discussed freely and legitimately. Deregulation 
allowed for the growth in smaller and in-store bakeries. Together with the removal of prescribed 
delivery zones/routes and production quotas, this put pressure on the costs per unit of  plant 
bakeries. 
There are four primary bakeries who enjoy a combined market share of between 50- 60 per cent 
of the domestic bread market in South Africa. Blue Ribbon Bakeries owned by Premier Foods, 
Albany Bakeries owned by Tiger Consumer Brands, Sasko and Duens Bakeries owned by 
Pioneer Foods and Sunbake Bakeries owned by Foodcorp .The remainder of the market is served 
by smaller independent bakeries. The four primary plant bakeries are all vertically integrated. 
Their milling operations account for more than 90 per cent of all milled wheat. As milling 
companies they sell flour to the independent bakeries. Plant bakeries and independent bakeries 
produce similar products and are competitors with each other. 
Wheat flour is the main ingredient used to bake bread. The cost of wheat flour constitutes 
approximately 41 per cent of the cost per loaf of bread. The bakeries’ bread recipes are similar 
since they contain the same ingredients. The costs of operating a plant bakery are also 
comparable, as are the costs of distribution which are mainly driven by fuel prices. The bakeries’ 
input costs essentially comprise wheat flour, fuel and labour are therefore similar and are subject 
to the same price fluctuations. Customers tend to be classified into three categories (retail, general 
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trade and agents). Retail customers are the large retail groups. The general trade comprises 
smaller entities such as spaza shops, cafes and smaller retailers and the final category includes a 
variety of agents such as resellers and independent distributors. The largest single buyer of bread 
are the large retail customers (supermarkets) who purchase approximately 30 per cent of the 
bakeries’ production. 
Plant bakeries set their prices nationally. Pioneer Foods sells its bread to distributors and retailers 
at a discount or rebate off the list price. The list price is therefore not the actual price paid by the 
customer. Once the list price is determined Pioneer Foods, in common with the practice employed 
by its competitors, will inform its various retail customers of the change in price. Pioneer Foods’ 
national sales managers, who are responsible for the actual bread prices for the national key 
accounts, being the large supermarket chains, forecourts and convenience franchises meet with 
the respective buyers of these important retailers in order to communicate the price adjustment 
and, critically, to negotiate discounts before the net price is loaded on to the large retailers’ 
systems. Increases to the general trade customers and distributors will be communicated by letter 
usually delivered together with the bread. 
Pioneer Foods’ bakery managers are responsible for determining the actual bread price for 
smaller customers, local supermarkets, convenience stores and distributors and will take regional 
competition into consideration when determining the bread price. The primary plant bakeries in 
the Western Cape province which collectively account for approximately 60 per cent of bread 
sales areTiger Brands, Pioneer Foods and Premier Foods. 
 
B. THE BREAD CARTEL 
 
In December 2006, the Commission received information of an alleged bread cartel operating in 
the Western Cape province. Following a preliminary investigation, the Commission initiated a 
complaint against Premier Foods, Tiger Brands and Pioneer Foods, all of whom allegedly had 
been involved in a bread cartel.  
 
During the Commission’s investigation into the Western Cape complaint, Premier Foods applied 
for leniency, indicating its willingness to fully co-operate with the Commission on its role in the 
bread cartel. Premier Foods disclosed to the Commission that it was a member of a bread cartel 
together with Tiger Brands and Pioneer Foods, fixing selling prices and other trading conditions. 
Premier Foods also revealed that the bread cartel operated in other parts of the country and that 
the cartel allocated markets. Cartel agreements were used to secure co-ordination at both national 
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and regional levels and were mutually reinforcing. Based on this information, the Commission 
proceeded to initiate a second investigation into the allegation that a bread cartel operated in other 
parts of the country.  
Tiger Brands followed Premier Foods and corroborated the information provided by Premier 
Foods. Tiger Brands provided further evidence on the bread cartel, including additional 
information that the bread cartel was also fixing flour and maize meal prices. On 28 November 
2007, the Tribunal imposed a fine of R98 million on Tiger Brands for its role in the bread cartel. 
This represented about 5.7 per cent of its turnover from baking for the financial year 2006. 
Foodcorp, a respondent in the national complaint, entered into a settlement agreement with the 
Commission and on 6 January 2009 the Tribunal confirmed the settlement agreement and 
imposed a fine of R45 million on Foodcorp. This represented 6.7 per cent of its turnover for 
baking operations for the financial year 2006. Pioneer Foods however, at this stage, denied that it 
was involved in a Western Cape cartel. After contested proceedings, on February 3, 2010 the 
Tribunal ruled that Pioneer Foods had engaged in fixing the price of bread products in the 
Western Cape province and nationally and imposed on Pioneer Foods a fine of R196 million. 
Pioneer Foods conceded that it had, in respect of the Western Cape complaint, acted in 
contravention of section 4(1) (b) of the Competition Act (the section that prohibits collusion). 
This concession only came at the end of the hearings during legal argument. Pioneer Foods 
admitted that it co-operated with its competitors in fixing the price of standard bread, the discount 
granted to the agents or resellers and in fixing the price of toaster bread. It also admitted to market 
sharing arrangements. 
Up until it was disbanded in 2002, meetings of the Western Cape Chamber of Baking took place 
regularly. These were chaired by Pioneer Foods. It was common practice for the participants to 
discuss prices of breadafter the conclusion of the official business of the meetings. With the 
disbandment, informal meetings continued to be convened every 4 - 5 months to discuss, inter 
alia, the price magnitude and timing of the price increases and discounts to agents. Agreements 
that arose from these informal meetings were sometimes not honoured. Cheating was generally in 
terms of granting confidential discounts particularly to the large retailers. This generated a 
retaliatory response from the other cartel members thus reducing the net margin gained from an 
agreed increase.  
Informal meetings were discontinued after a meeting held in October 2003 broke up in 
considerable acrimony precisely because of perceptions of cheating on pricing agreements. 
However, ad hoc contact between representatives of the plant bakeries continued even after these 
informal ‘post-chamber’ meetings had been terminated. For example, in December 2006 Premier 
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Foods, Pioneer Foods and Tiger Brands contravened section 4 (1) (b) (i) and (ii) of the 
Competition Act 122  in that they met and agreed that (1) all three firms would increase the 
discounted price of toaster bread on 5 February 2007 to realise R4.25 per loaf including tax; (2) 
all three firms would increase the price of the standard loaf of bread by 35c per loaf from 18 
December 2006; (3) the dates by which the bread price increases were to be implemented would 
be staggered so as not to be implemented on the same date; (4) discounts given by all three firms 
to agents in the Paarl and Cape Peninsula area would be capped at 90c and 75c respectively; (5) 
none of the firms would supply new distributors; (6) none of the firms would supply each other’s 
former employees; and (7) none of the firms would make bread deliveries on 25 and 26 
December 2006. 
The Tribunal found that Pioneer Foods had indeed been involved in a conspiracy to fix the 
increase of the price of a standard loaf of bread in the Western Cape as well as the timing of the 
price increase. In addition, to Pioneer Foods’ concessions regarding the fixing of the agents’ 
commissions and the various market allocations, the Tribunal found that Pioneer Foods’ conduct 
amounted to a comprehensive contravention of Section 4(1) (b) (i) and (ii) of the Competition 
Act. 
5. Collusion and predation 
 
This section sets out in sufficient detail Harrington (1989)’s model which is relevant to the issues 
at hand. Harrington (1989) studies whether cartel members can sustain cooperation over time in a 
perfect-information, infinitely repeated game under the threat of free entry and shows that firms 
can deter entry by credibly threatening to meet any entrant with an episode of below-cost pricing. 
In the free entry equilibrium, when firms do not collude, the response of the incumbent firms to 
entry is the single-period Nash equilibrium.  
However, when firms collude, one response of incumbent firms to entry is defined by the cartel 
breaking up. When firms attempt to support cooperation by threatening to break up the cartel in 
response to either internal or external defection, price cannot be kept significantly above the 
competitive level when the cost of entry is low. Since single-period Nash equilibrium profits are 
always positive, the threat of discontinuing collusion is not a sufficiently severe punishment so as 
to allow active firms to maintain a significant degree of cooperation when the threat of entry is 
strong. 
                                                          
122 These two sections prohibit price fixing and market allocation respectively 
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The other response, when firms collude, is defined by the cartel surviving entry. Incumbent firms 
can either accommodate the entrant by achieving a collusive outcome or coordinate in punishing 
the entrant. The strategy of the incumbent firms may or may not entail driving the new entrant out 
of the industry.  
To illustrate the normal form model, assume there is large pool of active and inactive firms which 
are represented by Z. Let 𝐴𝑡  be a subset of Z denoting active firms and 𝑁𝑡 the number of active 
firms, both for period t where t = 1, 2,….The set of potential entrants in period t is then 
represented by 𝑍 − 𝐴𝑡. A firm which is ‘active’ chooses an output rate while a firm which is 
‘inactive’ decides whether or not to enter the industry. All active firms offer a homogeneous 
product where the inverse market demand function is P(Q); Q being the industry output rate. Each 
firm has the same cost function 𝐶(𝑞𝑖) where 𝑞𝑖  is the output rate of firm i. The single-period 
profit function of firm i is then 𝛱(𝑞𝑖, 𝑄−𝑖) ≡ 𝑃(𝑞𝑖 + 𝑄−𝑖)𝑞𝑖 − 𝐶(𝑞𝑖) where 𝑄−𝑖 = 𝑄 − 𝑞𝑖  and 
 𝜋(𝑞, 𝑛) ≡ 𝛱(𝑞, (𝑛 − 1)𝑞). 
 
Assume further that, there exits 𝑄 ̅such that 𝑃 (𝑄) = 0, iff  𝑄 ≥ ?̅?. P(Q) is twice differentiable, 
bounded and 𝑃′(𝑄) < 0;   ∀  𝑄 ∈ [0, 𝑄]̅̅ ̅. 𝐶(𝑞𝑖)  is twice differentiable and e  𝐶(0) = 0.  𝑃(0) >
𝐶
′   (0) > 0, and 𝐶"(𝑞𝑖) ≥ 0;  ∀ 𝑞𝑖  ≥ 0. ∏(𝑞𝑖, 𝑄−𝑖) is quasi- concave in 𝑞𝑖 and  𝜋(𝑞, 𝑛) is strictly 
quasi concave in q. These assumptions are conducive to entry. Ignoring any cost of entry, the firm 
cost function exhibits non-increasing returns to scale so that minimum efficient scale is arbitrarily 
close to zero. A decision to enter incurs a non-recoverable cost K, where 𝐾 ≥ 0, and allows the 
firm to begin production in the following period. 
Suppose incumbent firms respond to entry by accommodating the entrant and achieving a new 
collusive outcome. Let 𝑞 ′ (𝑛) ∈ [𝑞𝑚́ (𝑛), 𝑞𝑐(𝑛)] denote the firm collusive output rate when there 
are n active firms. If  𝑁𝑡  active firms are colluding in period t and pursue a policy of 
accommodation, a potential entrant can anticipate firms shifting production from   ?́?(𝑁𝑡)  to 
  ?́?(𝑁𝑡 + 1) in response to entry. Suppose that internal defection is punished by discontinuing 
collusion.  A free-entry equilibrium is then defined by the function   ?́?(𝑛) and a number of firm, 














Whatever the market structure is, no active firm has an incentive to deviate from the collusive 
outcome as shown in equation 1. Entry is unprofitable when potential entrants anticipate collusion 
to be continued after entry according to equation 2. In this case, entry must be at least as 
profitable when active firms accommodate entry as when they discontinue cooperation. As the 
number of firms increases without bound, the single period Nash equilibrium price converges to 
the competitive price. If the cost of entry is positive but small then the number of active firms is 
relatively large so that the best cooperative price is found to be close to the competitive price. 
Therefore, when entry is accommodated, price cannot be kept significantly above the competitive 
level in the absence of significant costs to entry. 
Following Abreu (1986), Harrington (1989) also considers the case when incumbent firms 
continue to collude after entry but instead of pursuing accommodation they coordinate in 
implementing a policy of predation. Abreu (1986) investigated more severe punishments than 
reversion to a single-period Nash equilibrium in order to derive the highest level of profits that a 
fixed number of firms can sustain as a sub-game perfect equilibrium. Abreu’s work shows that 
the optimal punishment strategy can be used to deter entry as well as prevent cheating by active 
firms. Since the optimal stick-and-carrot punishment minimises the post-defection payoff for all 
active firms (subject to the punishment being symmetric), it then also represents the optimal 
punishment to be inflicted upon a new firm. 
In defining the period t action function of an active firm, let 𝑡′ be the most recent period for 







) 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑜𝑚𝑒  𝑗 ∈ 𝐴𝑡
′. 
For this purpose, consider the strategy for incumbent firms: 
 
𝑆𝑖




𝑞 ̇ (𝑁𝑡)    𝑖𝑓 𝑞𝑗
𝜏 = ?̇?(𝑁𝑡),   𝑗 ∈ 𝐴𝜏, 𝜏 = 1, … . . , 𝑡 − 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝐴𝜏 = 𝐴1 
𝜏 = 1 , … . , 𝑡   𝑜𝑟 𝑞𝑗
𝜏 = 𝑞 ̅(𝑁𝜏),     𝑗 ∈ 𝐴𝜏;   𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑜𝑚𝑒  𝜏 ∈ {𝑡′ + 1, … , 𝑡 − 1}
?̅?(𝑁𝑡)   𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
  } 
 
𝑖 ∈ 𝐴𝑡 , 𝑡 = 2, 3, ….                                                          (3) 
 
A potential entrant’s strategy is of the following form: 
 
𝐸𝑖






𝐷𝑜 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟   𝑖𝑓  𝑖 𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑜 𝐴𝑡  
𝑆𝑖
𝑡                                                         𝑖𝑓      𝑖 ∈ 𝐴𝑡
} 
𝑡 = 2, 3, … , 𝑖 ∈ 𝑍 − 𝐴𝑡 ,                                                        (4) 
 
For equation 4 to be a best response, it must be true that 
 
𝛿𝜋(𝑞 ̅(𝑛 + 1), 𝑛 + 1) + (
𝛿2
1−𝛿
)𝜋(?́?(𝑛 + 1) − 𝐾 ≤ 0                 (5) 
 
A new firm will incur K upon entry and induce punishment profits of  𝜋(𝑞 ̅(𝑛 + 1), 𝑛 + 1) in the 
following period. As long as all firms stay on the equilibrium path, a new firm can expect to earn 
collusive profits for the remainder of the horizon. For all 𝑛 ≥ 1 and 𝐾 ≥ 0, there exists 𝛿̿(𝑛) < 1 
such as a non trivial free entry optimal punishment strategy equilibrium exits if 𝛿 ≥ 𝛿̿(𝑛).123 This 
implies that for any initial market structure, incumbent firms can sustain a non-trivial degree of 
cooperation even if the cost of entry is very low. 
The intuition behind Harrington’s influential result is that firms will go through with the proposed 
punishment if and only if their discount factor is sufficiently high. But since deviation from the 
punishment entails trading off higher profits today for lower profits tomorrow (as a firm 
postpones returning to the cooperative outcome), a higher discount factor allows firms to credibly 
threaten a higher value for output or a lower punishment price and thus a lower punishment 
payoff. The severity of the punishment can then be made greater as the discount factor is raised, 
there is some minimum discount factor, such that it is credible to impose a punishment which 
yields each firm its mini-max payoff of zero (that is, the lowest payoff it can be held down to by 
the other firms). Thus, the joint profit-maximizing price can be sustained under free entry and 
without there being a high cost to entry. 
In sum, it is possible for any initial market structure to sustain a price above the competitive level, 
even the joint profit maximizing price, regardless of the level of entry costs. Of course, in order 
for active firms to maintain a significant degree of cooperation, they must threaten entrants with a 
more severe punishment than simply breaking up the cartel. Abreu (1986)’s pioneering derivation 
of optimal stick-and-carrot strategies characterizes the type of punishment that will indeed allow 
cooperation to be sustained under the threat of entry. 
                                                          
123 For proof see Harrington (1989) 
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Thus, if potential entrants expect the cartel members to respond aggressively to entry, the cartel 
members may be able to maintain price significantly above the competitive level despite low 
entry costs. However, a question arises as to when should the potential entrants expect cartelists 
to respond to entry with such aggressive behaviour? Cartel members might instead plan to 
accommodate entrants or entry may induce the cartel to break up. The source of this problem is 
that there exist multiple sub-game perfect equilibria for the infinite horizon game and, therefore, 
different possible outcomes for the post-entry game. 
Pioneer Foods, the allocated cartelist in Mossel Bay and Worcester areas, first approached 
entrants with a proposal to accommodate them if they agreed to fix their prices. Pioneer Foods 
then realised that it was a self-defeating and unprofitable policy for an incumbent firm to 
accommodate entry when there is a large pool of potential entrants. Pioneer Foods’ behaviour is 
summarised in the following allegations: (1) In Worcester, independent bakeries met with Pioneer 
Foods in 2002 in order to fix prices of bread. According to Ocean Bakery, Pioneer Foods wanted 
to have the price of bread fixed at R3.00 per loaf and threatened to engage in a price war if the 
other firms refused to do the same; (2) Wynland Bakery entered the Worcester market in 2002, 
and alleged that Pioneer Foods threatened that should Wynland Bakery continue charging prices 
below those charged by Pioneer Foods, Pioneer Foods would drop their price. According to 
Wynland Bakery, Pioneer Foods reduced its price of the Vita bread to R2.00 per loaf when 
Wynland Bakery refused to comply with Pioneer Foods’ demands (3) Mossel Bay Bakery alleged 
that when it entered the Mossel Bay market in 2004, Pioneer Foods threatened a price war and 
that Pioneer Foods repeated its threats in 2007. 
 
A. VARIABLES AND ESTIMATION 
 
In this section, I describe the data and variables used in the empirical analysis. I deal here with 
monthly time series data. Private data was obtained during the investigation. To complement the 
private data, I include in the dataset monthly consumer price index data gathered from Statistics 
South Africa. This data captures monthly food prices and is provided by the South African Grain 
Information Service. The data available corresponds to the period which starts from January 2003 
to December 2009 (84 months). 
To determine whether a hypothetical competitor as efficient as Pioneer Foods would be likely to 
be foreclosed by Pioneer Foods’ conduct requires examining Pioneer Foods’ own monthly unit 
cost and prices. The Price variable is monthly unit “net sales realisation” price, that is, the price 
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after all discounts and/or rebates have been taken into account per loaf of standard 600g bread.124 
While bread is perishable and has a limited shelf life, it can be transported over long distances. 
For example, Pioneer Foods has a bakery in Worcester and supplies bread from this bakery to its 
depots in Mosselbay, Beaufort West and other areas. Figure 3-2 below shows the distribution 
network of Pioneer Foods from Worcester. I consider Pioneer Foods’ prices in relation to 
standard bread in Worcester and Mossel Bay (about 300km away). In these towns, Pioneer Foods 
was the allocated cartel member in town (meaning that the other cartel members agreed not to 
supply) and was dominant. 
Figure 3-1: Pioneer Foods’ distribution from Worcester 
 
 
The average variable costs variable includes input costs, activity costs and distribution costs. A 
firm’s costs can be divided into those that vary with output and those that are fixed. Costs that do 
                                                          
124 Bread is a homogenous product often made from wheat-flour dough that is cultured with yeast, allowed to rise, and 
finally baked in an oven. Owing to its high levels of gluten (which give the dough sponginess and elasticity), wheat is 
the most common grain used for the preparation of bread. There are many different variations of bread such as white 
bread, brown bread, whole wheat bread, rye bread etc. Sasko bakeries has 32 different kinds of bread products, for 
instance standard bread, English pan loaf, speciality loaves and sandwich loaves, etc. Sasko manufactures different 
types of bread (white, brown, homemade and health breads) under the brand names such as Sasko Sam, Daybreaker, 
Uncle Salie and Nature's Harvest. Apart from bread, Sasko also produces rolls and buns. The different kinds of bread 
have significantly different product attributes such as more pronounced tastes and denser, grainier textures which can 






vary with output are the variable costs since they vary in proportion to output. Average variable 
costs are therefore equal to average total cost less average fixed costs.  
Pioneer Foods is vertically integrated, active in the flour industry upstream, and the bread 
industry downstream. Due to transfer pricing, the price Pioneer Foods charges itself for flour may 
not be a true reflection of what it would cost Pioneer Foods to manufacture. Therefore, I use the 
price of flour that Pioneer Foods charges independent bakeries. The cost of flour used for a loaf 
white and brown bread flour is calculated from the price that Pioneer Foods charges to other 
independent bakeries for its 12.5kg white and brown bread flour in the Western Cape region. 
Other input costs used in the production and packaging of a loaf of bread are also included. The 
inputs used in the production of Pioneer Foods’ 600g bread loafs are very similar with the only 
difference being the type of flour used in the production of the particular bread type. Activity 
costs per loaf of bread include the costs associated with production, electricity, oven fuel, direct 
depreciation on production equipment and maintenance of production equipment per loaf of 
bread. Distribution costs include monthly distribution costs per loaf of bread. Distribution costs 
include labour, fuel and vehicle maintenance costs.  
 
B. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Recall that the legal standard for predatory pricing involves examining the relationship between 
price and average variable costs and/or marginal cost. Figure 3-3 shows Pioneer Foods’ price, 
AVC and margins for Vita and Econo bread for the period January 2003 to October 2009 in 
Worcester. Pioneer Foods priced below AVC in early 2003 as well as from February 2004 until 
about July 2004. Vita bread was renamed Econo bread in April 2005. Ocean Bakery exited the 
market towards the end of 2005. Qualibake and Wynland Bakeries were closed down in 2004. 
Pioneer Foods’ margins increased from around February 2006, after its competitors exited the 
market. Econo bread was removed from the Worcester market in September 2007.  
In August 2009, Econo was re-introduced in Worcester but this time at a much higher price. 
Essential Vita and Econo bread brands were used as fighting brands. Vita and Econo brands were 
closet substitutes to the bread baked by independents and were targeted at LSM125 category 1 to 4 
while, it could be argued that Sasko Sam is high quality bread and targets LSM categories 1 to 7. 
Fighting brands confine predatory pricing to particular brands so that the dominant firm avoids 
                                                          
125  Living Standards Measure, a common metric in South Africa for assessing standard of living. It divides the 
population into 10 LSM groups, 10 being highest and 1 the lowest. 
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losing money on all of its sales. By engaging in such a strategy the dominant firm may seek to 
limit the cost of its predatory strategy. 
Figure 3-2: Sasko’s Vita and Econo bread prices and AVC in Worcester, (Rands, 600g) 
 
Source: own calculations 
 
Figures 3-4 and 3-5 show Sasko sam white and brown bread prices and AVC in Mossel Bay for 
the period January 2003 to October 2009. Up until November 2004, Pioneer Foods had baked and 
sold bread in Mossel Bay. Pioneer Foods closed down its bakery in Mossel Bay in October 2004 
and opened a distribution depot and transported bread to Mossel Bay baked from Pioneer Foods’ 
Worcester bakery about 300 km’s away. I represent AVC when regard is taken for transport costs 
from Worcester to Mossel Bay and local distribution costs. These transport costs are based on 
estimates from an independent bakery. The shaded margins represent Pioneer Foods’ margins 
inclusive of the transport costs from Worcester to Mossel Bay and bars represent Pioneer Foods’ 
margin assuming it baked bread in Mossel Bay. Figure 3-4 shows that Pioneer Foods’s prices 
were below AVC from October 2004 to March 2005 and again from September 2007 to July 
2008. Figure 3-5 shows that Pioneer Foods’ prices were below cost from March 2004 to May 
2004, November 2004 to January 2005, December 2007 to Feb 2008 and April 2008 to May 
2008. Mossel Bay bakery exited the market in January 2009 and became Pioneer Foods’ 




Figure 3-3: Sasko Sam white bread prices and AVC in Mossel Bay, (Rands, 600g) 
 
Source: own calculations 
 
Figure 3-4: Sasko Sam brown bread prices and AVC in Mossel Bay, (Rands, 600g) 
 






The story behind predatory pricing by a cartel is that a new entrant decides to enter and gain 
market share by undercutting the cartel pricing equilibrium. Either all firms together or a few 
alone respond by engaging in a price war until the new entrant relents and is either 
accommodated into the cartel or exits. Generally, in oligopoly industries raising prices (after a 
predatory price war) does not only require discouraging entry, but also requires discouraging 
competition from many competitors. 
The question then becomes, is a cartel price war following new entry predatory? Or does that 
depend on whether its motivation is to encourage higher prices? To illustrate this observability 
problem, suppose entry is observed in the bread industry for which it is believed that entry 
barriers are relatively low. This is followed by a period in which prices below AVC are observed. 
However despite the aggressive welcome, the new firm does not exit. This leads to a period in 
which bread prices increase and thereafter they stabilise. At first glance, one may conclude that 
the period of price below AVC signalled the intent to promote exit which turned out to be 
unsuccessful. This analysis would therefore increase the probability of type II errors by allowing 
anticompetitive predatory pricing. 
In contrast, another interpretation may be that for the bread cartel to effectively maintain 
cooperation under the threat of entry, given the low barriers in bread baking, it had to respond to 
entry by pricing below average variable cost. Below AVC pricing in response to entry which 
succeeds in inducing exit therefore is indicative of successful predation. Below AVC pricing 
whether successful or not also indicates predatory intent.  However, below AVC pricing in 
response to entry which fails to induce exit may not be indicative of unsuccessful exit promotion 
but rather of successful collusion. By responding aggressively to entry, the cartel members are 
acting to deter future entry and by doing so are able to sustain a significant degree of cooperation 
in spite of the absence of substantial barriers.  
The evidence on the price wars in several towns in the Western Cape province suggests that they 
were predatory in nature. Comparing AVC to prices to establish whether the conduct was anti-
competitive, suggests indeed that a legal standard was violated. In both Worcester and Mossel 
Bay entrants were driven out of the market by predatory prices and after their exit prices 
increased substantially. This provides one essential element of a predation case, proving that 
losses can be recouped. Establishing predatory intent is an important part of the qualitative 
argument. Entrants quote a series of threats to use of predatory pricing. These threats were 
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deliberate and conscious attempt to force new entrants out of the market. There were also 
meetings on the formal terms under which an entrant could be admitted to the cartel and if 
entrants did not abide to the terms a price war would be declared. Pioneer Foods admitted to the 
strong evidence of predatory intent on the part of its managers. The timing of entry into the cartel, 
price wars and the price movements described are all consistent with the predation story. 
Cartel investigations do not usually discuss whether the cartel engaged in activities to block entry 
because such evidence is not necessary for conviction, especially so where price fixing is per se 
illegal. But undermining barriers, especially those erected by cartelists is an important part of 
competition policy. Access to markets is actively limited by the cartels, using strategic behaviour 
such as predatory price wars. Cartels need to exclude entrants simply because firms who face 





IV. ESSAY FOUR 
4. DESIGNING APPROPRIATE REMEDIES AND THE PIONEER FOODS 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The concluding of complex remedial schemes has brought the issue of appropriate remedies for 
competition law violations to the centre of the attention of competition law policy makers, 
enforcers, practitioners, and academics in South Africa. With Pioneer Foods admitting to its 
involvement in milled wheat and milled white maize (or milled white corn) cartels as well as 
engaging in general exclusionary conduct, there was little doubt as to the existence of most 
egregious offenses in competition law and the subsequent harm to consumers and competition. 
The main concern expressed related to the Commission’s exercise of discretion in crafting 
appropriate remedies. With the uncovering of cartels in markets involving bread, flour, and white 
maize meal, this heightened the debate about appropriate remedies. White maize meal and bread 
are staple foods for most South African households, especially the poor. When the Commission 
concluded the settlement agreement, some argued that the Commission exceeded its authority 
when entering into the agreement with Pioneer Foods;126 whilst others accepted the outcome as 
valid.127 
 
In its pursuit of innovative approaches to remedies, the Commission put itself in a difficult 
position of engineering remedies to achieve specific market outcomes.128 The remedies that were 
confirmed by the Tribunal are a major measure of “success” in the enforcement of competition 
law in developing countries. They included, inter alia, a fine of R500 million, part of which by 
agreement was set aside for the creation of an Agro-processing Competitiveness Fund (“Agri-
fund”), a commitment not to reduce capital expenditure as well as a commitment to reduce prices 
                                                          
126 The National Treasury Department made an application to intervene in the Tribunal questioning the settlement 
agreement’s validity and the Commission’s authority to conclude it.  
127 Trade Unions, NGOs, and the National Department for Economic Development came in support of the Commission. 
128 For example, the Minister of the National Department for Economic Development pronounced proudly in the 
National Parliament that “[t]his settlement shows the resolve of the competition authorities to act swiftly and 
effectively to promote a competitive food-processing sector. . . . For this reason, both structural and behavioural 
measures are important to bring in new players along the value chain. The new, pro-active stance of the competition 
authorities, coupled with a strong investigative capacity, makes it harder for companies to escape with anti-
competitive conduct.” Statement by Ebrahim Patel, Minister of Econ. Development, to the National Assembly on the 




on the sale of selected flour and bread products over an agreed period. The creation of the Agri-
fund was aimed at lowering the barriers to entry into the agro-processing industry, while the price 
reduction and capital expenditure commitments sought to constrain Pioneer Foods, compensate 
and disgorge some of its profits to the benefit of consumers, and improve the competitive 
dynamics of the relevant markets.129 
 
I focus on the discount remedy.130 It is surprising that discount remedies, while permissible under 
competition law, are rarely used by competition authorities. More provocatively, given the very 
weak private and class damage suits in South Africa and the frequent ineffectiveness of 
behavioural and structural remedies, I argue that it is time for this enormously powerful but 
seldom used remedial tool to take centre stage as a competition law remedy. In order to make a 
relatively informed assessment of the impact of the discount remedy, I use two comparative 
approaches. First, I refer to the example of soaring food prices globally, not only to add a 
comparative perspective but also because South Africa is not immune to global increases in food 
prices. South Africa is a relatively small player in the world market, and wheat is internationally 
traded; commodity prices are subject to global price movements after taking account of transport 
costs. Generally, wheat prices are around import parity, reflecting the fact that South Africa is a 
net importer of wheat. Secondly, I evaluate prices and sales only in the market at issue, 
comparing prices (and sales) in the remedy period to available prices (and sales) before and after 
the period of impact. 
The settlement agreement raises interesting questions. What is an appropriate and suitable 
remedy? Does the appropriateness test require a fit between the theory of harm and the type of 
remedy imposed? Is there a limit to the Commission’s exercise of discretion in crafting remedies? 
All these important questions are discussed in section 2. Section 2 explores the design of the 
settlement, focusing on the relationship between the narratives of harm and the consequent choice 
of the remedies. Section 3 evaluates and provides some evidence of the effectiveness of the 
discount remedy. Section 4 concludes. 
 
                                                          
129 Price reductions only applied to selected products the gross margins of which were high enough to avoid predatory 
outcomes. 
130 Time has been relatively short since the implementation of remedies in the Pioneer Foods settlement agreement to 
be able to proffer a well substantiated judgement on its success or failure. As such, we will not assess the impact of 
the capital expenditure remedy. However, we note that Pioneer Foods has not reduced its capital expenditure to date. 
In fact, it has committed to build a new biscuit factory. In general, we will not evaluate the deterrence effects of the 
settlement agreement on Pioneer Foods, although we make reference to fines and deterrence.  
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2. Designing appropriate remedies in the Pioneer Foods settlement 
 
A. DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 
 
The pursuit of distributive justice is eminently permissible if not compelled by South African 
competition law and its unique responsiveness to issues of distributional equity and fairness. The 
Commission has several special mandates, among others, to promote efficiency, adaptability and 
development of the economy; to provide consumers with competitive prices and product choices; 
to promote employment and to advance the social and economic welfare; and to ensure that small 
and medium sized enterprises have an equitable opportunity to participate in the economy. The 
goal of South African competition law is not only to enhance total economic efficiency, in which 
case the pursuit of distributive justice would be by assumption a waste of resources. Competition 
law is, at least in part, concerned with avoiding wealth transfers from consumers to cartelist firms. 
Competition law is not perceived in a narrow sense and has more than one final goal. By 
protecting the competitive process, the Commission furthers various goals of competition policy, 
including maximizing welfare as well as protecting market participants such as final consumers. 
Competition law has a distributive and protective function.131 
 
In general terms, different remedial approaches are directed either by corrective or distributive 
forms of justice. Corrective justice is based on the notion that victims be put in the position they 
would have been but for the violation of their rights.132 Corrective justice is not concerned with 
the impact of the remedy on third parties and other interests. Distributive justice, on the other 
hand, is concerned with the distribution of shares of resources among members of a given group. 
It takes into consideration third party and other legitimate social interests that may be affected by 
a remedy.  
Distributive justice allows competition authorities to appreciate the reality represented by the 
socioeconomic context. This context in South Africa is characterised by the widespread poverty 
and inequality. In the competition policy sphere, context is represented by anticompetitive 
outcomes in any given sector because of South Africa’s history of regulated cartels, inherited 
monopolies, and high concentration levels. Traditionally, deterrence, pecuniary damages, 
compensation, disgorgement, and restitution have strong roots in the corrective justice 
philosophy. Their main objective in particular is to restore the position of the victim. In contrast, 
injunctive relief has a dual role by serving the objects of both corrective and distributive forms of 
                                                          
131 See Zimmer (2011). 
132 See Modak-Truran (1991) and (2000). 
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justice. It can be argued that distributive justice sets the foundation against which the but-for 
world in corrective justice is measured. This suggests that corrective justice is the remedial arm of 
distributive justice. The pursuit of distributive justice through restoration of competition, 
compensation, and disgorgement is a legitimate task for competition law enforcement. 
 
B. THE “APPROPRIATENESS” STANDARD 
 
Section 49D(1) of the Competition Act provides that, if the Commission and a respondent “agree 
on the terms of an appropriate order,” the Tribunal may confirm the agreement as a consent order. 
An “appropriate” consent order is one which is “suitable,” that is, “suitable in the sense that it is 
an agreement that suits the contending interests of the Commission, as the proxy of the public 
interest, and the respondent, and in that sense, can be appropriate as between themselves.”133 
However, Section 58(1)(a) of the Competition Act does not provide an exhaustive list of the kinds 
of orders that the Tribunal may make. Whatever remedy imposed must be “appropriate.” The 
principle of appropriateness constitutes an important limit to the Commission’s discretion in 
imposing remedies.  
The Tribunal is required to be satisfied when confirming a consent and settlement agreement. 
This means that remedies agreed by the Commission and a respondent do not exceed the limits of 
what is appropriate and suitable. In a sense, the appropriateness of a particular remedy differs 
from a cost-benefit analysis, which focuses only on the gravity of harm and the alternative 
remedies that might be imposed. The appropriateness and suitability character of remedies 
requires remedial measurement, not only with regard to the magnitude and scope of the harm to 
consumers and competition or the nature of the infringement, but also in relation to the type of 
violation that was identified. This would cover not only a particular competition law prohibited 
practice, but also the theory of harm advanced in the specific case. Remedies need to be effective 
in pursuit of their objectives. The principle of appropriateness requires a fit between the harm and 
the remedy. The Commission’s discretion in crafting remedies is very broad, allowing it to 
address various aims and objectives of the Competition Act subject of course to the 




                                                          
133  Order and Reasons, Competition Comm’n v. South African Airways (Competition Tribunal), Case No. 




C. THE NARRATIVES OF HARM  
 
Cartels have pernicious effects on poor consumers despite the obstacles created by legal 
prohibitions on collusion and individual firm’s incentives to compete rather than to collude. For 
South African consumers, bread and maize meal are staple foods, and flour is a major input of 
bread. The direct cost of cartels is plain: prices are high and there is reduced product choice (if 
there is customer allocation and/or if the cartelized product is differentiated). Until the 1990s, the 
marketing of agricultural products in South Africa, including grain products, was extensively 
regulated by the state through the Marketing Act of 1937 (consolidated in the Marketing Act of 
1968). 134  After deregulation in 1996, while direct controls were removed, it appeared that 
extensive private anticompetitive arrangements replaced the public controls. 
In December 2006, the Commission received information of an alleged bread cartel that was 
active in the Western Cape. The Commission initiated a complaint against Premier, Tiger Brands, 
Foodcorp, and Pioneer Foods, all of whom allegedly had been involved in the bread cartel. The 
four companies are the largest in many food product markets and are vertically integrated into 
flour and bread production. Premier applied for leniency in terms of the corporate leniency policy 
, during which it revealed that bread and milling cartels operated in parts of South Africa and 
admitted to its involvement. Premier’s leniency application was corroborated by a further 
leniency application from Tiger Brands. Tiger Brands also admitted to its involvement. 
Subsequently, Foodcorp also admitted to its conduct and settled the bread case with the 
Commission. 
After contested proceedings and on February 3, 2010, the Tribunal ruled that Pioneer Foods had 
engaged in fixing the price of bread products in the Western Cape province and nationally, 
imposing on Pioneer Foods a fine of R196 million. Following this, Pioneer Foods approached the 
Commission with the intention of settling all the other cases that had been referred to the Tribunal 
for adjudication or that were currently under investigation by the Commission in which it was a 
respondent. The following is a brief description of some of the markets damaged by Pioneer 
Foods’ anticompetitive conduct that formed part of the settlement agreement.135 
 
                                                          
134 Marketing Act 37 of 1937. 
135 See Consent and Settlement Agreement Between the Competition Commission and Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd. in 
Regard to Contraventions of Sections of the Competition Act 89 of 1998, as Amended, Competition Comm’n v. 




The Commission’s investigation revealed that, at various stages from 1998 to at least 2007, 
Pioneer Foods and its competitors in the milled wheat and white maize markets (including Tiger 
Brands, Pioneer Foods, Foodcorp, and Premier) engaged in price-fixing arrangements in 
contravention of section 4(1)(b)(i) of the Competition Act. Pioneer Foods and its competitors had 
attended numerous meetings and had held telephone conversations in which they agreed at both 
national and regional levels inter alia to fix the price of milled white maize products and milled 
flour products, as well as to create uniform price lists for wholesale, retail, and general trade 
customers. They also agreed to the timing of the price increases and the implementation thereof. 
Through these price-fixing arrangements, Pioneer Foods and its competitors prevented and/or 
limited price competition amongst themselves. Pioneer Foods admitted that it contravened section 
4(1)(b)(i) of the Competition Act with this conduct. 
The Commission’s investigation also revealed that Pioneer Foods engaged in predatory conduct. 
The Commission’s investigation was pursuant to an initial complaint brought forward by Mossel 
Bay Bakery, an independent bakery. According to Mossel Bay Bakery, Pioneer Foods engaged in 
a predatory price conduct, charging prices for bread below cost with the intention of eliminating 
Mossel Bay Bakery from the market. The Commission’s investigation revealed that Pioneer 
Foods was dominant in several local markets and that from 2002 to 2004 and in 2007, Pioneer 
Foods had indeed priced below cost. Pioneer Foods admitted to threatening competitors with 
predatory conduct in several towns within the Western Cape province and introducing fighting 
brands in order to protect its market share in areas where it was facing competition. These 
fighting brands were to be pulled out once a competitive threat had been removed. This conduct 
prevented small independent bakeries from competing effectively and allowed Pioneer Foods to 
build a reputation for fighting entry across markets and time. Pioneer Foods admitted that its 
conduct may have impeded small independent bakeries from expanding within the market and 
competing effectively, in contravention of section 8(c) of the Competition Act. 
Following the uncovering of the cartels in bread and milling, the Commission also initiated an 
information exchange case involving the wheat milling members of the National Chamber of 
Milling (“NCM”) and the South African Chamber of Baking (“SACB”). The Commission was 
concerned that it was not observing competitive outcomes even after having uncovered cartels in 
the industry. The Commission’s investigation revealed that the respondents, which included 
Pioneer Foods, submitted to and received commercially sensitive information from the SACB and 
NCM. This investigation is at the time of writing (December 2013) on-going, but the respondents 




D. THE CONSEQUENT CHOICE OF THE REMEDIAL APPROACH 
 
The Pioneer Foods settlement agreement had, among others, the purpose of enhancing and 
restoring competition in the relevant markets. The agreement sought to promote competition in 
pursuit of the objectives and purposes of the Act. Pioneer Foods undertook in terms of the 
proposed settlement agreement to the following. First, it would desist from the conduct that 
infringed or might infringe the Act, continue its compliance program to prevent future 
infringements, and cooperate with the Commission in its prosecution of others. Second, it would 
pay a fine of R500 million to the National Revenue Fund. In addition, the Commission, the 
National Treasury, and the Economic Development Department separately agreed that the 
Economic Development Department would submit a budgetary proposal and business case 
motivating for the creation of an Agro-processing Competitiveness Fund of R250 million drawn 
from the penalty and to be administered by the Industrial Development Corporation (“IDC”). 
Third, it would reduce the prices of certain of its products for an agreed period of time up to the 
total value of R160 million. Fourth, it would maintain its capital expenditure budget and just 
increase it by R150 million.  
The settlement agreement excluded an earlier fine of about R196 million in relation to Pioneer 
Foods’ involvement in the bread cartel. The fine of R500 million amounted to about 5.6 per cent 
of the turnover of Pioneer Foods’ subsidiary Sasko in 2009. The fine was in essence in relation to 
Pioneer Foods’ admitted involvement in the white maize meal and milled wheat products cartels. 
In respect of the exclusionary conduct case, Pioneer Foods admitted to the conduct as being in 
contravention of section 8(c), for which there would be no penalty for a first contravention. 
Pioneer Foods’ admitted to anticompetitive conduct involving products affecting all South 
Africans and especially the poor, for whom bread and maize meal are staple products. The effect 
of the conduct was inherently harmful to consumer welfare.  
Pioneer Foods’ conduct also affected the structure of the relevant markets. This conduct, coupled 
with the legacy of the previous regime with its state-sanctioned cartels, created an environment 
that did not encourage or facilitate entry. The Commission regarded it as its mandate, not just to 
address the cartel conduct though punishment and deterrence, but also to address the structure of 
these markets through the Agri-fund. The Agri-fund is aimed at facilitating new entry into the 
value chain in the agro-processing industry, specifically by small to medium enterprises that are 




Although the bread baking industry in South Africa is characterized by low exogenous barriers to 
entry, the existence of the cartel in flour mitigated the ability of independent bakers to enter and 
expand within the industry. Premier, Tiger Brands, Pioneer Foods, and Foodcorp together account 
for more than 95 per cent of the milled flour market; at the same time, they collectively dominate 
the downstream bread market. A cartel facilitates entry by keeping prices high. In the case of 
cartelist firms in bread supply, predation was collective.136 Predatory pricing conduct was used to 
create artificial barriers to entry. South African consumers were faced with a vertically integrated 
monopoly. The settlement agreement set out to undermine the anticompetitive environment 
created by the cartels by reducing the barriers to entry. It aimed to introduce competition and 
instability into historically stable markets, to the benefit of consumers. 
The pricing reduction remedy was intended to not only compensate consumers but also to 
undermine the effects of Pioneer Foods’ admitted anticompetitive conduct on prices in the 
relevant markets. Prices of flour, maize meal, and bread products went up as a result of collusion 
and strategic behaviour and have been sticky downwards following the uncovering of this 
anticompetitive behaviour, particularly with regards to bread prices (as Figure 4-2 demonstrates). 
Through the price reduction commitment, the Commission sought to achieve a direct benefit to 
consumers as well as to stimulate more intense rivalry in the market. The price reduction 
commitment was designed to stimulate rivalry while at the same time enabling smaller non-
vertically integrated participants in bread. To avoid unintended predatory outcomes, the price 
reductions were targeted at those products with sufficiently high gross margins. 
The commitment to increase approved capital expenditure by an additional amount of R150 
million was aimed at increasing Pioneer Foods’ output for certain product lines as well as 
contributing to the creation of jobs. The Commission was concerned about the impact of the 
settlement agreement, in the context of the economic recession, that Pioneer Foods might use it to 
justify job losses and reduced output. 
 
3. A critical assessment of the effectiveness of the Pioneer Foods remedies 
 
In this part, I focus on evaluating the impact of the price reduction remedy. Consumers were 
harmed by the conduct of Pioneer Foods and others. To partially compensate consumers for their 
injury, Pioneer Foods committed to reduce its prices of selected standard bread and flour products 
for a limited period of time up to the value of R160 million. I demonstrate using a simple 
                                                          
136 While the Commission pursued predation allegations only on Pioneer Foods in the Western Cape province, there 
were allegations of similar conduct by other cartelist firms in other regions. 
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framework that such discount remedies result in a deadweight loss by inducing excessive 
consumption by consumers; however, I do not compare the magnitude of the loss to that caused 
by the cartels. I demonstrate the impact of the discount remedy on prices and sales before and 
after the remedy. But first, I discuss the impact of settlement programs and fines on deterrence.  
 
A. SETTLEMENT PROGRAMS  
 
Settlement programs generate clear and significant benefits. First, they reduce legal costs for both 
the competition authorities and respondent firms. They allow for speedy resolution of disputes 
outside the formal litigation route, but their outcomes have a force of law. The added benefit for 
consumers is that the conduct will cease earlier than would be the case if the respondent firm 
defended the matter while continuing the conduct. For the respondent firm, the added benefit is to 
put the matter behind it and focus on running the business. Competition law transgressions 
consume a lot of management time and attract bad publicity. For settlement programs to work, all 
parties must see the benefits. It is for this reason that administrative penalties in settlements 
should generally be lower than the fines that the case would attract if it was litigated. In other 
words, the firms must know that if they do not settle, they are likely to be successfully prosecuted 
and fined heavily. Settlements therefore reduce the expected penalty paid by competition law 
violators. However, the presence of litigation costs suggests that it is worth settling even if the 
penalty is not lowered. 
Pioneer Foods could have been fined at least up to 10 per cent of turnover for its involvement in 
each of the two cartels in which it admitted involvement (the white maize milling cartel and the 
wheat milling cartel). In other words, Pioneer Foods would not have settled unless the settlement 
payment was less than the expected cost of pursuing the Commission’s referrals through 
adjudication, trial, and appeal. Such outcomes lead to reduced deterrence. Polinsky and Rubinfeld 
(1989) offer one illustration of this point, using a model in which the injuring party settles only if 
the settlement leads to a reduction in the expected penalty plus the expected cost of litigation. 
While an exact balancing of the costs and benefits of a settlement program is undoubtedly 
difficult, settlement programs do generate improved deterrence within the constrained, limited 
enforcement budget, as is the case in South Africa. A settlement program communicates to others 
the benefit of settling early rather than at a later stage. The need for speedy resolution has 
implications for the costs of litigation. In this case, Pioneer Foods only came forward with a 
settlement proposal after having been fined for its involvement in the bread cartel and four years 





B. FINES AND DETERRENCE 
 
The literature on fines points out that fines deter cartel violations in a number of ways.137 First, 
fines may have a deterrent effect, by creating a credible threat of being prosecuted and punished. 
This raises the expected costs of a cartel above the expected benefits. Second, fines may have a 
moral effect, in that they send a message to the spontaneously law-abiding, reinforcing their 
moral commitment to the competition law prohibitions.138 In addition, fines have disgorgement of 
the unjust profits as one of their effects in that the proceeds of fines normally go to into the public 
budget rather than to the victims of the cartel violations. It could be argued also that fines 
contribute to the pursuit of distributive justice through compensation in an abstract and indirect 
way, of course, if one assumes that the restoration of competition will benefit the general public.  
Fines are usually much lower than the collusive gains and in many cases do not represent a 
credible threat to deter collusion. Connor and Lande (2007) compared the fine levels imposed by 
the European Commission and the U.S. authorities to the amounts gained on average by cartels as 
a result of their offense.139 They collected and analyzed the available information concerning the 
size of the overcharges caused by hardcore price fixing, bid-rigging, and market allocation 
agreements. They found that cartels over-charged on average between 18 per cent and 37 per cent 
in the United States and between 28 per cent and 54 per cent in the European Union.140 Connor 
(2006)’s analysis of EU cartel decisions from 1998 to 2004 likewise concludes that deterrence is 
not being served, in that “fines imposed by the EC Commission are not based on estimates of the 
offender’s gain or victim’s losses . . . the (EC) Commission makes no attempt to estimate the 
overcharge or to concede that it is possible to do so. As a result . . . it would seem doubtful that 
fines, even at their present historically high levels, deter price fixers.”141 
Deterrence through the use of fines will work if, and only if, from the perspective of the company 
contemplating whether or not to commit a violation, the expected fine exceeds the expected gain 
from the violation.142 This assumes, as Jenny (2009) points out, that persons engaging in illegal 
                                                          
137 Concerns about the inadequacy of fines are the object of an intense debate within the competition policy circles. See 
Harrington (2004); OECD (2003); and Motta (2008). 
138 See Wils (2006). 
139 See Connor and Lande (2007). 
140 Connor and Lande (2005) conclude that average cartel overcharges in the United States are between 15 percent and 
36 percent, with most of the median and average results between 20 percent and 30 percent. They recommend that 
the Sentencing Commission raise the current level of cartel penalties.  
141 See Connor (2006). 
142 See Wils (2006). 
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practices are rational individuals who consider the expected cost and benefit to them of violating 
a law and will engage in such a violation if it pays.143 
 
The Tribunal has established that the primary role of fines in South Africa is deterrence rather 
than retribution.144  However, the current situation in South Africa is that fines are the only 
sanction used to deter cartel violations and are not combined with fines on individuals, 
imprisonment, or other individual sanctions or with private damages. Moreover, private 
enforcement of competition law is weak. Under-deterrence arises from generous discounts and 
weak private anti-cartel enforcement. Aproskie and Goga (2011) examined two popular claims 
that fines are passed on to consumers and that high fines could lead to poor competitive outcomes 
such as firms exiting the market. They conclude that administrative penalties do not lead to higher 
prices for consumers; fines do not generally impact the optimum pricing levels of a firm and that 
only in very specific circumstances would a fine lead to firm closure.  
From a deterrence point of view, Jenny (2009) rightly observes that “it makes no difference 
whether payments are made to the state budget or to consumers. Thus the current discussion in 
the EU on private enforcement should take into account the fact that even if the purpose of private 
enforcement is to compensate victims rather than to punish violators, the possibility of adding 
compensatory damages to administrative (or criminal) sanctions increases the overall cost of 
being caught for violators and therefore increases the deterrent effect of the enforcement system. 
This means that when considering whether an enforcement system is over deterrent or under 
deterrent (and when considering whether more or less resources should be devoted to public 
enforcement), one should take into account the effect of the interaction between public and 
private enforcement.” 
The administrative penalty imposed on Pioneer Foods as a result of the settlement was 8.9 per 
cent of Pioneer Foods’ grain business turnover.145 In monetary terms, the administrative penalty 
was the highest ever levelled on a firm in South Africa. I must assume that Pioneer Foods did not 
just want to put the matter behind it, but thought the likelihood of getting higher penalties at the 
Tribunal was higher. This conclusion would not have been unreasonable. Should the Tribunal 
have levelled a maximum fine on the total turnover of Pioneer Foods for each of the 
contraventions, the penalty could have been over one billion rands. While fines must be set at 
levels that effectively deter anticompetitive behaviour, such a calculation is difficult. In Europe, 
                                                          
143 See Jenny (2009). 
144 Administrative Penalty and Reasons for the Competition Tribunal’s Decision, Competition Comm’n v. Fed. Mogul 
Aftermarket Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd. and Others (Competition Tribunal), Case No. 08/CR/Mar01 (Jan. 28, 2003) 
(S. Afr.), available at http://www.comptrib.co.za/assets/Uploads/Case-Documents/08CRMar01.pdf. 
145 The penalty includes the fine of R500 million and the price reduction commitment of R160 million. 
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the cap is 10 per cent of the group’s (not the firm’s) worldwide turnover, and still there are repeat 
offenders.146 It is important to also note that the South African jurisdiction is relatively new and 
immature when it comes to fining. The majority of fines are imposed by way of settlements, and 
the courts have not had many opportunities to decide on the matter, and there are no fining 
guidelines. It is therefore extremely difficult to assess the effect of fines on deterrence at this 
stage. 
 
C. THE DISCOUNT REMEDY 
 
To my knowledge, a pure discount remedy as contemplated in the Pioneer Foods price reduction 
commitment has not been used in South Africa or elsewhere, although coupon remedies have 
been widely used in the United States. For example, in 1994, passengers who had travelled on 
major U.S. airlines between January 1988 and June 1992 received coupons with a total face value 
of approximately $400 million.147 The coupon could be applied toward their cost of subsequent 
flights, expired after three years, and could be transferred only to immediate family members or 
to someone designated in advance.148 
 
I. A Simple Analytical Framework  
 
The Pioneer Foods price reduction commitment remedy was essentially a pure discount remedy. 
It involved a discount off the competitive price for all consumers of the product. Suppose the cost 
of producing the good is assumed to be constant per unit, with no fixed costs. During the cartel 
period, a firm charges the monopoly price. Assume for simplicity that, after the cartel period has 
been stopped, the non-collusive price is the competitive price, aside from the effect of any 
remedy. This might be the case because the price that would be paid in the absence of a discount 
is set by competitive firms who are not subject to any remedy. The consumption decision for a 
consumer in the cartel period is shown in Figure 1.149  
  
                                                          
146 See Massimo Motta, Recent CAC Judgement Opens Door to Leniency on Cartels, BUS. REPORT, Aug. 31, 2011.  
147 See Polinsky and Rubinfeld (2008).  
148 Similarly in 1994, Circa Pharmaceuticals settled a class-action price-fixing suit by issuing $2.5 million in coupons 
that permitted former customers to purchase Circa products at a discount. 
149 See Polinsky and Rubinfeld (2008), modelling the deadweight loss from coupon remedies. 
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Figure 4-1: The consumption decision for a consumer in a cartel period 
 
 
The loss of consumer surplus due to the price mark-up is the sum of the areas A and B. The value 
of the discount remedy to this individual is the sum of the areas S, T, and U. The discount is less 
than the mark-up in the in the cartel period. This follows from the observation that consumers buy 
more of the good at the discounted price than they did at the marked-up price. Consequently, if 
the discount equalled the mark-up, consumers would gain more from the discount than the loss 
from the mark-up. This is easy to see in Figure 4-1. The gain from the discount is the sum of the 
areas S, T, and U. The harm from the mark-up is the sum of the areas A and B. If the discount 
were to equal mark-up, then S and A would be of identical size, and T would exceed B; thus, the 
gain would exceed the loss. To avoid overcompensating consumers, the discount must be less 
than the mark-up. The deadweight loss of the discount remedy is shown in Figure 1 as the loss 
corresponding to area V (see also Appendix 1A for a technical derivation of this result). 
Borenstein (1996) argued that firms will offset discounts by increasing the retail price from which 
the discount is calculated. The incentive for firms to respond by raising the retail price depends on 
whether the firm views the total loss under a discount remedy to be a sunk cost or believes that its 
behaviour can reduce that loss. However, the design of the discount remedy could eliminate such 
strategic behaviour. For instance, if the discount remedy has a binding time limit, specifying that 
discount will continue until a certain date in the future, then the total forgone profits from the 
contract are not fixed, and the firm will change its prices strategically in order to minimize the 
loss. If discount is dollar-limited, continuing until a given total discount amount is reached, then 




Competitive price plus mark up 
Competitive price 
Competitive price minus discount 
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The extent to which free riding occurs among buyers and sellers also affects the response to the 
discount contract. As Borenstein (1996) rightly observes, even if a discount contract is dollar 
limited, the forgone profits for any one firm will not be fixed if the dollar discount is pooled 
across many defendants. Pooling of discounts across firms affects the incentive of any one firm to 
respond to a discount contract by adjusting its retail price. The incentives of sellers to adjust 
prices and the profits that sellers would forgo are also affected by the pooling of the total discount 
settlement among buyers. Competition in the market place will also prevent any one firm from 
responding to a discount remedy by raising their prices. If I assume that firms are engaged in 
repeated Bertrand competition, the static Nash equilibrium involves marginal cost pricing. If, 
however, the discount remedy is time limited, it can yield lower net befits for consumers when 
applied to more competitive markets. 
With the Pioneer Foods discount remedy, rival firms did not know the duration and extent of the 
reductions. However, the total value of the discount remedy was known. In an environment where 
markets had been stable as a result of collusion and information exchange, this lack of 
transparency introduces rivalry.  
 
II. Implementation mechanism 
 
The discount remedy implementation mechanism was designed in such a way that the average 
realized gross profit for the selected products over the base period would be compared with the 
average realized profit over the comparative period. The base period was chosen arbitrarily and 
did not correspond to the cartel period. The comparative period was defined as the period under 
review during the implementation of the discount remedy. The discount remedy amounted to a 
gross profit reduction of R160 million when compared with the base period.  
Minimum levels of price reductions were set for each identified product category to ensure that 
the reductions had a meaningful effect for consumers. The stipulated minimum levels related to 
national averages over the comparative period per specified product category. A minimum price 
reduction of R350 per tonne on white bread flour, brown bread flour, and cake flour were set. For 
selected 600g and 700g white and brown bread categories, a minimum price reduction of 30 cents 
per loaf were set.150 A further stipulation was included to mitigate the likelihood of any predatory 
outcomes as a result of reductions in bread prices. Pioneer Foods was not allowed to reduce prices 
                                                          
150 See Media Release, Competition Commission, Pioneer Implements Agreement with Competition Commission to 




for those products whose gross profits were narrow. While the total value of the discount remedy 
was known to rivals, the duration and the minimum thresholds were not. Thus, the discount 
remedy was designed such that it was flexible, created uncertainty, and was not transparent to 
rivals. Furthermore, the Commission committed to monitoring compliance on the part of Pioneer 
Foods as well as monitoring the pass-through on the part of major retailers; however, monitoring 
the discount remedy requires resources. 
 
III. Methodology  
 
The methodology chosen is that of the “but-for” world, given by what the economic outcome 
would have been but for the Pioneer Foods settlement.151 I measure the actual prices (or sales) 
during the discount remedy period and compare these to the pre- and post-discount remedy period 
prices (or sales), or to the global developments in prices. I reinterpret the before-and-after 
approach in a regression framework, in which I estimate the price (sales) over the entire period 
for which data is available on a dummy variable equal to one when the price (sales) corresponds 
to the period when there was a discount remedy. The parameter associated with this dummy 
variable measures the amount of the price decrease (or sales increase) during the discount 
remedy. I assume a constant price differential through the impact period (as suggested by the 
coefficient on the dummy variable). Further, I extend the regression framework to include control 
variables that I believe affect the prices regardless of whether there has been a discount remedy. 
These include relevant economic variables that changed during the period of observation. 
 
The model is expressed in its implicit form as: 
𝑙𝑛(𝑤ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒) =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑙𝑛(𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒) + 𝛽2 𝑙𝑛(𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒) +
𝛽3(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦) +               (6) 
I do not include the quantity variable itself as an independent variable but instrument quantity by 
using the price of substitutes (maize meal prices). This is done to avoid the inter-dependence of 
price and demand.152 The cost and demand-shifters included are assumed to be exogenous, since 
they are presumed to be determined independently of price and therefore unaffected by price. The 
error term reflects random shifts in demand, cost, or conduct by the market participants. In 
                                                          
151 This approach is largely empirical, and it does not require making specific economic assumptions about the market. 




addition, there are demand and cost shifters which are only observable to the firms. These 




In thinking about the impact of this discount remedy, it is worth discussing first global 
developments in food prices. In 2010, international wheat pricing came under upward pressure 
because of the poor crop forecasts from Russia and Russia’s subsequent banning of wheat exports 
until at least December 31, 2010. The strength of the rand and the new import tariff on wheat 
resulted in a steady increase in local wheat prices. Between April 2010 and October 2010, the 
Safex price of wheat increased by almost 22 per cent. These factors contributed to increases in 
food prices and had an impact on the discount remedy. During the impact period, global food 
prices were at their highest since 1990, according to the United Nations Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FOA), and the food price index recorded above the 200 mark for the first quarter of 
2011, as Figure 4-2 shows. During the same period, the cereal price index overshot the food price 
index. 
Figure 4-2: FAO food price index and FAO cereal price index, 2005-2011 
 
Source: FAO Food Price Index, United Nations Food & Agriculture Organization. Available at 
http://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/wfs-home/foodpricesindex/en/ 
Notes: All indices have been deflated using the World Bank manufactures unit value index (MUV) rebased from 
1990=100 to 2002–2004=100. The food price index consists of the average of 5 commodity group price indices 
weighted with the average export shares of each of the groups in the period from 2002 to 2004, while the cereals price 
index is compiled using the grains and rice price indices weighted by their average trade share from 2002 to 2004. 
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Pricing data from Statistics South Africa indicates that the price reductions made by Pioneer 
Foods translated into cheaper bread prices for end consumers. In light of the increasing global 
inflationary pressures on food prices and South Africa’s position as a net importer of wheat, 
during the impact period, it appears that the discount remedy yielded positive results for 
consumers. Importantly, South African bread prices have been historically sticky downwards, as 
Figure 4-3 shows.153  However, during the impact period, the national price of brown bread 
decreased by around 11 cents per loaf and stabilized at a lower level of around R7.30 per loaf 
(nominal consumer price index, from November 2010 to March 2011), while the national price of 
white bread was stable at around R8.31 per loaf from November 2010 to February 2011 and 
falling to around R8.22 per loaf in March 2011. Interestingly, the national average price of both 
brown and white bread (700g) increased by about 70 cents post the impact period. Pioneer Foods 
and its rivals knew that the discount remedy was for a defined period of time, and so they either 
could ignore the price reductions if they thought they would not have a long-term effect on their 
market shares or they could retaliate by lowering their prices in the hope that they would recoup 
their lost margins when the discount remedy was over. This is probably one explanation for the 
huge increases after the event. 
Figure 4-3: National bread and flour prices 
 
Source: Statistics South Africa, SAFEX. Food Price for the Period, South African Grain Information Service and own 
calculations 
                                                          
153 For instance, the manager of Pioneer Food’s subsidiary division, Sasko, indicated in testimony to the Tribunal as 
part of the bread cartel hearings that bread prices were never reduced when input costs declined because consumers 




Next, I turn to the results of the comparison of pre- and post-impact period prices and sales with 
the actual impact period prices and sales to assess the price decrease. Pricing data from selected 
retailers in relation to bread products purchased from the major bread producers, namely Pioneer 




Figure 4-4: Average wholesale price from producers to retailers, white bread 700g 
 
Source: Selected retail outlets (Inland markets). and own calculations 
 
 
Figure 4-5: Average wholesale price from producers to retailers, brown bread 700g 
 




Figures 4-4 and 4-5 provide an indication of the impact of the discount remedy on the wholesale 
price of standard 700g bread loafs. The results show that, during the impact period, average 
wholesale prices of white and brown 700g bread decreased. Competition in the market prevented 
any one firm from raising prices, even as input costs rose. It appears also that competition in the 
market induced responses from Pioneer Foods’ competitors, resulting in even wider gains for 
consumers than Pioneer Foods’ own pricing commitment. 
Pre- and post-remedy prices are reasonable approximations for the prices but for the remedy. To 
the extent that the remedy period prices differ in a statistically significant way from the pre- and 
post-remedy prices, I attribute a more or less reasonable degree of confidence in the price 
decrease. Table 4-1 shows the results from the regression analysis. In summary, the dependent 
variable in model 1 is the average wholesale price of bread charged by the bread producers, and 
the exogenous covariates include: (1) the wheat costs and flour costs (cost factors) and (2) maize 
meal prices (demand factors). For brown bread, the dummy variable is negative, and the 
estimated price reduction of 41 cents is statistically significant. While the dummy variable for 
brown bread is negative, as expected, the estimated price reduction of 27 cents is statistically 
insignificant. This may reflect consumer preferences for white bread and that bread producers 
introduced more discounts on brown bread than they did on white bread. 
 
Table 4-1: Results from the regression analysis 




  Dummy variable 
Model 1 (Average Wholesale Price) –0.418 *** –0.269 
-    Cost factors (wheat and flour costs) (–0.154) 
 
(–0.214) 
-    Demand factors (maize meal prices)     
Model 2 (log Average Sales) 0.011 * 0.266 
  (0.105)   (0.146) 
Notes: The table presents estimates of impact of the discount remedy and standard deviation (in parentheses). *** 
Indicates significant at the 1% level; * indicates significant at the 10% level. 
   
Now consider the possibility of a consumption inefficiency created by the discount remedy. For 
example, if the cartel period resulted in the prices being set above the competitive prices for some 
period of time, during the remedy period, the price is discounted to some price below the 
competitive price for a period of time. If a particular consumer’s demand was “high” in the cartel 
period, and that consumer’s demand was “low” in the remedy period, that consumer will be 
induced to buy a socially excessive amount of the good during the remedy period. But if that 
consumer’s demand is high again in the remedy period, there will not be a distortion. This is 
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because if a consumer’s demand remains high during the remedy period, the consumer will 
purchase more of the good at the competitive price than he did during the cartel period, resulting 
in Pioneer Foods quickly reaching the target value of $20.2 million (or R160 million). 
Consequently, all marginal purchases during the remedy period will be at the competitive price. 
Figures 4-6 and 4-7 show the average wholesale purchases of standard bread by retailers from 
producers. Figure 6 does not appear to suggest strong distortions in consumption patterns for 
brown bread. This could be because the amount of discount was too low to induce customers to 
buy a socially excessive amount of goods during the impact period. Alternatively, the demand for 
bread, being a staple and perishable good, remained high before and after the discount remedy. 
Regression results in Table 4-1 show that the coefficient on the dummy variable for brown bread 
is significant and positive. This suggests that sales of brown bread rose by 1 per cent during the 
remedy period. Figure 4-7 shows an increase in demand for Pioneer Foods’ white bread during 
the remedy period. However, the coefficient on the dummy variable for white bread, while 
positive, is insignificant (as Table 4-1 shows).  
 
Figure 4-6: Average wholesale purchases from producers to retailers, brown bread 700g 
 





Figure 4-7. Average wholesale purchases from producers to retailers, white bread 700g 
 
Source: Selected retail outlets (Inland markets) and own calculations 
 
According to Samantha Enslin-Payne, Pioneer Foods reportedly, following the implementation of 
the agreement, increased its volume growth at the expense of competitors.154 Competitors such as 
Tiger Brands publicly acknowledged that trading volumes had been negatively impacted, 
particularly in flour, as a result of the highly competitive trading environment. An article by the 
Business Report in February noted how Tiger Brands’ Albany bread was losing market share to 




Corrective justice demands that victims be put in the position they would have held but for the 
violation of their rights. On the other hand, distributive justice is based on recognition of the 
constraints of putting victims in the position they would have held had the violation not occurred. 
Distributive justice does not focus solely on the interests of the victim. Distributive justice is 
                                                          
154 See Samantha Enslin-Payne, Tiger Brands Loses Market Share, BUS. REPORT (NATIONAL), Feb. 21, 2011, at 19. 
Also available at http://www.iol.co.za/business/companies/tiger-brands-loses-market-share-1.1029831 
155 See Samantha Enslin-Payne, Tiger Brands Loses Market Share, BUS. REPORT (NATIONAL), Feb. 21, 2011, at 19. 
Also available at http://www.iol.co.za/business/companies/tiger-brands-loses-market-share-1.1029831 
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flexible and bent towards a practical consideration of the impact of the remedy. It is relevant to 
situations that require a redistribution of resources, as is the case in South Africa.  
I show that the Pioneer Foods settlement agreement was designed to address the negative impact 
of anticompetitive conduct. It provides for the opportunity to redress the anticompetitive 
environment created by long-running cartels and exclusionary conduct that may not be addressed 
solely by administrative penalties. I show that the remedies relate to the restoration of 
competition, deterrence, compensation, and disgorgement. The creation of the Agri-fund aims to 
lower the barriers to entry into the agro-processing industry, while the price reduction and capital 
expenditure terms seek to constrain Pioneer Foods, compensate, and disgorge some of its profits 
to the benefit of affected consumers and improve the competitive dynamics of the relevant 
markets. These remedies and the administrative penalty excluded the administrative penalty of 
about R196 million imposed by the Tribunal on Pioneer Foods in relation to Pioneer Foods’ 
involvement in the bread cartel. 
I also show that the anticompetitive effects of Pioneer Foods’ conduct were clearly identified, and 
theories of harm emerged as a retrospective rationalization of different strategies adopted by 
Pioneer Foods that harmed consumers and competition: the cartel conduct maintained monopoly 
profits, and the exclusionary conduct, through predatory pricing, undermined entry. The 
identification of specific narratives of harm operated as limits to the identification of adequate 
remedies. 
I discuss the key features that influenced the decision to settle for both the respondent firms and 
for the Commission. On one hand, there is a wide consensus that the saving of time and ligation 
costs are significant benefits of cartel settlements and that, for this reason, administrative 
penalties in settlements should generally be lower than fines. In addition, for a competition 
authority, freed up resources can be used to prosecute more cases. In this way, settlements can 
increase the ex ante deterrence effects. On the other hand, the argument against settlements is 
that, through a fine reduction, settlements can reduce deterrence. The design of a settlement 
agreement is fundamental for its success. South African jurisdiction is relatively new and 
immature when it comes to fining. The majority of fines are imposed by way of settlements, and 
the courts have not had many opportunities to decide on the matter. In this regard, perhaps the 
time has come for the Commission to adopt guidelines for fines. 
Discount remedies are especially appropriate in developing countries such as South Africa. It is 
somewhat puzzling why before the Pioneer Foods settlement agreement a pure discount remedy 
had not been used in South Africa, especially given weak private enforcement of competition law. 
Like all remedies, a pure discount remedy raises its own problems. Perhaps a more serious 
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concern is that it is too modest a remedy. To fully deter misconduct, disgorgement of illicit profits 
must cover the total harm created by the conduct divided by the ex ante probability of detection 
and successful adjudication. Fully redressing cases where private enforcement of competition law 
is weak may require competition authorities to impose fines adequate to achieve optimal 
deterrence or at least reduce some of the shortfall in deterrence by depriving a firm violating 
competition law some of its illicit loot and at the same time compensating consumers for some of 
their losses. 
Overall, my discussion points to an important principle: the costs of remedies should not 
outweigh the consumer benefit they achieve. An important disagreement exists between those 
questioning the Pioneer Foods settlement agreement’s validity and the Commission’s authority to 
conclude it and others who advance the view that the Commission was within its right. We have 
no doubt that, regardless of the appropriateness, success, or failure of the remedial action in the 
Pioneer Foods settlement agreement or in general, the debate on competition law remedies is the 








I. DISCOUNT REMEDIES AND ALLOCATIVE INEFFICIENCY 
 
Following from Polinsky and Rubinfeld (2008)156 suppose that a firm produces a homogenous 
good with constant marginal cost per unit. During the cartel period, the firm charges the 
monopoly price. Assume for simplicity that, after the cartel period, the competitive price will 
prevail, aside from the effect of any remedy. This might be the case because the price that would 
be paid in the absence of a discount is set by competitive firms who are not subject to any 
remedy. The consumption decision for a consumer in the cartel period is shown in Figure D-1.157  
 




Let 𝑐 = constant marginal cost of production and 𝑚 = price mark-up during the cartel period. 
The price during the cartel period is  𝑐 + 𝑚, and the price thereafter would be 𝑐  if there was no 
remedy. The static Nash equilibrium involves marginal cost pricing. After collusion all profits are 
competed away. Assume that the demand for the product is linear and stochastic. In each period a 
consumer may have “low” demand or “high” demand. The individual’s demand curve is  
𝑞 = 𝑎𝑖 − 𝑏𝑃            (1) 
                                                          
156 Polinsky and Rubinfeld (2003) in a working paper version of the 2008 article in the Journal of Industrial Economics 
compare the deadweight loss from coupon and discount remedies but because they are not aware of discount remedies 
in practice, they do not include in the final version of the Journal of industrial economics article references to discount 
remedies. They argue that they are not aware of any example wherein discount remedies were imposed by competition 
authorities.  
157 See also Polinsky and Rubinfeld (2008) and Bonakele and Mncube (2012). 
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where 𝑖 = 𝐻  if demand is high and 𝑖 = 𝐿  if demand is low (𝑎 𝐻 > 𝑎𝐿) . Assume demand is 
independent from period to period. Let 𝜃 = probability that demand is low. The population of 
consumers is normalized to be unity.158 Consider the losses suffered by consumers during the 
cartel period. The loss of consumer surplus for a consumer whose demand 𝑎𝑖 − 𝑏𝑃 in the cartel 
period, due to the price mark-up, is the sum of the areas A and B in Figure 1 or  
(𝑎𝑖 − 𝑏(𝑐 + 𝑚))𝑚 +
1
2
𝑚2 )          (2) 
Now suppose 𝐾 =  the expected consumer surplus loss during the cartel period. 
𝐾 = 𝜃 [(𝑎𝐿 − 𝑏(𝑐 + 𝑚))𝑚 +
1
2




𝐾 = [𝜃𝑎𝐿 + (1 − 𝜃)𝑎𝐻 ]𝑚 − 𝑏𝑐𝑚 −  
1
2
𝑏𝑚2                 (3) 
Unlike Polinsky and Rubinfeld (2008), suppose that the discount remedy consists of allowing all 
consumers (whether harmed or not) to purchase as much of the good as they want at some price 
less than the competitive price 𝑐.159  
Discount remedies are over inclusive, some consumers who were not harmed will benefit from 
the discount. The assumption that consumers are made whole is applied on a class wide basis, and 
not an individual by individual basis. Let 𝑠 =  discount below the competitive price. Then the 
price in the remedy period is 𝑐 − 𝑠. As shown Figure D-1, an individual with demand curve 𝑑𝑖 in 
the remedy period will purchase 𝑎𝑖 − 𝑏(𝑐 − 𝑠) units of the good. The value of the discount 





The expected value of the discount remedy to consumers, given the probability of demand being 
low or high, is  
𝜃[(𝑎𝐿 − 𝑏𝑐)𝑠 +
1
2
𝑏𝑠2] + (1 − 𝜃)[(𝑎𝐻 − 𝑏𝑐)𝑠 +
1
2
𝑏𝑠2]           (4) 
Setting the expected value of the discount remedy to consumers, equation 4, to equal the expected 
consumer surplus loss during the cartel period, equation 3, and solving for 𝑠  determines the 
discount that makes the class whole. The resulting quadratic equation in 𝑠 is: 
                                                          
158 Thus, we refer to an individual consumer and the class of consumers interchangeably. 
159 Polinsky and Rubinfeld (2008) assume that consumers who bought the good at the marked up price are given 





𝑏𝑠2 + [𝜃𝑎𝐿 + (1 − 𝜃)𝑎𝐻 − 𝑏𝑐]𝑠 − 𝐾 = 0              (5) 
Therefore, the discount, 𝑠 , that solves equation 5, is less than the mark-up in the in the cartel 
period m. Consumers buy more of the good at the discounted price than they did at the marked-up 
price. If the discount equalled the mark-up, consumers would gain more from the discount than 
the loss from the mark-up. In Figure D-1, the gain from the discount is the sum of the areas S, T, 
and U and the harm from the mark-up is the sum of the areas A and B. If s  were to equal m, then 
S and A would be of identical size and T would exceed B. The gain would exceed the loss. To 
avoid overcompensating consumers, the discount s  must be less than the mark-up m. Deadweight 
loss is a reduction in net economic benefits resulting from an inefficient allocation of resources. 
The deadweight loss of the discount remedy is shown in Figure D-1 as the loss corresponding to 
area V, which equals 1
2
𝑏𝑠2  this loss is the same for individuals with low demand and high 
demand. 
The implicit assumption in the analysis so far, is that a one remedy period is equal in length to the 
period during which the harm occurred. Now consider allowing the remedy to apply over multiple 
periods by assuming a lower discount for a longer period of time. One might expect that the 
present value of the deadweight loss would continue to decline as the number of remedy periods 
is increased, because a lower discount can be used. The present value of the deadweight loss of 
the discount remedy does decline as the number of remedy periods increases, but it does not go to 
zero. To be sure, suppose 𝜑 = discount below the competitive price when there are n remedy 
periods;  𝑑 =  time discount rate; 𝐷 = 1
1+𝑑
 and ∑(n)=1+D+𝐷2 + ⋯ + 𝐷𝑛 . The benefit to 
consumers of a discount of magnitude 𝜑 for n periods is 
∑(n){θ [(aL − bc)φ +
1
2
bφ2] + (1 + θ)[aH − bc)φ +
1
2
bφ2]}         (6) 
Setting equation 6, the present value of the stream of consumer surpluses for the n periods, equal 
to the harm during the cartel period equation 3 and solving for  𝜑 yields: 
𝜑 = [−∑(𝑛)(𝜃𝑎𝐿 + (1 − 𝜃))𝑎𝐻 − 𝑏𝑐) + 
(∑(𝑛)2(𝜃𝑎𝐿 + (1 − 𝜃)𝑎𝐻 − 𝑏𝑐)
2 + 2∑(𝑛)𝑏𝐾)
1
2/∑(𝑛)𝑏                (7) 
where K is defined by equation 3. The corresponding present value of the deadweight loss is 
1
2
∑(𝑛)𝑏𝜑2            (8) 
The limit of ∑(n) is 1/(1 − 𝐷), which is positive and finite. It is then clear from equation 6 that 
the limit of φ must be positive; otherwise the benefit to consumers of the discount would go to 
zero and not make them whole. Hence, the limit of the deadweight loss equation 8 must be 
positive. It is thus not hard to imagine that it would be problematic to spread the discount over a 
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substantial period of time. First, a firm that is required to charge a price below its marginal cost 
for a lengthy period would eventually choose to exit the industry. Second, the longer the discount 
is applicable, the more difficult it becomes to determine the competitive price to which the 
discount should be applied. Obviously, both of these problems are lessened if the discount 
remedy is in effect for a relatively short period of time. 
 
To demonstrate the practical relevance of the issues discussed above, a simulation exercise is 
insightful. I (arbitrarily) choose the following model parameters: aL = R 150, aH = R 550, b =
5, c = R 5, m = 2 and θ = 0.8. Given these assumptions, for a one period remedy, the harm 
suffered by the class during the cartel period is R 400. To make the consumer class whole using a 
discount remedy in one period would require a discount of R1.9 which would result in a 
deadweight loss of R9.025. By changing 𝜃 from 0.8 to 0.3, the harm to the consumer class is 
R800. To make the consumer class whole using a discount remedy would require a discount of 
R1.95, which would result in a deadweight loss of R9.526 (see Table D-2). To illustrate the 
benefit of extending the discount remedy from one period to two periods, reconsider the example 
above and assume that the discount rate D = 0.1. If θ = 0.8, the deadweight loss declines from 
R9.025 when there is one remedy period to R4.773 if there are two remedy periods. If θ = 0.3, 
the deadweight loss declines from R9.526 to R4.975. Therefore, with multiple remedy periods, 
the allocative ineffieciency of discount remedies diminishes. 
 
Table C-1:  Consumer harm, discount and deadweight loss 
 
Suppose further that the number of remedy periods increases from one to two. Let z = discount 
below the competitive price when there are two periods. The benefit to the class if the discount is 
z for two periods is 
(1 + D){θ [(aL − bc)z +
1
2
bz2] + (1 − θ) [(aH − bc)z +
1
2
bz2]}          (10) 
And the associated deadweight loss is  
Consumer harm Discount Deadweight loss 
One remedy period
R 400 R 1.91 R 9.09
R 640 R 1.94 R 9.41
R 800 R 1.95 R 9.52
Two remedy period
R 400 R 0.99 R 4.75
R 640 R 1.02 R 4.92











(1 + 𝐷)𝑏𝑧2                   (11) 
Setting equation 10 equal to equation 4 yields the following quadratic equation in z: 
𝑧2 + 2 [
𝜃𝑎𝐿 + (1 − 𝜃)𝑎𝐻 − 𝑏𝑐
𝑏
] 𝑧 − 2[𝜃𝑎𝐿 + (1 − 𝜃)𝑎𝐻 − 𝑏𝑐)/(1 + 𝐷)𝑏]𝑠 − 𝑠
2/(1 + 𝐷) = 0 
Two remedy periods will be preferred to one if and only if  







V. ESSAY FIVE 





Following from the discussion in Essay four, competition policy remedies are interventions that 
aim to restore competition in the market place.160 To achieve this, competition policy remedies 
bring to an end the anticompetitive conduct, disgorge illicit profits and/or compensate those who 
have suffered as a result of the anticompetitive conduct. In addition, competition policy remedies 
also place incentives to minimise the recurrence of the anticompetitive conduct. It is important to 
note, however, that restoring competition does not mean that competition policy remedies are 
aimed at achieving perfect competition in the market place (perfect competition only applies to a 
theoretical setting, where there are no barriers to entry, economic profits are competed away and 
is practically unattainable). Rather, competition policy remedies are aimed at restoring the market 
to conditions that would have existed in the absence of the anticompetitive conduct (commonly 
known as the ‘but for’ market conditions). 
A discount remedy is an agreement between a competition authority and a firm that the firm will 
sell to all buyers at a given discount whether or not they were harmed by the conduct of the firm. 
The discount can be specified as either a certain specified amount or a percentage. A coupon 
discount remedy, on the other hand, is an agreement between a competition authority and a firm 
that the firm will sell at a discount only to holders of coupons. 
One important question on the use of a discount remedy by a competition authority is whether 
this is beneficial to consumers? The answer appears obvious; a discount price reduction would be 
beneficial to all consumers, both the rich and the poor. Yet the extent of such a benefit could vary 
depending on a number of factors including: (1) the shape of the demand curve; (2) the presence 
of other competitors; (3) the value of the discount recipients have for the product; (4) the size of 
the discount; (5) the amount of discount issued; (6) the ability of sellers to selectively adjust price 
or quality; (7) the shape of the seller’s cost curve; and (8) the length of the discount period. 
                                                          
160 See also Lianos and Economides (2010). 
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Perhaps this is why discount remedies while enormously powerful, are seldom used by 
competition authorities. To our knowledge, the Pioneer Foods discount remedy was the first of its 
kind in South Africa or elsewhere, although coupon discount remedies have been widely used in 
the US where many antitrust lawsuits involving price fixing have settled for coupon discount 
remedies and cash.161 
Another reason could be the assumption that private actions provide adequate monetary relief, 
therefore discount remedies do not provide an additional benefit. For instance, when a cartel has 
harmed a customer, that customer may, under some circumstances, pursue a private damages 
claim for the purpose of litigation and/or settlement. The adequacy of the private actions 
assumption seems dubious, especially in South Africa, where private enforcement of competition 
law is weak.162  
 
Perhaps a more serious concern is that there is an open question as to whether the Commission 
has authority to conclude discount remedies. 163  The Commission has discretion in crafting 
appropriate remedies for competition law contraventions but this discretion has limits. During the 
Tribunal process of confirming the Pioneer Foods settlement agreement, the National Treasury 
Department (“National Treasury”) made an application to intervene.164 According to the National 
Treasury, the only monetary sanction contemplated by the Competition Act is an administrative 
penalty. The National Treasury’s constitutional and statutory duty is to ensure that monies are 
properly transferred to and from the National Revenue Fund. Any fine imposed under the 
Competition Act is payable exclusively into the National Revenue Fund. The National Treasury 
argued during the confirmation proceedings that the Commission could not use its discretionary 
powers for a purpose not expressly authorised by the Competition Act, however laudable the 
intention. Furthermore, the National Treasury suggested that discount remedies are arguably an 
attempt to siphon off from the National Revenue Fund. 
                                                          
161 In the USA, coupon discount remedies have been widely used in many antitrust lawsuits involving price fixing For 
example, in 1994, passengers who had travelled on major U.S. airlines between January 1988 and June 1992 received 
coupons with a total face value of approximately $400 million (see also Polinsky and Rubinfeld (2008)). See also 
Appendix E for a selected summary of competition cases involving discount remedies broadly. 
162 To the best of my knowledge, there has only been one private competition law damages claim in South Africa. 
Nationwide Airlines and Comair instituted civil claims in the High Court for damages arising out of the abuse of 
dominance by South African Airways.. 
163 See article by Michael Bleby titled “Treasury tussle for Pioneer Food fine” on 25 November 2010 in Business Day 
newspaper. Also available at: http://www.bdlive.co.za/articles/2010/11/25/treasury-tussle-for-pioneer-food-
fine;jsessionid=72BEE8DDC7ABC7428A4B9A72A2EB389E.present1.bdfm 
164 A party that has a direct and substantial interest in the confirmation proceedings of the Competition Tribunal can 
accordingly be joined as a party to the confirmation proceedings. 
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I evaluate the effectiveness of the Pioneer Foods discount remedy. I begin in section 2 by 
discussing as a matter of competition law, the foundations of imposing discount remedies. The 
Commission’s discretion in crafting appropriate remedies is at the centre of my analysis. I argue 
that discount remedies are part of the exercise of discretionary remedialism. In section 3, I 
provide a brief discussion of the cartel conduct and then provide an overview of the choice and 
design of the Pioneer Foods discount remedy. In section 4, I evaluate the effect of imposing a 
discount remedy on one firm in an oligopoly market. To this end, I focus on the strategic 
interactions between the firms before, during and after the discount remedy. I find that the period 
before, during and after was characterised by increasing wheat prices. However, increasing wheat 
prices did not translate into increased bread prices during the discount remedy period. After the 
discount remedy period, prices of bread increased sharply. I conclude in section 5.  
 
2. Discount remedies and competition law 
 
The Commission has some discretion in crafting appropriate remedies for competition law 
contraventions. In the case of the Commission’s settlement with Pioneer Foods, one such remedy 
was the discount remedy imposed on Pioneer Foods. Discretionary remedialism is the “view that 
courts (but in our case I could add competition authorities) have a discretion to award the 
‘appropriate’ remedy in the circumstances of each individual case rather than being limited to 
specific (perhaps historically determined) remedies for each category of causative events” (see 
Lianos, 2011). A deep-rooted concern is discretionary remedialism could increase uncertainty and 
unpredictability as to the nature and form of the remedy. Uncertainty and unpredictability are 
certainly to be avoided with regard to the areas of law that rely on private governance (e.g. 
contracts, torts), where the aim is to facilitate the exercise of private choice in the most efficient 
way. 
But, more provocatively, is predictability and certainty necessary to the same extent within a 
regime of public governance, such as competition law? For example, it is possible to argue that 
greater predictability of the competition law remedy might make it possible for the firm to 
calculate precisely the costs and benefits of the violation and therefore to make sure that the 
breach of competition law is profitable (Lianos, 2011). 
Section 49 D (1) of the Competition Act provides that, if the Commission and a respondent 
“agree on the terms of an appropriate order,” the Tribunal may confirm the agreement as a 
consent order. An “appropriate” consent order is one which is “suitable,” that is, “suitable in the 
sense that it is an agreement that suits the contending interests of the Commission, as the proxy of 
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the public interest, and the respondent, and in that sense, can be appropriate as between 
themselves.” However, section 58 (1) (a) does not provide an exhaustive list of the kinds of 
orders that the Tribunal may make. Whatever remedy imposed must be “appropriate.” The 
principle of appropriateness constitutes an important limit to the Commission’s discretion in 
imposing remedies.  
The Tribunal is required to be satisfied when confirming a consent and settlement agreement. 
This means that remedies agreed by the Commission and a respondent do not exceed the limits of 
what is appropriate and suitable. The Commission’s discretion in crafting remedies is very broad, 
allowing it to address various objectives of the Competition Act subject of course to the 
appropriateness test. 165  Essentially, the appropriateness test is an objective test and is thus 
justifiable. It does not state a list of appropriate remedies. Remedial discretion and the consequent 
unpredictability of the remedy are therefore tolerated, as long as it is within acceptable, from the 
point of view of appropriateness and suitability, limits. 
Where conventional wisdom recognises that, because competition law cases involve market wide 
harm, they are uniquely suitable for class action treatments, a court could accept narrow 
arguments that in markets with product differentiation, buyer negotiation, or price discrimination, 
harm from anticompetitive conduct is individuated. By requiring precise calculations of the but-
for price for each consumer class member, this narrow view imposes a higher burden of proof 
than would be imposed in an individual case, where proof of harm can be uncertain and any 
reasonable approximation of the amount of damages suffices. But the point for present purposes 
is not whether the narrow view on competition law class actions is right or wrong. The point is 
that the narrow view supports having competition authorities take up the slack left by the 
substantial barriers to competition law class actions by bringing out discount remedies from their 
remedial toolbox. 
 
3. The Pioneer Foods discount remedy  
 
An important precondition for a robust review of the Pioneer Foods discount remedy is a 
profound understanding of both the cartel agreement in general and the design of the discount 
remedy in particular. As a consequence, this section concentrates first on providing an overview 
                                                          
165  South African competition law has a number of objectives including goals based on both economic welfare 
(promoting economic efficiency and consumer welfare) and non-economic welfare (fairness and the protection of a 
group of market participants, for example, small and medium-sized enterprises). 
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of the flour and bread cartels. Second, it gives a brief description of the design of the Pioneer 
Foods discount remedy. 166  
 
A. THE FLOUR AND BREAD CARTELS 
 
Section 4 (1) (b) of the Competition Act, 1998, as amended, provides that an agreement between, 
or concerted practice by, firms or a decision by an association of firms, is prohibited if it involves 
directly or indirectly fixing a purchase or selling price or any other trading condition or dividing 
markets by allocating customers, suppliers, territories, or specific types of goods or services.  
There are four major firms that operate in the wheat milling industry in South Africa. These firms 
are Premier Foods, Tiger Brands, Pioneer Foods and Foodcorp. They are all vertically integrated 
and account for more than 90 per cent of the wheat milling market. They mill wheat into flour 
which is then used to supply both their own bakeries and independent third parties such as the 
chain stores and other bakeries. Up until the 1990s, the marketing of agricultural products in 
South Africa, including grain products, was extensively regulated by the state. In the 1996, the 
wheat industry was deregulated. In 2007, the Commission discovered that the four major wheat 
millers had continued, albeit privately, with regulating the industry. This conduct contravened 
Section 4 of the Competition Act, with respect to collusion involving flour and bread products. 
When Premier Foods applied for and was granted corporate leniency in terms of the 
Commission’s corporate leniency policy in the bread cartel case in March 2007, Premier Foods 
indicated that the cartel extended to the milling industry. Premier Foods’ corporate leniency 
extended to its involvement in the milling cartels (milled white maize and milled flour 
products).167 Tiger Brands corroborated Premier Foods’ allegations and entered into a settlement 
agreement with the Commission on 9 November 2007.168 In terms of the settlement agreement, 
the Tribunal imposed a fine of R98 million on Tiger Brands for its role in the bread cartel. Tiger 
Brands provided further evidence, not provided by Premier Foods on the operation of the milling 
cartels and applied for and was immunity from prosecution in terms of the corporate leniency 
policy for its involvement in the milling cartels.  
On 6 January 2009, the Tribunal confirmed a settlement agreement between the Commission and 
Foodcorp regarding Foodcorp’s involvement in the bread cartel and imposed a fine of R45 
                                                          
166 Media release, 02 November 2010, Competition Commission settles with Pioneer Foods. Also available at 
http://www.compcom.co.za/assets/Uploads/AttachedFiles/MyDocuments/Commission-settles-with-Pioneer-Foods2.pdf 
167  Media Release, 14 February 2007, Competition commission prosecutes bread cartel. Available at: 
http://www.compcom.co.za/2007-media-releases/ 
168 Press Statement, 12 November 2007, Tiger Brands admits to participation in bread and milling cartels and settles 
with Competition Commission. Available at: http://www.compcom.co.za/2007-media-releases/ 
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million on Foodcorp.169 On 3 February 2010, after contested proceedings, the Tribunal found that 
Pioneer Foods had been involved in a conspiracy to fix the prices of bread as well as market 
allocation in the Western Cape province and nationally. For this conduct, the Tribunal imposed a 
fine of R196 million on Pioneer Foods.  
On 30 November 2010, the Tribunal confirmed a settlement agreement between the Commission 
and Pioneer Foods regarding Pioneer Foods’ involvement in the milling cartels.  The remedies 
that were confirmed in this settlement agreement heightened the debate about appropriate 
remedies. The remedies included, among others, (1) a fine of R500 million, part of which by 
agreement was set aside for the creation of an Agro-processing Competitiveness Fund (“Agri-
fund”), (2) a commitment not to reduce capital expenditure, as well as, (3) a commitment to 
reduce prices on the sale of selected flour and bread products over an agreed period.  
In sum, Premier Foods, Tiger Brands, Pioneer Foods and Foodcorp have all admitted that their 
conduct contravened section 4 (1) (b) of the Competition Act. They have admitted that during the 
period between 1999 and 2007, they were all part of a cartel that fixed selling prices, as well as 
the implementation dates of such prices, and allocated markets for flour and bread. 
 
B. THE DESIGN OF THE DISCOUNT REMEDY 
 
The Pioneer Foods price reduction commitment was essentially a discount remedy. It forced 
Pioneer Foods to offer a discount off the competitive price for all consumers of the selected flour 
and bread products, unlike a coupon discount remedy which awards only the harmed consumers 
with coupons that can be used to purchase the good at a price below that which would otherwise 
prevail. Put differently, Pioneer Foods agreed in November 2010 that it will, over a defined 
period, adjust its pricing in respect of certain flour products (white bread flour, brown bread flour 
and cake flour) and bread products (all standard 600g and 700g white and brown loaves 
accounting for around 85-90 per cent of Pioneer Food’s bread sales). 
The discount remedy was designed in such a way that the average realized gross profit for the 
selected bread and flour products over the base period would be compared with the average 
realized profit over the comparative period.170 The base period was defined as the six month 
period from 1 October 2009 to 31 March 2010. The base period coincided with the period in 
                                                          
169  Press release, 5 January 2009, Competition Commission settles with Foodcorp. Available at: 
http://www.compcom.co.za/assets/Uploads/AttachedFiles/MyDocuments/5-Jan-09-CC-Settles-with-Foodcorp.pdf 
170 The Commission chose to call the discount remedy a “price reduction”, while Pioneer Foods chose to call it a 
“margin reduction”.  
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which the Commission had initiated and was investigating a further complaint against the four 
major millers of wheat. The complaint alleged that members of the National Chamber of Milling 
had engaged in anti-competitive exchange of commercially sensitive information and that this 
behaviour resulted in continued anticompetitive outcomes in flour and bread markets. The 
comparative period was defined as the period under review during the implementation of the 
discount remedy. The discount remedy amounted to a total price reduction of R160 million.171 
The extent of the price reduction was adjusted to take into account: (1) increases in costs such as 
electricity and labour; (2) any difference in the gross profit over the comparative and base periods 
in respect of flour sold internally between Pioneer Foods' flour and baking operations (the 
intention was to maintain gross profit at the calculated base so that the gross margin reduction on 
vertically integrated flour and baking operations would be calculated at the level of bread); (3) as 
well as any difference in gross profit on all bran products sold for the comparative and base 
periods (so that revenue from bran as a by-product was in fact taken into account as a reduction in 
costs of flour production).  
On one hand the price reduction was intended to benefit end consumers who had been subjected 
to anti-competitive prices over the years and on the other hand, to increase price competition in 
the markets for flour and bread products. Given the sensitive, commercial nature of information 
relating to Pioneer Foods' pricing, the exact duration as well as the expected average price 
reductions for each of the selected products was confidential and not known to the other market 
participants.172 Minimum levels of price reductions for each product category and the time period 
over which it will be implemented were set at a level so as to have a meaningful effect.173 
Furthermore, prices on certain products, with existing gross profit below a confidential minimum, 
would not be further reduced to avoid predatory outcomes.  
To illustrate how the price reduction was calculated, suppose that the standard bread margin for 
the comparative period was R0.41 per loaf lower (R3.30 less R2.89) as shown in Table 5-1 (this 
equates to a 41 cents reduction in the price of bread). Suppose further that 391 million loaves of 
bread had been sold in the comparative period. This would result in the total price reduction of 
R160 million. 
 
                                                          
171  See Competition Commission and Pioneer (Consent Order), Case number: 15/CR/Mar10. Available at: 
http://www.comptrib.co.za/assets/Uploads/1015CRMar10-Pioneer.pdf 
172 The duration was for 6 months. 
173 The price of standard white and brown loaves of bread was to be reduced by an average minimum of 30 cents. This 
price reduction was to be in addition to any other promotional discount to retailers. The price of flour was to be reduced 
by an average minimum of R350 per tonne. 
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Table 5-1: Illustration of the calculation of the total price reduction 
 Base period  Comparative 
period 
 R per unit R per unit 
Total gross profit 2.56 2.1 
Total damages and not assigned -0.29 -0.24 
Exclusion of overheads  1.03 1.03 
Exclusion of overhead recovery 0.76 1.03 
Increase 10% on fixed and variable cost 0.26   
Margin  3.30 2.89 
Margin reduction ("comparative period" less "base period”)   -0.41 
 
Pioneer Foods accepted the risk of ensuring that the targeted price reduction was met over the 
comparative period. In the event that the price reductions exceeded the agreed target, Pioneer 
Foods accepted this risk and agreed that such a situation would not form a basis for any claim for 
a reduction in fine or other amounts payable in terms of the settlement agreement. Thus, the 
discount remedy was designed such that it was flexible, created uncertainty, and was not 
transparent to rivals. Furthermore, the Commission committed to monitoring compliance on the 
part of Pioneer Foods as well as monitoring the pass through on the part of major retailers.  
 
4. Evaluating the effectiveness of discount remedy in the bread industry 
 
While limited, the theoretical literature on discount remedies tends to focus on analytical studies 
of coupon discount remedies, providing counter-examples of the inefficiency of coupon discount 
remedies. Gramlich (1986) discusses several rationales for using coupon discounts rather than 
cash as a remedy. Gramlich (2003) evaluates how the form of the coupon discount  remedy, 
whether it is a fixed discount, a percentage discount, or the right to buy at a fixed price affects the 
benefits obtained by consumers, the profits lost by the respondent, and the efficiency (total 
surplus) of the market when firms have market power.174  Many commentators are generally 
highly critical of coupon discount remedies. They argue that coupon discount remedies facilitate 
settlements between the lawyers representing the class of consumers and the respondent that are 
not in the interests of the consumers. More generally, the lawyers’ compensation is usually based 
on the value of the remedy to the class. According to Gramlich (1986), the average coupon 
discount redemption rate for consumer and corporate plaintiffs combined is 26.3 per cent. For 
consumer plaintiffs alone, it is 13.1 per cent. When the lawyers succeed, they are well rewarded, 
                                                          
174 Miller and Singer (1997), and Leslie (2002) discuss also coupon discount remedies. 
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while the effective cost to the respondent of the settlement will be relatively low and consumers 
obtain a remedy that is of relatively little value. 
In addition to the agency problems175, coupon discount remedies suffer from two additional flaws. 
First, as emphasized in Borenstein (1996) in a model with imperfect competition, the coupon 
settlement will typically affect the future pricing behaviour of the respondents. Borenstein's main 
point can be illustrated in an example with undifferentiated Bertrand-style price competition. In 
the absence of coupons, the competitive price would settle at marginal cost and the defendants 
would make zero profits. If all consumers receive an abundant supply of coupons, the competitive 
price would be the marginal cost of production plus the face value of a coupon. At this price, 
firms earn zero profits. Note that the consumers are no better off with coupons than without: the 
competitive pricing has completely neutralized the effect of the coupons. With heterogeneous 
consumers, where some receive non-transferable coupons and others do not, consumers as a class 
do not benefit. The price of the product would rise to reflect that the coupon will be redeemed. 
Consumers who own the coupons will be better off than before while consumers who did not 
receive coupons will be worse off. 
Polinsky and Rubinfeld (2008) focus on an important welfare distortion arising from coupon 
discount settlements. Consumers are heterogeneous in their model, with stochastic per period 
demand that is uncorrelated across periods. Through a coupon settlement, consumers receive 
coupons in proportion to their earlier purchases during the injury period. In this context, several 
situations can arise. Suppose a consumer who had low demand in the injury period (and hence a 
small number of coupons) ends up with high demand later. This consumer will use all of his or 
her coupons and will also purchase additional products at full price: the consumer's purchase level 
does not hinge on the coupon's value. Suppose instead that a consumer who had high demand in 
the injury period (and hence has many coupons) has low demand subsequently. For this 
consumer, the coupons will increase his purchase level since the marginal unit is now cheaper. A 
fundamental distortion can arise in this case, that is, the quantity that this consumer purchases 
may be inefficiently high in the sense that the marginal cost of the unit is higher than the intrinsic 
value that the consumer derives from its use.176 
 
                                                          
175 Also known as principal-agent problems, agency problems arise in situations where interests diverge. In other 
words, whenever the welfare of one party, termed the ‘principal’, depends upon actions taken by another party, termed 
the ‘agent.’ The problem lies in motivating the agent to act in the principal’s interest rather than simply in the agent’s 
own interest. 
176 Polinsky and Rubinfeld (2007) develop an argument for a hybrid remedy that includes the use of coupons giving 
consumers a choice between a cash amount and a certain number of coupons as a mechanism to facilitate the proper 
measurement of damages. 
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A. DISCOUNT REMEDIES AND COMPETITION 
 
Suppose there are two classes of consumers. One class of consumers only buys standard bread 
and the other class of consumers only buys non-standard bread. Non-standard bread includes 
variety breads, generally perceived as higher in nutritional value than standard bread and is 
usually consumed by higher income or health-conscious individuals. Recall, that the Pioneer 
Foods discount remedy specifically excluded consumers who bought non-standard bread. Pioneer 
Foods was free to charge these consumers any price. Ignoring first of all, the strategic relations 
between firms, assume that the industry is characterised by monopolistic competition. Following 
Borenstein (1996) aassume that the standard bread buyers’ demand for bread is given by the 
proportion, 𝑔(𝑝) each period and is a given fraction, 1 − 𝜎, of the total demand the firm faces, 
𝑓(𝑝) per period, 
𝑔(𝑝) = (1 − 𝜎)𝑓(𝑝)                        ∀𝑝                                       (1) 
In the absence of the discount remedy, the firm (assumed to be Pioneer Foods) would want to 
charge standard bread buyers (the discount group) a higher price, paid by the non-discount group 
buyers. For simplicity, assume further that marginal costs are constant, 𝑐  and where 𝑝𝑆  and 
𝑝𝑁  represent the prices of standard bread and non-standard bread, respectively. If standard bread 
buyers receive a discount off the price of standard bread for one period, 𝑑, less than the price, the 
firm faces the following maximisation problem: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝜋 = (𝑝𝑁 − 𝑐)𝜎𝑓(𝑝𝑁) + (𝑝𝑆 − 𝑐 − 𝑑)(1 − 𝜎)𝑓(𝑝𝑆 − 𝑑)                  (2) 
 
First order conditions (𝑝𝑁): 
𝜎𝑓(𝑝𝑁) + (𝑝𝑁 − 𝑐)𝜎𝑓
′(𝑝𝑁) = 0                          (3) 
Thus 
𝑓(𝑝𝑁) + (𝑝𝑁 − 𝑐)𝑓
′(𝑝𝑁) = 0 
 
First order conditions (𝑝𝑆): 
(1 − 𝜎)𝑓(𝑝𝑆 − 𝑑) + (𝑝𝑆 − 𝑐 − 𝑑)(1 − 𝜎)𝑓
′(𝑝𝑆 − 𝑑) = 0                 (4) 
Thus 
𝑓(𝑝𝑆 − 𝑑) + (𝑝𝑆 − 𝑐 − 𝑑)𝑓
′(𝑝𝑆 − 𝑑) = 0 
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If the profit function is globally concave in price, then 𝑝 = 𝑃∗, so profits are increased by raising 
price from 𝑃∗. The incentives for the firm is to increase the price one group while reducing it for 
the other group. Note that the optimal price occurs where the weighted average of the first order 
condition for the non-discount buyers and the first order condition for the discount buyers is equal 
to zero. In the case of a linear demand function and constant marginal costs, the discount price 
would equal the price when there is no discount remedy in force.  
The firm’s incentive to change prices depends on a number of factors including the relationship 
between the costs of changing prices and the comparative loss in profits of maintaining prices. 
For example, the costs of changing prices might be higher than the comparative loss in profits 
from maintaining prices. To be specific to the Pioneer Foods example, the discount remedy was 
used in a setting where it was difficult to forecast the bread price, particularly because wheat costs 
change frequently. In this setting, the costs of changing prices are unlikely to prevent re-
optimisation because the firm has to adjust prices frequently for other reasons. In addition, 
Pioneer Foods’ could have perceived the discount to be not worth the concern of changing prices 
if for example, the discount group was small or the discount itself is small. While this may 
generally be true, however, with regards to Pioneer Foods and for bread alone the discount group 
accounted for between 85-90 per cent of bread sales.  
The optimisation problem discussed above demonstrates the conclusion that the firm has the 
incentive to raise prices for the non-discount group of buyers and that these buyers are likely to 
bear most of the cost of a discount remedy. This conclusion is built on the assumption that the 
firm is a monopolist facing a relatively inelastic firm level demand curve. But does the result hold 
in more competitive markets? In more competitive markets, the argument that competition will 
prevent the firm from offsetting the discount by raising prices seems more appealing. This 
argument relies on the fact that strategic interactions could affect a firm’s response to a discount 
remedy ignored in the just discussed example. Borenstein (1996) has considered the discount 
issue in the context of a symmetric differentiated duopoly setting.  Following his analysis, 
assume: 
𝑄𝑆 = ℎ(𝑝𝑆, 𝑝𝑁),    𝑄𝑁 = ℎ(𝑝𝑁 , 𝑝𝑆),     𝑐𝑆 = 𝑐𝑁 = 𝑐       (5) 
Reaction functions are upward sloping in price. The Nash equilibrium price is, ?̆?, in the absence 
of the discount remedy. Suppose first that the discount remedy is then imposed on both firms. The 
new symmetric equilibrium price (P) and the discount price (𝑃 − 𝑑) will be such that 𝑃 − 𝑑 <
?̆? < 𝑃. Now suppose the discount remedy is imposed on firm 1, (assumed to be Pioneer Foods) 
and not on firm 2. Further for simplicity, suppose that firm 2 can either charge a single price or it 
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can match the terms of the discount remedy. If firm 2 chooses to match the terms of the discount 
remedy, then this situation corresponds to a situation in which the discount applies to both firms.  
If firm 2 chooses to charge a single price to discount and non-discount buyers, firm 2’s best 
response could be to increase or decrease that price from ?̆? or leave it unchanged depending on 
the weighted average of the slopes of the profit functions (?̆? ) it faces from the discount and non-
discount buyers once firm 1 moves. On the other hand, if firm 2 chooses to price discriminate in 
favour of the discount buyers without matching the terms of the discount remedy, firm 1 prices 
are likely to be unaffected or only slightly affected by firm 2’s response. In this situation, firm 2 
would respond to firm 1’s forced discount by lowering its own prices to the discount group and 
raising prices to the non-discount group. Firm 2’s prices would still be lower than firm 1 and its 
discount would still be above that of firm 1. The above illustrations simply show that the direction 
of the net effect on price as a result of imposing a discount remedy on only one firm is at best 
ambiguous. 
To illustrate the relevance of the issues discussed above, I compare the actual market situation 
during the period when the discount remedy was in place with the situation on the same market 
before and after. Using time series data on actual prices of bread sold in South Africa from a 
selected national retailers means that market characteristics such as the degree of competition, 
market structure, costs and demand characteristics are more comparable. The dataset contains 
information on monthly retail and wholesale bread prices from June 2010 to June 2013. The 
dataset is constructed using private data. The non-public data set typically has the advantage of 
providing richer and more detailed information. The non-public data is collected from selected 
retailers. Recall that the Commission undertook to monitor prices as a result of the Pioneer Foods 
discount remedy.177 Included in the dataset is the cost of wheat which is exogenous to the conduct 
of the firms.178 The following major retailers provided the Commission their monthly retail prices 
and the whole sale price with which they had bought the bread: (1) Pick n’ Pay; (2) Woolworths; 
(3) Massmart; and (4) Shoprite. 
During the discount remedy period, the Commission undertook a quasi-regulatory role by 
monitoring not only compliance on the part of Pioneer Foods but also monitoring of pass on 
effect of retailers. Generally, bread prices are viewed historically as being sticky downwards. For 
instance, one manager of Pioneer Foods’ subsidiary division, Sasko, indicated in testimony to the 
                                                          
177 Media Release, 14 December 2010, Pioneer implements agreement with Competition Commission to reduce the 
price of selected bread and flour products. Available at: 
http://www.compcom.co.za/assets/Uploads/AttachedFiles/MyDocuments/Pioneer-media-release-14Dec10.pdf 
178 The dataset includes monthly consumer price index data from Statistics South Africa (“Stats SA”). This data 
captures monthly food prices and is provided by the South African Grain Information Service (“SAGIS”). 
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Tribunal as part of the bread cartel hearings that bread prices were never reduced when input 
costs declined because consumers apparently did not appreciate fluctuations in bread prices. 
Figures 5-1, 5-2 and 5-3 provide a comparison of Pioneer Foods’ wholesale pricing and the 
wholesale pricing of its main rivals on standard white bread, standard brown bread and non-
standard bread before, during and after the discount remedy. As shown in Figure 5-1 and 5-2, 
Pioneer Foods reduced its prices on standard white bread and brown bread during the discount 
remedy period. Tiger Brands and Premier Foods followed by either maintaining prices for both 
standard white bread and brown bread or reducing them slightly during the discount remedy. 
Foodcorp however, chose to increase its prices for standard brown bread while maintaining prices 
of standard white bread during the discount remedy period. After the discount remedy, Pioneer 
Foods and its rivals all increased their prices.  
With regard to non-standard bread, Pioneer Foods increased the price faced by the non-standard 
bread customers during and after the discount remedy period (as shown in Figure 5-3). Tiger 
Brands and Premier Foods maintained prices during the remedy period while increasing them 
after the remedy period. 
 
Figure 5-1: Average wholesale prices of standard white bread, 06/2010 -06/2011 (Rands) 
 






Figure 5-2: Average wholesale prices of standard brown bread, 06/2010 -06/2011 (Rands) 
 
Source: Selected retail outlets and own calculations 
 
Figure 5-3: Average wholesale prices of non-standard bread, 06/2010 -06/2011 (Rands) 




While, the economic model presented above applies to individual firm decisions, I do not 
estimate firm-level models. For estimation purposes aggregate data is used. The approach adopted 
is the before-and-after method. Retail prices of standard white and brown bread before and after 
the end of the Pioneer Foods’ discount remedy period are used to establish the appropriate 
benchmark retail prices within the discount remedy period had the discount remedy not been 
effected. The discount remedy operated from December 2010 to April 2011. This method is based 
on the idea that to the extent that discount remedy prices differ in a statistically significant way 
from the prices prior to the implementation of the discount remedy period and the prices once the 
discount remedy period ended, the difference could be attributed to the discount remedy.  
In my model, the equilibrium price is a function of a supply-side factor (flour price) and a 
demand-side factor (price of substitute), both are expected to be positively related to equilibrium 
price. I implement the before-and-after approach within a multiple regression framework and 
include a dummy variable equal to 1 when the discount remedy was in effect and 0 otherwise. 
The coefficient on the dummy variable indicates whether the average price during the discount 
remedy period was significantly different and, in particular, lower than the average price during 
the non-discount remedy period. The model is expressed in its implicit form as: 
𝑙𝑛( 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒) =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑙𝑛(𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒) + 𝛽2 𝑙𝑛(𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒) +
𝛽3(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦) +               (6) 
I do not include the quantity variable itself as an independent variable but instrument quantity by 
using the price of substitutes (maize meal prices). This is done to avoid the inter-dependence of 
price and demand.179 The cost and demand-shifters included are assumed to be exogenous, since 
they are presumed to be determined independently of price and therefore unaffected by price. The 
error term reflects random shifts in demand, cost, or conduct by the market participants. In 
addition, there are demand and cost shifters which are only observable to the firms. These 
unobservable characteristics will be captured by the error term in the empirical model.  
Table 5-2 reports the estimation of the model for both the retail prices of standard white and 
brown bread. The table shows the estimation results for the case of the logarithm of the respective 
variables. It is revealed that the retail price difference between the discount remedy period and the 
non-discount remedy period for standard brown bread is exp(-0.0164) -1 = -1.63 per cent and is 
statistically significant. If I assume the average retail price of standard brown bread is R7.3 per 
loaf, the price reduction benefit is R 0.12 per loaf. For standard brown bread, while the discount 
remedy dummy variable is negative, it is not statistically significant. With respect to the 
                                                          




relationship between the retail bread price and the flour price, the regression results reveal that a 1 
per cent increase in the price of flour leads to a 0.499 per cent increase in the retail price of 
standard brown bread. For maize meal, I find that a price increase of 1 per cent leads to an 
increase in the retail price of standard brown bread of 0.081 per cent. Interestingly, while positive, 
the effect of maize meal price on bread price is not statistically significant. 
Table 5-2 : Regression analysis 
 
(1) (2) 
VARIABLES ln (std brown bread) ln (std white bread) 
   ln (flour) 0.499*** 0.529*** 
 
(0.126) (0.142) 
ln (maize meal) 0.0812 0.0494 
 
(0.284) (0.311) 
dummy remedy -0.0164* -0.00592 
 
(0.00895) (0.0104) 
Constant 0.825*** 0.929*** 
 
(0.243) (0.255) 
   Observations 13 13 
R-squared 0.919 0.892 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Figures 5-4 and 5-5, show average wholesale and retail price for Pioneer Foods’ standard white 
bread and brown bread before, during and after the discount remedy.180 As shown, the retailers 
passed on the price reduction benefits from the Pioneer Foods discount remedy during the remedy 
period and increased the prices substantially after, following an increase in the wholesale price of 
standard bread. The Pioneer Foods discount remedy was aimed not at achieving price reduction 
benefits for the direct purchasers (retail outlets) of bread from the bread producers but rather at 
achieving price reduction benefits for indirect purchasers, that is, general consumers who buy 
bread from the retail outlets. For indirect purchasers, the price reduction benefit depends on the 
amount of price reduction retail outlets higher up in the distribution chain “pass on” to them. The 
analysis of the price reduction benefits from Pioneer Foods’ discount remedy is especially 
difficult because the customer group targeted to recover these benefits consists of indirect 
purchasers. For example, while a lower price at the Pioneer Foods bread baking level may be 
expected to lead to lower prices at the retail level and ultimately lower prices to consumers, the 
extent to which a particular indirect purchaser benefits from the price reduction requires an 
analysis of the pass-on effect of the lower costs at each level in the supply chain. 
                                                          




Adding to the complexity of the indirect purchaser analysis is the fact that there may be multiple 
supply chains. To illustrate, Pioneer Foods might sell directly to some retailers and indirectly to 
others. Alternatively, an analysis of pass-on effect along the supply chain will depend at each step 
on the extent to which the relevant market or markets are or are not competitive, and if not 
competitive, the nature of the strategic interaction among the competitors. These complicating 
factors increase the likelihood that the price reduction benefits to be recovered by downstream 
customers will vary from individual to individual. 
Figure 5-4: Average wholesale and retail prices for Pioneer Foods’ standard white bread, 
06/2010 -06/2011 
 





Figure 5-5: Average wholesale and retail prices for Pioneer Foods’ standard brown bread, 
06/2010 -06/2011 
 




Discount remedies are especially appropriate in developing countries such as South Africa. The 
Pioneer Foods discount remedy was designed to address the negative impact of anticompetitive 
conduct:  
 The discount remedy was amounted to a total price reduction of R160 million;  
 It was applied to selected flour and bread products; 
 Certain products with existing low margins were excluded; and  
 The discount remedy only applied to one firm; and  
The discount remedy provided for an opportunity to redress the anticompetitive environment 
created by long-running bread and flour cartels that may not be addressed solely by 
administrative penalties (see Bonakele and Mncube (2012)). The discount remedy sought to 
constrain Pioneer Foods, compensate, and disgorge some of its profits to the benefit of affected 
consumers and improve the competitive dynamics of the relevant markets. The Pioneer Foods 
discount remedy constitutes a key measure of ‘success’ for the cartel case (s). 
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South Africa is a net importer of wheat. Prior to the implementation of the Pioneer Foods 
discount remedy, the wheat price had been increasing steadily impacting on the price of flour and 
bread. During the discount remedy period, wheat prices continued to show an upward trajectory. 
This, however, was not translated into increased bread prices. South Africa was shielded from 
higher bread prices, in part because of the Pioneer Foods discount remedy, albeit temporarily 
during the discount remedy period. After the discount remedy period, prices of bread increased 
sharply. Note as well that the cartel price increasing effects identified in Essay 3 relate to different 
time period and are not in tension with this conclusion of the considerable success of the discount 
remedy during the remedy period. 
Still, for many, qualms will remain about allowing competition authorities to use discount 
remedies for competition law violations. But the deeper source of those qualms is not really that 
alternative remedies are better placed. Instead, the qualms are more about whether competition 
authorities and firms might abuse discount remedies rather than employ them optimally. 
Furthermore, the qualms represent some underlying insecurity about whether discount remedies 
are really permissible in competition law. Indeed, the National Treasury made an application to 
intervene in the Tribunal questioning the Pioneer Foods settlement agreement’s validity and the 
Commission’s authority to conclude it. Be that as it may, there are, of course, different choices 
that can be made and combined in order to affect the incentives of firms and restore the best 
possible outcome for competition in specific relevant markets.181  
 
  
                                                          
181 For example, one could develop remedies that affect the discretion of firms to run their business. In other words, 
develop remedies that affect their autonomy as market participants and consequently their incentives. This could be 
conceived as a continuum ranging from preserving some degree of discretion for the firms (in the case of contractual 











I. SELECTED COUPON DISCOUNT SETTLEMENTS 
 















coupon 30 5 years fixed $ off 
USA 1990 Superior 
Containers 
Firms cash & 
coupon 
70 3 months fixed $ off 
USA 1992 Bulk Popcorn Firms cash & 
coupon 
4 1 year fixed $ off 
USA 1994 Domestic Air 
Transport 
Consumers cash & 
coupon 
408 3 years fixed $ off 
USA 1998 Residential 
Doors 
Firms cash & 
coupon 
2 15 months fixed $ off 
USA 2000 Motorsports 
Merchandise 
Consumers cash & 
coupon 

































South African competition authorities are subject to two types of constraints: (1) limited resources 
and (2) imperfect information. Limited resources constrain, for example, the Commission’s 
ability to monitor all the markets and investigate all the firms suspected of engaging in 
anticompetitive conduct including colluding. The second constraint relates to the fact that the 
Commission cannot perfectly observe the characteristics and behaviour of the firms. This 
asymmetry of information is the source of adverse selection and moral hazard problems that 
reduce the Commission’s efficiency and impact. Give the limitations faced by competition 
authorities, concerns about the relationship between the errors and the enforcement of 
competition rules has been a mainstream consideration in competition policy discourse in last 2 
decades.182  
In light of the above and to improve decision making, the error-cost framework is an important 
innovation in this regard. The framework makes the following assumptions: First, both Type I 
(false positive, where innocent firms are sanctioned or subject to significant costs imposed by 
investigations and litigation) and Type II (false negative, where violators are not sanctioned) 
errors are inevitable in competition law cases because of difficulties in distinguishing pro-
competitive business practices from anticompetitive behaviour. Second, the social costs 
associated with Type I errors are generally greater than the social costs of Type II errors because 
market forces can be expected to offer some correction with respect of Type II errors. Third, 
optimal competition policy rules will minimise the expected sum of errors costs subject to the 
constraint that the rules be relatively simple and reasonable administrable. As a result, the error 
cost framework gives rise to a number of simple filters that can be used to minimise error costs. 
This framework is similar to a Bayesian decision making framework which addresses problems of 
decision making under uncertainty.183 
According to Kaplow (2011), to determine an optimal regime for enforcing the rule against 
collusion requires attention to three factors: (1) the social objective, (2) the problem of detection 
and (3) the design of appropriate remedies. In South Africa, the purpose of the rule prohibiting 
firms from entering into agreements not to compete with one another is to deter such behaviour. 
This arises from concerns about the static effects such as allocative inefficiency and transfers 
                                                          
182 This follows the influential contribution by Easterbrook (1986) on this subject.  
183  Applying the Bayesian approach, the competition authority holds an earlier belief about the likelihood that a 
particular business practice is anticompetitive. With case specific information or new evidence as the theoretical and 
empirical understanding of the practices evolves, earlier beliefs are updated. The optimal decision rule is then based on 
new, updated likelihood that the practice will be anticompetitive by minimising a loss function measuring the social 
cost of Type 1 and Type II errors. 
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from consumers to producers as well as the dynamic effects such as inducing excessive entry in 
homogeneous goods industries. In other words, suppose firms have engaged in collusive 
behaviour, the primary benefit for enforcing the rule against collusion is deterrence. This means 
that the social benefit is from collusion occurring less often. The prospect of remedies will also 
deter collusion. Therefore, the social cost of false negatives is in the loss of deterrence. On the 
other hand, suppose the rule against collusion is enforced on firms that have not engaged in 
collusive behaviour. In this situation, sanctions imposed may chill beneficial business practices 
because firms anticipate that their conduct may generate a substantial risk of false positives.  
While detection of successful collusion is inevitable imperfect, there are a number ways to detect 
collusion and these should be ideally considered in combination. For example, collusion could be 
detected through corporate leniency programmes and market based evidence, notably pricing 
patterns, the use of facilitating practices and market structure factors. However, because of 
difficulties with detecting collusion, it is not easy to achieve effective deterrence, even in the 
presence of tough enforcement in terms of both overall effort and the level of sanctions.  
The analysis of competition law remedies generally focuses on fines because monetary sanctions 
are mostly used. They also tend to be the most efficient sanction to the extent feasible subject to 
the limit of a firm’s assets. In order to deter collusion, remedies should reflect harm. Competition 
law remedies in South Africa do not reflect this prescription very well. 184  The Competition 
Amendment Act introduces imprisonment as a helpful supplement in achieving deterrence.185  
There are a number of lessons to draw from this study. First, consider the potential consumer 
welfare effects of collusion. The cartels significantly raised prices for several years. These price 
increases were on staple foods (maize meal and bread as well as wheat flour, a key input to bread) 
which means that poor consumers were hurt the most. This clearly undermined the food security 
and threatened the livelihoods of the most vulnerable by eroding their already limited purchasing 
power.  
The quantification of cartel overcharges may be required in both public and private enforcement 
of competition laws. In public enforcement, cartel overcharges may be quantified as part of the 
decision by a competition authority what fine to impose. In private enforcement, the 
quantification of cartel overcharges is the central issue to a damages claim. It is impossible to 
                                                          
184 For instance, collusion cases that exhibit small price elevations are more likely to involve false positives and thus 
generate chilling costs, and hence moderating expected sanctions is valuable and less social cost from forgone 
deterrence results. 
185
 However, the imprisonment of individuals found in violation of the rule against collusion is also socially costly. 
Resources are consumed in running the system. There is also an open question as to whether the loss to imprisoned 
individuals is matched by any direct social offset. 
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know with certainty how for example the flour market would have evolved in the absence of the 
collusive behaviour. Therefore, the calculation of overcharges is subject to considerable limits as 
to the degree of certainty and precision. There is no a single ‘true’ value of the overcharge 
suffered that can be determined, but only best estimates relying on assumptions and 
approximations. While admittedly, estimations of overcharges are subject to assumptions. 
However, that the estimation methods are imperfect is however not a reason to discard them. Best 
practice suggests that whenever used, one should assess the results of each approach in light of its 
limitation, perform a sensitivity analysis to assess the robustness of the results and reconcile with 
more direct evidence available (for instance, internal documents of the cartelists on agreed price 
increases).  
The cartel cases in the grain industry give us several insights into firm behaviour and follow-on 
policy implications. Access to markets is actively limited by the cartels (or at least such attempts 
are made through strategic behaviour), using artificial barriers. Cartels need to exclude entrants 
simple because firms who face numerous rivals are constrained in their incentive and ability to 
coordinate. Historically, cartels have used a variety of different techniques to block entry. These 
include the threat of predatory price wars. The story behind predatory pricing by a cartel is that a 
new entrant decides to enter and gain market share by undercutting the cartel pricing equilibrium. 
Either all firms together or a few alone respond by engaging in a price war until the new entrant 
relents and is either accommodated into the cartel or exits. Generally, in oligopoly industries 
raising prices after a predatory price war does not only require discouraging entry, but also 
requires discouraging competition from other competitors.  
This study shows that cartel investigations do not discuss whether the cartel engaged in activities 
to block entry because such evidence is not necessary for conviction, especially so in South 
Africa where price fixing is per se illegal. But undermining barriers, especially those erected by 
cartels is an important part of competition policy.  
In addition, this study shows that significant industry restructuring (such as the liberalisation, 
ushered in by the first democratic government) led to the break-up of regulated cartels, yet there 
was no attempt or provision actively monitor and to see if competition was being preserved post 
the restructuring. Liberalisation alone, without vigorous anti-cartel enforcement, may give rise to 
increasing cartel activity rather than competition. In the grain industry, liberalisation may have 
inadvertently, by increasing competition in formerly protected markets, increased the incentives 
for firms to participate in cartels. 
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Since its adoption, the CLP has proved a formidable tool for cartel detection. The uncovering of 
the bread, flour and maize meal cartels through the CLP illustrates that the detection of one cartel 
may often lead to the detection of other cartels. Yet, the greatest challenge for the CLP will be the 
introduction of criminal sanctions pursuant to the Competition Amendment Act. Provision is also 
made for the Commission to certify firms and individuals subject to criminal liability as deserving 
of leniency. The Commission may also make submissions to the National Prosecuting Authority 
(“NPA”), however, the NPA will have the responsibility for prosecuting individuals committing a 
criminal offence under the Competition Amendment Act and may or may not the support the 
granting of leniency. The Competition Amendment Act will create a new legal environment for 
cartel enforcement through the co-existence of a criminal law regime and a civil law regime. 
This poses important questions for the future. Will criminalisation have an adverse effect on the 
CLP? How much of what types of evidence in various contexts will be sufficient for a finding of 
liability? But as in any discussion of collusion, it is easier to ask questions than to find answers. 
Perhaps it is time for a wholesale rethinking. No doubt future studies of collusive behaviour may 
have many explanations and many distinct outcomes. This study seeks to provide a systematic, 
ground up and case study driven analysis of collusion and to advance our understating on many 
subsidiary questions on collusion in South Africa to the extent possible. 
In summary, to understand collusion, economics offers a standard model. According to the 
standard model, the goal of a cartel is to raise prices, determine output and maximise joint profits 
for the cartel members. While industry profits may be maximised by adherence to the cartel 
agreement, individual firms have an incentive to cheat because individual firm profits may be 
maximised by cheating. Consequently, to be effective the cartel must have a credible punishment 
mechanism to timely detect and punish cheating cartel members. But when collusive agreements 
are examined in detail as has been done in this study, it is without doubt that collusive agreements 
do not always conform to the standard textbook or even sophisticated game theoretic models. 
This fact complicates the task of competition authorities and muddies both legal and economic 
theory. However, it clearly illustrates why a case by case analysis is indispensable to our 







Abreu, D (1986), External equilibria of oligopolistic super games, Journal of Economic Theory 
39 (1): 191-225. 
Andreu, E., J. Padilla and N., Watson (2011), Assessing damages in (Input) price fixing cases, 
Essay prepared for presentation at the Concurrences’ conference “New Frontiers of Antitrust”, 
Paris, 11 February 2011. 
Aproskie, J and S. Goga (2011), Administrative penalties – impact and alternatives, Journal of 
Economic and Financial Sciences 4(S):113-146. 
Areeda, P. and D. Turner (1975), Predatory pricing and related practices under section 2 of the 
Sherman Act, Harvard Law Review 88 (4): 697-733. 
Asker, J (2010), A study of the internal organization of a bidding cartel, American Economic 
Review 100 (3): 724-762. 
Aubert, C., Kovacic, W. and P. Rey (2005), The impact of leniency and whistleblowing programs 
on cartels, International Journal of Industrial Organization 24 (6): 1241-1266. 
Aw, B.Y (1993), Price discrimination and mark ups in export markets, Journal of Development 
Economics 42 (2): 315-336. 
Baker, J. B., and D. L. Rubinfeld (1999), Empirical methods in antitrust litigation: Review and 
critique, American Law and Economics Review 1(1): 386-435. 
Basso, L. and T. Ross (2010), Measuring the true harm from price-fixing to both direct and 
indirect purchasers, Journal of Industrial Economics 58 (4): 895-927. 
Beniot, J-P (1984), Financially constrained entry in a game with incomplete information, RAND 
Journal of Economics, 15 (4): 490-499. 
Bertrand, J (1883), Théorie mathématique de la richesse sociale, Journal des Savants, 67: 499-
508. 
Bernheim, B.D. and M. Whinston (1990), Multimarket contact and collusive behaviour, RAND  
Journal of Economics 21(1):1-26. 
Bizjak, J.M., and J.L. Coles (1995), The effect of private antitrust litigation on the stock market 
valuation of the firm, American Economic Review 85 (3): 436-459. 
Bolotova, Y., J. Connor, and D. Miller (2008), The impact of collusion on pricing dynamics: 
Empirical evidence from two recent cases, International Journal of Industrial Organization 26 (6): 
1290-1307.  
Bolton, P., J. Brodley and M. Riordan (2000), Predatory pricing: Strategic theory and legal 
policy, Georgetown Law Journal 88(8): 2239-2330. 
156 
 
Bolton, P. and D. Scharfstein (1990), A Theory of predation based on agency problems in 
financial contracting, American Economic Review 80(1): 93-106. 
Bonakele, T., and L. Mncube (2012), Designing appropriate remedies for competition law 
enforcement: The Pioneer Foods settlement agreement, Journal of Competition Law and 
Economics 8 (2): 425-447. 
Bork, R. H., and G. Sidak (2013), The misuse of profit margins to infer market power, Journal of 
Competition Law and Economics 9 (3): 511-530. 
Borenstein, S (1996), Settling for coupons: Discount contracts as compensation and punishment 
in antitrust lawsuits, Journal of Law and Economics 39(2): 379-404. 
Bowley, A (1924), The mathematical groundwork of economics, Oxford University Press: 
Oxford. 
Bresnahan, T. F (1981), Duopoly models with consistent conjectures’, American Economic 
Review 71(5): 934-945. 
Bresnahan, T. F (1982), The oligopoly solution concept is identified’, Economics Letters 10(1-2): 
87-92. 
Bresnahan, T. F (1989), Empirical studies of industries with market power, In Schmalensee, R., 
Willig, R., (Eds.), Handbook of Industrial Organization 2(17): 1011-1057. 
Brock, W. and J. Scheinkman (1985), Price setting super-games with capacity constraints, 
Review of Economic Studies 52(3): 371-382. 
Cabral, L. and M. Riordan (1994), The learning curve, market dominance, and predatory pricing, 
Econometrica 62(5): 1115-1140. 
Cabral, L. and M. Riordan (1997), The learning curve, predation, antitrust, and welfare, Journal 
of Industrial Economics 45(2): 155-169. 
Clay, K. and W. Troesken (2003), Further tests of static oligopoly models - whiskey, 1882-1898, 
Journal of Industrial Economics 51(2): 151-166. 
Cohen, M.A. and D.T. Scheffman (1989), The antitrust sentencing guidelines: Is the punishment 
worth the costs? Journal of Criminal Law 27 (2): 331-366. 
Combe, E., C. Monnier, and R. Legal (2008), Cartels: The probability of getting caught in the 
European Union, Working Paper PRISM-Sorbonne, Paris.  
Connor, J.M (2001), Global price fixing: Our customers are the enemy, Boston, MA, Kluwer 
Academic. 
Connor, J.M (2004), Global antitrust prosecutions of modern international cartels, Journal of 
Industry, Competition and Trade 4(3): 239-267. 
Connor, J. M. and R. H. Lande (2005), How high do cartels raise prices? Implications for reform 
of the antitrust sentencing guidelines, Tulane Law Review 80(4): 513-570. 
157 
 
Connor, J.M. and Y. Bolotova (2006), A meta-analysis of cartel overcharges, International 
Journal of Industrial Organization 24 (6): 1109 -1137. 
Connor, J.M. and R. H. Lande (2006), The size of cartel overcharges, Antitrust Bulletin 51(4): 
983-1022.  
Connor, J. M (2007), Forensic economics: An introduction with special emphasis on price fixing. 
Journal of Competition Law and Economics 4(1): 31-39 
Connor, J. M. and R. H. Lande (2007), Cartel overcharges: Implications for U.S. and EU fining 
policies, Antitrust Bulletin 51(4): 983-1022. 
Corts, K.S (1999), Conduct parameters and the measurement of market power, Journal of 
Econometrics 88(2): 227-250. 
Cournot, A (1838), Recherches sur les Principes Mathématiques de la Théorie des Richesses, 
Paris: Hachette. 
Cutts, M. and J. Kirsten (2006), Asymmetric price transmission and market concentration: An 
investigation into four South African agro-food industries, South African Journal of Economics 
74(2): 323-333. 
Davis, P. and E. Garcés (2009), Quantitative techniques for competition and antitrust analysis, 
Princeton University Press 
Deneckere, R (1983), Duopoly super-games with product differentiation, Economics Letters 
11(1): 37-42. 
de Roos, N (2006), Examining models of collusion: The market for Lysine, International Journal 
of Industrial Organization 24(6): 1083 -107. 
de Vanssay, X. and C. Erutku (2011), Damage at the pump: Does punishment fit the crime? 
Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade 11(4): 351–367. 
Easterbrook, F (1981), Predatory strategies and counterstrategies, University of Chicago Law 
Review 48 (2): 263-337. 
Easterbrook, F (1986), Workable antitrust policy, Michigan Law Review, 84 (August): 1696–
1713. 
Economides, N and I. Lianos (2010), The quest for appropriate remedies in the EC Microsoft 
cases: a comparative appraisal, in: Rubini, L. ed(s). Microsoft on Trial: legal and economic 
analysis of a transatlantic antitrust case. Cheltenham, E Elgar.  
Economides, N. and I. Lianos (2010), A critical appraisal of remedies in the EU Microsoft cases, 
Columbia Business Law Review 10(2):346-420. 
Ehmer, C. and F. Rosati (2009), Science, myth and fines: Do cartels typically raise prices by 
20%? Concurrences- Law and Economics Number 4-2009. 
Elhauge, E (2008), Disgorgement as an antitrust remedy, Harvard Law School John M. Olin 
Center for Law, Economics and Business Discussion Paper Series, Paper 613. 
158 
 
Ellison, G (1994), Theories of cartel stability and the Joint Executive Committee, RAND Journal 
of Economics 25 (1): 37-57.  
Elzinga, K (1970), Predatory pricing: The case of the Gunpowder Trust, Journal of Law and 
Economics 13(1): 223-240. 
European Commission (2009), Quantifying antitrust damages, Towards non-binding guidance for 
Courts, Study prepared by Oxera. 
European Commission (2011) Draft Guidance Paper on Quantifying Harm in Actions for 
Damages Based on Breaches of Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, June 
Evans, D. and A. J. Padilla (2005), Designing antitrust rules for assessing unilateral practices: A 
Neo-Chicago approach, University of Chicago Law Review 72 (1): 73-98. 
Finkelstein, M., and H. Levenbach (1983), Regression estimates of damages in price-fixing cases, 
Law and Contemporary Problems 46(4): 145-169. 
Frey, G., and M. Manera (2007), Econometric models of asymmetric price transmission, Journal 
of Economic Surveys, 21(2): 349-415. 
Forrester, I. S (2004), Article 82: Remedies in search of theories?, in International Antitrust Law 
and Policy, Fordham Corporate Law Institute, (B. Hawk, ed.) 
Fox, E (2005), Remedies and the courage of convictions in a globalized world: How globalization 
corrupts relief, Tulane Law Review 80 (2): 571-594. 
Friederiszick, H., and L.-H. Röller (2010), Quantification of harm in damages actions for antitrust 
infringements: Insights from German Cartel cases, Journal of Competition Law and Economics 6 
(3): 595-618.  
Friedman, J (1971), A non-cooperative equilibrium for super-games, Review of Economic 
Studies 38(1):1-12. 
Friedman, J.W. and J. F. Thisse (1994), Sustainable collusion in oligopoly with free entry, 
European Economic Review 38(2): 271-283. 
Fudenberg, D. and J.Tirole (1986), A “signal-jamming” theory of predation, RAND Journal of 
Economics 17 (3): 366-376. 
Fumagalli, C and M. Motta (2009), A simple theory of predation, FEEM Discussion Paper No. 
15.2009. 
Genesove, D. and W. P. Mullin (1998), Testing static oligopoly models: conduct and cost in the 
sugar industry, 1890-1914, Rand Journal of Economics 29(2): 355-377. 
Genesove, D., and W. Mullin (2001), Rules, communication and collusion: Narrative evidence 
from the Sugar Institute case, American Economic Review 91(3): 379 - 398. 
Genesove, D. and W. P. Mullin (2006), Predation and its rate of return: The sugar industry: 1887-
1914, RAND Journal of Economics 37 (2): 47-69. 
159 
 
Goldberger, A. S (1991), A course in econometrics, Harvard University Press 
Gollop, F. M. and M. J. Roberts (1979), Firm interdependence in oligopolistic markets, Journal of 
Econometrics 10(3): 313-331. 
Gomez, R. J. Goeree and C. Holt (2008), Predatory pricing: Rare like a unicorn? in C. Plott and 
V. Smith (eds) Handbook of Experimental Economics Results. 
Gramlich, F (1986), Scrip damages in antitrust cases, Antitrust Bulletin 31 (1): 261-85. 
Gramlich, F (2003), Coupon remedies in antitrust Cases: The form of the discount also matters, 
Discussion Paper EAG 03-3, Economic Analysis Group, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of 
Justice 
Green, E. J. and R. H. Porter (1984), Noncooperative collusion under imperfect price information, 
Econometrica 52(1): 87-100. 
Groenewald, J. A (1964), The effects on national economic welfare of economic interference in 
favour of agriculture, South African Journal of Economics 32(2): 283-293. 
Harrington, J (1984), Noncooperative behavior by a cartel as an entry-deterring signal, RAND 
Journal of Economics 15(3): 426-433. 
Harrington, J (1989), Collusion and predation under (Almost) free entry, International Journal of 
Industrial Organization 7(3): 381-401. 
Harrington, J (2004a), Post-cartel pricing during litigation, Journal of Industrial Economics  
52 (4): 517-533.  
Harrington, J (2004b), Cartel pricing dynamics in the presence of an antitrust authority, RAND 
Journal of Economics 35 (4): 651-673.  
Harrington, J (2005), Optimal cartel pricing in the presence of an antitrust authority, International 
Economic Review 46 (1):145-169. 
Harrington, J (2008), Detecting Cartels, In Buccirossi, P. (Eds), Handbook of antitrust economics, 
MIT Press, 213-258 
Harrison, G (1988), Predatory pricing in a multiple market experiment: A note, Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization 9 (4): 405-417. 
Isaac, R. M., and V. Smith (1985), In search of predatory pricing, Journal of Political Economy, 
93 (2): 320-345. 
Iwata, G (1974), Measurement of conjectural variations in oligopoly, Econometrica 42(5): 947-
966. 
Lianos, I (2010), Is the availability of “appropriate” remedies a limit to competition law liability 
under Article 102 TFEU? The mischiefs of “discretionary remedialism” in competition law , in F. 
Etro & I. Kokkoris (ed.), Competition Law and the Enforcement of Article 82 , Oxford University 
Press, pp. 165-202. 
160 
 
Jenny, F (2009) Optimal Antitrust Enforcement: From Theory to Policy Options in I. Lianos and 
I. Kokkoris, The Reform of European Competition Law: New Challenges (The Hague: Kluwer, 
2009). 
Kaplow, L (2011), An economic approach to price fixing, Antitrust Law Journal 77(3): 343-449.  
Kaplow, L. and C Shapiro (2007) Antitrust, in Handbook of Law and Economics (Polinsky & 
Shavell, eds.; Elsevier), vol 2, 1072-1225.  
Kim, D-W. and C.R. Knittel (2006), Biases in static oligopoly models? evidence from the 
California electricity market, Journal of Industrial Economics 54(4): 451-470. 
Klimchuk, D (2003), On the autonomy of corrective justice, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
23(1): 49-64. 
Kobayashi, B (2010, The law and economics of predatory pricing, in Antitrust Law and 
Economics, Keith N. Hylton (ed.) Edward Elgar, pp. 116–56. 
Koller, R (1971), The myth of predatory pricing: An empirical study, Antitrust Law and 
Economics Review 4 (4): 105-123. 
Kreps, D. and R. Wilson (1982), Reputation and Imperfect Information, Journal of Economic 
Theory 27 (2): 253-79. 
Kuhn, K-U. and Vives, X. (1995), Information exchanges among firms and their Impact on 
Competition, Luxemburg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. 
Lau, L.J (1982), On identifying the degree of competitiveness from industry price and output 
data, Economics Letters 10(1-2): 93-99. 
Leslie, C. R (2002), A market-based approach to coupon settlements in antitrust and consumer 
class action litigation, UCLA Law Review 49(2): 991-1098. 
Levenstein, M. and V. Suslow (2004), What determines cartel success?, in Peter Z. Grossman, 
ed., How Cartels Endure and How They Fail: Studies of Industrial Collusion, Cheltenham, UK, 
Edward Elgar. 
Levenstein, M. and V. Suslow (2006), What determines cartel success?, Journal of Economic 
Literature 44 (1): 43-95.  
Lianos, I., and N. Economides (2010), The quest for appropriate remedies in the Microsoft 
antitrust EU cases: A comparative appraisal, in L. Rubini (ed.), Microsoft on Trial: Legal and 
Economic Analysis of a Transatlantic Antitrust Case, Edward Elgar, pp. 393-463 
Lianos, I (2011), Competition law remedies: In search of a theory, Law and Governance in 
Europe Working Paper Series,  
Lin, C.-Y. C (2005), Estimating annual and monthly supply and demand for world oil: A dry 
hole? In Hogan, W.W. (Eds.), Repsol YPF – Harvard Kennedy School Fellows 2003-2004 
Research Papers, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 213-249. 
161 
 
Mankiw, N.G. and M.D. Whinston (1986), Free entry and social inefficiency, RAND Journal of 
Economics 17(1): 48-58. 
Marx, L. and G. Shaffer (1999), Predatory accommodation: Below-cost pricing without exclusion 
in intermediate goods markets, RAND Journal of Economics 30(1): 22-43. 
McCrary, J. and D.L. Rubinfeld (2011), Measuring benchmark damages in antitrust litigation, 
NBER Working Paper. 
McGee, J (1958), Predatory price cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) case, Journal of Law and 
Economics 1(1): 137-169. 
Meyer, J. and S. von Cramon-Taubadel (2004), Asymmetric Price Transmission: A Survey, 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 55(3): 581-611. 
Meyer, F. and J. Kirsten (2005), Modelling the wheat sector in South Africa, Agrekon 44(2): 225-
237. 
Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts (1982a), Limit pricing and entry under incomplete information, 
Econometrica 50(2): 443-59. 
Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts (1982b), Predation, reputation and entry deterrence, Journal of 
Economic Theory 27 (2): 280-312. 
Miller, G. P. and L.S. Singer (1997), Nonpecuniary class action settlements, Law and 
Contemporary Problems 60(1): 97-154. 
Mncube, L (2013), Strategic entry deterrence: Pioneer Foods and the bread cartel, Journal of 
Competition Law and Economics 9 (3): 637-654. 
Mncube, L and Ngwenya, A., (2011), ‘South Africa's Pioneer Settlement in Bread and Milling: 
An Innovative Way to Remedy Competition Law Violations in Developing Countries.’ Paper 
presented at The Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics (ACLE) annual Competition & 
Regulation Meeting, Amsterdam, May 2011. 
Modak-Truran, M., (2000), Corrective justice and the revival of judicial virtue, Yale Journal of 
Law and Humanities 12(2): 249-298. 
Motta, M. and M. Polo (2003), Leniency programs and cartel prosecution, International Journal 
of Industrial Organization 21(3): 347:379. 
Motta, M (2004), Competition Policy: Theory and Practice. Cambridge University Press. 
Motta, M (2008), On cartel deterrence and fines in the European Union, European Competition 
Law Review 29(4): 209-220. 
Mueller, W.F. and R. C. Parker (1992), Bakers of Washington cartel: Twenty-five years later, 
Review of Industrial Organization 7(1): 75-82. 
Nieberding, J (2006), Estimating overcharges in antitrust cases using a reduced-form approach: 
Methods and issues, Journal of Applied Economics 9(2): 361-380. 
162 
 
Normann, H. T (2007), Experimental Economics for Antitrust Law and Policy, in W. Collins 
(ed.) Issues in Competition Law and Policy, American Bar Association Book Series. 
Ordover, J. and G. Saloner (1989), Predation, monopolization, and antitrust, in R. Schmalensee 
and R. D. Willig, (eds), Handbook of Industrial Organization, 1, pp. 538-596 North-Holland. 
OECD (2002), Fighting hard-core cartels: harm, effective sanctions and leniency programmes, 
OECD Publishing. 
OECD (2003) Hard Core Cartels: Recent Progress and Challenges Ahead OECD Publishing.. 
OECD (2007) Remedies and Sanctions in Abuse of Dominance Cases, OECD Publishing. 
Office of Fair Trading (2011) Conjectural Variations and Competition Policy: Theory and 
Empirical Techniques, A Report for the OFT by RBB Economics, October 
Plott, C (1989), An Updated Review of Industrial Organization: Applications of Experimental 
Methods, in, R. Schmalensee and R. D. Willig, (eds), Handbook of Industrial Organization, 2, pp. 
1109-1176 North-Holland. 
Pitofsky, R (2002), Antitrust at the turn of the twenty-first century: The matter of remedies’ 
Georgia Law Journal 91: 169-170. 
Polinsky, M., and D. L. Rubinfeld (1989), A note on optimal public enforcement with settlements 
and litigation costs, Research in Law and Economics 12(1): 1-8 
Polinsky, A. M. and D. L. Rubinfeld (2007), A damage-revelation rationale for coupon remedies,’ 
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 23(3): 653-661. 
Polinsky, A. M. and D. L. Rubinfeld (2008), The Deadweight Loss of Coupon Remedies for Price 
Overcharges, Journal Industrial Economics 56(2): 402- 417. 
Porter, R (1983), A study of cartel stability: The Joint Executive Committee, 1880-1886, Bell 
Journal of Economics 14 (2): 301-314.  
Porter, R., and J. Zona (1999), Ohio school markets: An analysis of bidding, RAND Journal of 
Economics 30 (2): 263-288.  
Posner, R.A (1969), Oligopoly and the antitrust laws: A suggested approach, Stanford Law 
Review 21(6):1562-1606.  
Posner, R.A (2001), Antitrust Law, 2nd ed. (University of Chicago Press, Chicago). 
Posner, R.A (2002), Economic Analysis of Law, 6th Ed., Aspen Publishers. 
Puller, S.L (2006), Estimation of competitive conduct when firms are efficiently colluding: 
Addressing the Corts critique’, Applied Economics Letters 1(15): 1497-1500. 
Raith, M (1996), A general model of information sharing in oligopoly, Journal of Economic 
Theory 71(1): 260-288. 
Raper, K.C., Love, H.A. and C.R. Shumway (2000), Determining market power exertion between 
buyers and sellers, Journal of Applied Econometrics 15 (3): 225-252. 
163 
 
Roach, R (1991), The limits of corrective justice and the potential of equity in constitutional 
remedies, Arizona Law Review 33: 859 905 
Roberts, J (1986), A signaling model of predatory pricing, Oxford Economic Papers 38 (supp.): 
75-93. 
Röller, L.-H. and F. Steen (2006), On the workings of a cartel: Evidence from the Norwegian 
Cement industries, American Economic Review 96 (1): 321-338.  
Rubinfeld, D.L (2008), Quantitative methods in antitrust, in ABA Section of Antitrust Law, 
Issues in Competition Law and Policy, volume 1:723-742 
Rubinfeld, D.L (2012), Antitrust damages, Chapter 14, in: Elhauge, E (ed.), Research Handbook 
on the Economics of Antitrust Law, Edward Elgar. 
Salvo, A (2010), Inferring market power under the threat of entry: the case of the Brazilian 
cement industry, RAND Journal of Economics 41(2): 326-350. 
Saloner, G (1987), Predation, mergers, and incomplete information, RAND Journal of Economics 
18 (2): 165-186. 
Scharfstein, D (1984), A policy to prevent rational test-market predation, RAND Journal of 
Economics 15 (2): 229-243. 
Schmalensee, R (1987), Competitive advantage and collusive Optima, International Journal of 
industrial organisation 5(4): 351-367. 
Scott Morton, F (1997), Entry and predation: British shipping cartels 1879-1929, Journal of 
Economics and Management Strategy 6 (4): 679-724. 
Selten, R. (1978), The Chain Store Paradox, Theory and Decision, 9 (2), 127-59. 
Shapiro, C (1989), Theories of Oligopolistic Behaviour, in Schmalensee, R. and Willig, R.D. 
(eds.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, vol. I, 329:414. 
Snyder, C (1996), Negotiation and renegotiation of optimal financial contracts under the threat of 
predation, Journal of Industrial Economics 44 (3), 325-343. 
Stigler, G (1964), A theory of oligopoly, Journal of Political Economy 55(1): 44-61. 
Telser, L (1966), Cut throat competition and the long purse, Journal of Law and Economics 9(: 
259-277. 
Tirole, J (1988), The Theory of Industrial Organization, MIT Press. 
Verboven, F (1997) ‘Collusive behaviour with heterogeneous firms’, Journal of Economic 
Behavior and Organization 33(1): 121-136. 
Verboven, F. and T. van Dijk (2009), Cartel damages claims and the passing-on defence, Journal 
of Industrial Economics 57 (3): 457-491. 
Vink N, and J. Kirsten (2000), Deregulation of agricultural marketing in South Africa: lessons 
learned. The Free Market Foundation, Monograph. 
164 
 
Vink, N (2012), The effects on national economic welfare of economic interference in favour of 
agriculture, South African Journal of Economics, 80(4): 553-566 
Vives, X (2001), Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas, New Tools (MIT Press, Cambridge). 
Weiman, D. and R. Levin (1994), Preying for monopoly? The case of Southern Bell Telephone 
Company, 1894-1912, Journal of Political Economy 102 (1): 103-126. 
Werden, G (2003), The effect of antitrust policy on consumer welfare: What Crandall and 
Winston overlook, Economic Analysis Group Working Paper, Antitrust Division. 
Whinston, M (2006), Lectures on Antitrust Economics, MIT Press. 
Wils, W. P.J (2006), Optimal antitrust fines: Theory and practice, World Competition 29(2): 183-
208. 
Wolfram, C.D (1999) Measuring duopoly power in the British electricity spot market, American 
Economic Review 89(4): 805-826. 
Yamey, B (1972), Predatory price cutting: Notes and comments, Journal of Law and Economics 
15(1): 129-142. 
Zerbe, R., Jr. and D. Cooper (1982), An empirical and theoretical comparison of alternative 
predation rules, Texas Law Review 61 (4): 655-715. 
Zerbe, R., Jr. and M. Mumford (1996), Does predatory pricing exist? Economic theory and the 
Courts after Brooke Group, Antitrust Bulletin 41: 949-985. 
Zimmer, D (2011), Consumer welfare, economic freedom and the moral quality of competition 
law – Comments on Gregory Werden and Victor Vanberg, in Competition policy and the 
Economic approach foundations and limitations, (J. Drexl, W. Kerber and R. Podszun (eds.), 






VIII. REFEREED JOURNAL TABLES OF CONTENTS FOR ALL THE PUBLISHED 
ESSAYS DURING THE COURSE OF THE STUDY 
 






























5. ESSAY FIVE – Published in Agrekon: Agricultural Economics Research, Policy 
and Practice in Southern Africa 
-  
 
 
 
